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PART A 
I. THE NETWORK FORM OF ORGANISATION 
“The merit notion that, in a free society, each individual will rise to the level justified by his or 
her competence conflicts with the observation that no one travels that road entirely alone.  
The social context within which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions  
what otherwise equally competent individuals can achieve”  
(Loury, 1977, p. 176) 
Of all the phenomena that have gripped the business world in recent years, few match the im-
pact of networks. In the ongoing evolution of the dominant organisational paradigm and mode 
of competition along the continuum of single, autonomous firms to dyadic alliances to networks 
to virtual companies, the current period is marked by a rapidly growing prevalence of the net-
work form of organisation (Parkhe, Wasserman & Ralston, 2006). Several environmental shifts 
have opened up rewarding opportunities for such interfirm cooperations – including the pro-
ceeding globalisation of markets, the rise of more technologically advanced economies, the 
convergence of and rapid shifts in technologies, as well as regulatory changes in and across 
nations (Gulati, 1995). Networks are reshaping the global business architecture. The ubiquity of 
networks, and networking, at the industry, firm, group, and individual levels has attracted sig-
nificant research attention (Parkhe et al., 2006). 
In the realm of strategic management and business administration literature, the term “network” 
often refers to long-term relations between firms, like joint ventures, R&D agreements, fran-
chising, or licensing (Gulati, 1995; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Lechner, 2001; McGee, 
Dowling & Megginson, 1995; Witt, 1999). Empirical studies have documented the dramatic 
growth of such alliances in numerous industrial sectors, the multitude of reasons why firms have 
entered into such partnerships, and the wide variety of contractual arrangements firms use to 
formalise relations (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006; 
Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Gulati, 1995; Harrigan, 1986; 1989; Lavie, 2006).  
Yet, although many researchers emphasise the functionality of “networks” for managing re-
source dependencies and fostering learning and knowledge exchange (Podolny & Page, 1998; 
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Witt, 2004), what they actually mean by the term “network” varies considerably (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). In this vein, Uzzi (1996) points out that there are different types of interfirm net-
works, and that the type in which an organisation is active determines potential effects of net-
working on performance. At one extreme, networks may be loose collections of firms (Dhanaraj 
& Parkhe, 2006); these structures resemble prototypical markets and tend to be impersonal, 
diffuse, and shifting in membership (Baker, 1990); at the other extreme, networks are finite, 
close-knit groups of firms that maintain ongoing, exclusive relationships (Uzzi, 1996). Powell 
(1990) argues that when firms have impersonal, arm’s-length relationships with each other, the 
pattern of exchange has a market-like structure; when they maintain “embedded” ties, this pat-
tern of exchange produces a network. 
The term “embeddedness”, refers to the key feature of Granovetter’s (1985; 2005) and Uzzi’s 
(1996) seminal approaches: the idea that networks can operate on a logic of exchange that dif-
fers from the logic of markets, as ongoing social ties shape actors’ expectations and opportuni-
ties in ways different from the economic logic of market behaviour. Hence, embeddedness re-
sults in outcomes not predicted by standard economic explanations. Uzzi (1996; 1997) argues 
that embeddedness can shift actors’ motivations from the narrow pursuit of immediate eco-
nomic gains towards cooperative interaction based on trust and reciprocity (Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Powell, 1990). Embedded ties allow firms to acquire resources cheaper than what could 
be obtained on markets, through market-like relationships, or by vertical integration; also, they 
allow firms to secure resources that would not be available on markets at all, like reputation or 
customer contacts. Thus, by creating economic opportunities that are difficult to replicate in any 
other organisational form (Uzzi, 1997), embeddedness in personal relationships can serve as a 
prime coping response to individual resource scarcity in the quest for competitive advantage and 
economic rents (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Goerzen, 2007; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 
2000).  
However, Uzzi (1996) further points out that “overembeddedness” can turn personal relation-
ships, although a potentially valuable asset, into a liability; for example, because of costs in-
volved in building and sustaining social ties or because acquired input is redundant or irrelevant. 
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Even though social ties can constitute an attractive means to overcome individual resource con-
straints, obviously, they are not a panacea to organisational challenges per se. 
Building on these observations, a recent stream of research applies social network theory to 
analyse interfirm relationships and examine the impact of cooperation, communication, learn-
ing, and imitation on a firm’s actions and performance (Granovetter, 2005; Hagedoorn, 2006; 
Joshi, 2006; Labianca & Brass, 2006; Lavie, 2006). Consistent with this literature, this thesis is 
based on the premise that economic explanations for entrepreneurial success are incomplete and 
undersocialized. While research on planning and management of networks has often conceptual-
ised networks as impersonal, institutional arrangements (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Furubotn 
& Pejovich, 1972; Parkhe et al., 2006; Powell, 1990) and has widely treated the “human factor” 
of organisational design implicitly (Uzzi, 1996; 1997), performance effects of network struc-
tures in fact depend on individuals who must convert organisational potential into reality.  
Following Granovetter (1985; 2005) and Uzzi (1996; 1997), this dissertation focuses on a social 
approach to network research in analysing the influence of network design on firm performance. 
First, its findings bear normative implications for the successful design of network structure and 
network member selection at the management level, that are possibly of interest to networks that 
are organised inefficiently in their present evolutional stage or that are still in formation. Sec-
ond, the findings may be of interest to current and prospective economic actors as regards the 
rewarding design of individual networking activities. The conceptual approach and the major 
literature voids that this thesis seeks to address are outlined below. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE  
1. Theoretical Background 
“Economic action is embedded in social relations which sometimes facilitate and at other 
times derail exchange […] An organization’s network position, network structure, and  
distribution of embedded exchange relationships shape performance such that  
performance reaches a threshold as embeddedness in a network increases.  
After that point, the positive effect of embeddedness reverses itself”  
(Uzzi, 1996, p. 674f.) 
So far, social networks largely represent a sociological concept (Witt, 2004). Recently, the suc-
cess of organisation networks has spawned new conjectures about the competitive advantage of 
social forms of organisation relative to market-based exchange systems (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 
2006; Hagedoorn, 2006; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Uzzi, 1996). Central to these conjectures is the 
“embeddedness” argument, which offers a potential link between sociological and economic 
accounts of business behaviour (Uzzi, 1996; 1997). 
“Embeddedness” refers to the process by which social relations shape economic action in ways 
that some mainstream economic schemes overlook or misspecify when they assume that social 
ties affect economic behaviour only minimally, or simply reduce the efficiency of the price sys-
tem (Crosby & Stephens, 1987; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). Granovetter (1985) has pointed 
out early that the “mixing of [economic and non-economic] activities” is the “‘social em-
beddedness’ of the economy” Granovetter (2005, p. 35), which relates to the extent to which 
economic action is linked to or depends on actions or institutions that are non-economic in con-
tent, goals or processes. As Granovetter has shown in seminal papers (1973; 1985), it is the 
intermixing of economic and non-economic activities where “non-economic activity affects the 
costs and the available techniques for economic activity” (Granovetter, 2005, p. 35).  
Granovetter’s (1973; 1985; 2005) idea is that much social life revolves around a non-economic 
focus. Individual actors can achieve savings when they pursue economic goals through non-
economic institutions and practices to whose costs they made little or no contribution; for ex-
ample, employers who recruit through social networks do not need to – and probably could not 
– pay to create the trust and obligations that motivate friends and relatives to help one another 
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find employment. The notion is that people often deploy resources from outside the economy to 
enjoy cost advantages in producing goods and services; such deployment resembles arbitrage in 
using resources acquired cheaply in one setting for profit generation in another. Then, social 
structure has an impact on economic outcomes (Granovetter, 2005).  
The economist Robert Gibbons (2005) gives a forward-looking interpretation of interdiscipli-
nary work in this field. He points out that sociology adds new independent variables (networks) 
to the economic (performance) equation. Thereby, social network theory can advance economic 
approaches.  
A social network is a relational structure of actors tied by social relations. Social networks form 
when individuals engage in transitive connections that integrate exchange processes in a per-
sonal context. Sociologists take individual persons as the nodes of the network and investigate 
communication or information flows along ties among these persons (Bavelas, 1948; Freeman, 
1978/79; Granovetter, 1973; Witt, 2004). Whenever the person under survey has more than one 
contact, researchers can speak of a “network” (Witt, 2004).  
Sociological approaches to network theory have a varied and an impressive lineage, including 
the sociometry of small groups (Moreno, 1934), the psychology of sentiments (Heider, 1946), 
cultural anthropology (Nadel, 1957), and graph theoretic mathematics (Harary, 1959); building 
on this interdisciplinary foundation, researchers have made major theoretical and empirical con-
tributions (e.g. Brass, 1984; Burt, 1992; 2000; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Krackhardt, 1990; Madhavan, Koka & Prescott, 1998; Podolny, 
2001; Powell, 1990; Rodan & Galunic, 2004; Uzzi, 1996; 1997) as well as methodological 
breakthroughs (Carrington, Scott & Wasserman, 2004; Parkhe et al., 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). Sociologists have developed core principles about the interactions of social structure, 
information flow, ability to punish or reward, and trust creation that recur in their analyses of 
political, economic and other institutions (Granovetter, 2005).  
Based on sociological insights, a recent stream of research applies social network theory to the 
study of interorganisational relationships (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Hagedoorn, 2006; Joshi, 
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2006; Labianca & Brass, 2006; Lavie, 2006; Nohria, 1992). This growing body of research 
criticises theories that explain firm strategies and performance exclusively on the basis of uni-
lateral immediate profit-seeking behaviour in competition-oriented environments (Granovetter, 
1985; Gulati, 1995; Lavie, 2006; Nohria, 1992). Instead, social network research examines im-
pacts of cooperation, communication, learning, and imitation, based on the thinking that indi-
viduals can interact in personal relationships that include trust and reciprocity. 
Concerning trust, Granovetter (2005) argues that the confidence that others will do the “right 
thing” despite clear incentives to the contrary, emerges, if it does at all, in the context of a social 
network. Trust reduces transactional uncertainty and creates opportunities for exchange that is 
difficult to price or enforce contractually. Concerning reciprocity, social network logic implies 
that cooperation is not only based on mutual advantage, but that embeddedness tends to move 
individuals from self-seeking actors towards becoming members of a community with (some) 
common interests, a shared identity, and a commitment to a common goal (similar, Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). As Putnam (1993, p. 182f.) explains, the idea of reciprocity is not “I’ll do this for 
you, because you are more powerful than I”, nor “I’ll do this for you now, if you do that for me 
now,” but rather “I’ll do this for you now, knowing that somewhere down the road you’ll do 
something for me”.  
Accordingly, Larson (1992) observes that “thicker” information on strategic actions, know-how 
in production, and profit margins is transferred through interfirm embedded ties, thereby pro-
moting learning in ways that arm’s length exchange cannot. Lazerson (1995) reports that suc-
cessful entrepreneurial business networks are defined by coordination devices that promote 
knowledge transfer and learning; Romo and Schwartz (1995) find that embedded actors in re-
gional networks satisfice rather than maximise on price, and that they shift their focus from the 
narrow economically rational goal of winning immediate gain and exploiting others’ depend-
ency to cultivating cooperative ties (Uzzi, 1997). Uzzi and Gillespie’s (2002) analysis shows 
that firms that embed their commercial bank exchanges in social attachments establish noncon-
tractual governance arrangements of trust and reciprocity that facilitate the transfer of distinctive 
resources, like fiscal expertise, supplier referrals, and credit. Uzzi and Lancaster (2004) estab-
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lish that embedded relationships between U.S. law firms and their respective clients decrease 
prices asked from these clients, as embedded ties lower transaction costs and at the same time, 
engender motivation to share these cost savings mutually rather than self-servingly gain all the 
additional benefits. Nebus (2006) points out that when individuals use social ties to other per-
sons for acquiring advice, they do so with an unwritten but understood promise of future service 
for the knowledge obtained in mind. 
As regards economic effects of such relationships, the so-called “network success hypothesis” 
assumes a positive relation between the networking activities of actors and their performance 
(Witt, 2004). The premise is that networks are the opportunity structures through which actors 
obtain input that promotes identifying and exploiting economic opportunities (Low & Abraham-
son, 1999). Accordingly, research emphasises the importance of social ties for business success 
because of the “social capital” inherent in social networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002).1  
Social scientists have offered a number of definitions of “social capital”. Yet, the concept is still 
in an emerging phase, comprising different connotations from various scholarly perspectives 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; De Carolis & Saparito, 2006; Hirsch & Levin, 1999). Loury (1992, p. 
100) states that social capital refers to “naturally occurring social relationships among persons 
which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace”. Adler & 
Kwon (2002, p. 23ff.) put it, “Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. 
Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations. Its effects flow from the 
information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor. […] Social capital theory 
is a story about how social networks provide resources to lower-level aggregates – organisations 
within societies, units within organisations, and individuals within units – with which the lower-
level aggregates can reshape the higher-level aggregates and renegotiate their place within 
them”. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 234) argue that social capital is “the sum of the actual 
and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
                                                     
1 For the introductory part of this thesis, a social network is defined as a durable form of social capital 
that is created and maintained by social history and ongoing collective action, that is underpinned by a 
strategic orientation, a sense of common interest, and the expectation of gains (similar, Olsen, 1965). 
On differences and similarities in definitions of the “umbrella concept” of social capital, see Adler & 
Kwon, 2002. 
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relationships possessed by an individual or social unit”. Although most definitions are broadly 
similar, they vary in their focus – some definitions concentrate a) exclusively on an actor’s rela-
tions with network-external actors (“bridging” social capital), b) solely on relations among ac-
tors within a collectivity (“bonding” social capital), or c) on both (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Gittell 
& Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000).  
In general, researchers use the notion of “social capital” to refer to both the social relationships 
that exist among actors and to the assets that are mobilised through these relationships (Burt, 
1992; Gant, Ichniowski & Shaw, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 1993). Social capi-
tal has informed the study of families, education, public health, community life, democracy and 
governance, economic development, and general problems of collective action (for overviews, 
see e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002; Jackman & Miller, 1998; Woolcock, 1998); in organisation stud-
ies, too, the concept of social capital is gaining currency as a powerful factor in explaining ac-
tors’ relative success in different arenas (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
Burt (1992, p. 7) links social capital and individual performance by characterizing social capital 
as a resource that creates an advantage in “the way in which social structure renders competition 
imperfect by creating entrepreneurial opportunities for certain players and not for others” and 
brings a higher rate of return on investments. Both the entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Zimmer, 
1986; Uzzi, 1996; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997) and the social capital literature (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; De Carolis & Saparito, 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Gho-
shal, 1998) emphasise the importance of social capital as the primary link to resources necessary 
for firm survival and growth (Morse, Fowler & Lawrence, 2007). Social capital can enhance 
performance directly by providing actors with access to information, financial capital, emotional 
support, legitimacy, or competitive capabilities, and can offer indirect benefits by leveraging the 
productivity of internal resources (Florin, Lubatkin & Schulze, 2003; Stam & Elfring, 2008). 
Burt (1997, p. 359) integrates the idea of social capital in a broader context, “social capital is the 
contextual complement to human capital. Social capital predicts that returns to intelligence, 
education and seniority depend in some part on a person’s location in the social structure of a 
market or hierarchy. While human capital refers to individual ability, social capital refers to 
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opportunity. Some portion of the value a manager adds to a firm is his or her ability to coordi-
nate other people: identifying opportunities to add value within an organisation and getting the 
right people together to develop the opportunities. Know who, when, and how to coordinate is a 
function of the manager’s network of contacts within and beyond the firm. Certain network 
forms deemed social capital can enhance the manager’s ability to identify and develop opportu-
nities. Managers with more social capital get higher returns to their human capital because they 
are positioned to identify and develop more rewarding opportunities”. Coleman (1988) illus-
trates the benefit of social capital with the example of a social scientist who catches up on the 
latest research in related fields through everyday interaction with colleagues.  
That is, although the encyclopaedias of yore may largely be replaced by web surfing today, the 
modern workplace retains its social properties – for a variety of reasons, people still seek to 
supplement knowledge obtained through other means with input from a network of individuals 
(Parkhe et al., 2006). In this vein, Koza and Dant (2007, 281f.) argue, “Information should be 
viewed as an investment that one channel member makes in another […], and communication 
provides the means of transfer of knowledge between channel member firms. [Members] strive 
to put in place integrating mechanisms that enable effective interaction, hence allowing the 
greatest chance for each to succeed”. Then, embeddedness in personal relationships can serve as 
a prime coping response to individual resource scarcity, which is essential in the quest for com-
petitive advantage and economic rents (Baum et al., 2000; Gulati et al., 2000).  
Yet, research has often concentrated on beneficial effects of networking. Although early social 
exchange theorists and network researchers have considered both the positive and negative as-
pects of relationships (e.g. Homans, 1961; Tagiuri, 1958; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; White, 
1961), over the past two decades, scholars have focused very intensively on the positive aspects 
of network relationships (Labianca & Brass, 2006). As a result, dysfunctionalities and costs of
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 networking activities remain underexplored. This shortcoming in network research exacerbates 
an in-depth understanding of how collective action should be organised (Parkhe et al., 2006).2  
As De Carolis, Litzky and Eddleston (2009) point out, not all well-connected, aspiring entrepre-
neurs are able to successfully launch a business. Reasons are that on the one hand, resources 
available through relationships can be redundant or irrelevant. In this vein, Adler and Kwon 
(2002, p. 26) observe, “In life we cannot expect to derive any value from social ties to actors 
who lack the ability to help us”. On the other hand, often, relationships provide potential bene-
fits only (Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey, 1998), meaning that obtainable input – like information 
access, emotional support, or legitimacy – explains performance only to the extent that actors 
capture the economic value that it can create (Crook, Ketchen, Combs & Todd, 2008). In addi-
tion, sustaining social relations does not come at zero cost, but there are investments involved in 
building and maintaining relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Nasrallah, Levitt & Glynn, 
2003; Uzzi, 1996). Uzzi (1997) points out that “overembeddedness” can stifle effective eco-
nomic action if the social aspects of exchange supersede the economic imperatives. Coleman 
(1994, p. 302) highlights that “a given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating cer-
tain actions may be useless or even harmful for others”.  
Adler and Kwon (2002) and Lin (1999) establish that research would benefit from a more sys-
tematic assessment of risks as well as benefits of social capital to understand better the down-
sides of social relationships, both for the focal actor and for others. Therefore, they deem re-
search on the differential access to resources and the positive and negative effects of social capi-
tal a high priority: “while we understand a lot about market failures and bureaucratic failures, 
more research on the distinctive forms of social capital failure would be an important antidote to 
romantic illusions about Gemeinschaft” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 35). As social structure can 
                                                     
2 Recent exceptions are: Poppo, Zhou and Zenger (2008) who argue that long-standing embedded ties 
lack broad oversight mechanisms that interject and promote changes in response to issues of strategic 
fit or alignment; Ernst and Bamford (2005) and Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) who caution that over time, 
inter-organizational exchanges may become rigid and fail to restructure when necessary; Goerzen 
(2007) who finds that repeated partnerships are associated with lower firm performance; or Uzzi and 
Spiro (2005) who analyse the network of Broadway actors and observe that network effects can be pa-
rabolic, i.e. performance increases up to a threshold, after which point the positive effects reverse. 
Though, empirical studies examining negative effects of embedded ties on performance remain nascent 
(Poppo et al., 2008). 
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differ in its usefulness for reaching economic ends, obviously, relationships per se are not a 
panacea to organisational challenges and individual resource scarcity.  
So basically, the network acts as a social boundary of demarcation around opportunities and 
constraints that are assembled in embedded ties (Uzzi, 1996). Managers as well as individual 
network members seeking to build effective networks first need to understand under what con-
ditions social structure confers potential advantages and how that can actually be converted to 
economic or other advantage. Just as the architect needs to understand what makes buildings 
stay up rather than fall down (Koka, Madhavan & Prescott, 2006), network strategists need to 
understand how to design network structure at the management level to provide network mem-
bers with the opportunities to realise network-inherent benefits. Also, they need a viable strat-
egy for how to select the “right” actors to form the network, too. At the same time, the individ-
ual network actors need to grasp how to design individual networking activities, so that the op-
portunities inherent in social structure are adequately used to promote individual performance.  
Against this background, there are a number of underexplored issues in network research. In 
this thesis, there are five main chapters. Each of the five chapters gives attention to a particular 
topic with some underexplored innate issues. The generic approach that binds these chapters 
together is the idea of analysing the influence of network design on firm performance through 
expanding economic reasoning with sociological approaches. The specific gaps addressed by 
each chapter are not necessarily exclusive, but some appear in different contexts in more than 
one chapter. Thereby, this thesis seeks to address several core research questions from different 
perspectives that are commissioned to stimulate theory development on building effective net-
works. The organising principle which integrates the five chapters, an overview of the main 
contributions offered by this thesis, and the methodological foundations applied to provide these 
contributions, are laid out in the following. 
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2. Research Approach and Contribution 
Organising Principle – Analysing Network Effects on Performance in the Context of a Lifecycle 
Perspective.  
Parkhe et al. (2006) stress the need to focus on process issues by placing network research tem-
porally and topically in its broader context (see figure 1; following Parkhe et al., 2006). “Tem-
poral” contextualisation uses the time dimension as an organising principle, from network birth 
to growth to maturity to death (see Monge & Contractor, 2003). In a parallel track, “topical” 
contextualisation focuses on central topics of interest to managers and researchers along various 
phases of a network’s lifecycle (Parkhe et al., 2006). Following the lifecycle concept as an or-
ganising principle enables the study of performance as an effect of changes in social construc-
tion (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). In this vein, Low and Abrahamson (1997) highlight that 
research must pay more attention to the lifecycle context in which organising occurs, as differ-
ent relationship structures are essential to performance in different lifecycle stages.  
 
Figure 1: Temporal and Topical Contextualisation 
Based on Parkhe et al.’s (2006) contextualisation, each chapter focuses on a central topic of 
interest to managers and researchers along different phases of a network’s lifecycle. The first 
chapter marks the beginning of the lifecycle, starting with the subject of successful selection of 
network participants based on their individual social capital external to the network (Chapter I). 
From member selection, the second chapter proceeds to the topic of the configuration of net-
work participants in an overall network structure (Chapter II). With the initial structure being 
established, the third chapter addresses location decision-making during subsequent network 
expansion (Chapter III). As an extension to expansion, the fourth chapter examines the success-
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ful internationalisation of cultural goods that are created in network teams (Chapter IV). Each 
chapter is a logical predecessor of the following chapters, as decisions in previous lifecycle 
stages make subsequent network performance, at least to some extent, path-dependent. The last 
chapter embraces the previous ones by offering some insights on feedback from consumer net-
works on the success of business activity in general, which may affect network organisations 
along each lifecycle stage (Chapter V). 
The organising principle of the lifecycle perspective is the first dimension along which chapters 
are structured. The second dimension classifies the sources of input that actors seek to acquire, 
as input can originate externally or internally to the focal (network) organisation (see figure 2). 
Other than Chapter I that concentrates on resources available external to the network organisa-
tion, Chapters II-IV focus on access to network-internal resources. Chapter V considers re-
sources available to individual economic actors from external networks. The major contribu-
tions of this thesis are outlined below.  
 
Figure 2: Organisation of Chapters 
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Contribution I: Expansion of Interdisciplinary Network Research.  
Based on the network lifecycle – that is itself an avenue for future research (Parkhe et al., 2006) 
– as an organising principle, the generic contribution of the five chapters is the extension of 
interdisciplinary network research. Here, “interdisciplinarity” refers to expanding the use of 
social network theory as an enrichment of economic reasoning, to examine effects of network 
structure and networking activities on performance. So far, research on planning and manage-
ment of networks in general has widely treated the “human factor” of organisational design 
implicitly (Inkpen, 1996; Jarillo, 1988; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry & Pinch, 2004; Tsai, 2001). 
This constitutes a major shortcoming since the alleged superiority of networks to other organisa-
tional designs depends on individuals within the organisation, as these must convert organisa-
tional potential into reality.  
Advocating the combination of sociological and economic approaches, Granovetter (2005, p. 
47) argues, “While economic models can be simpler if the interaction of the economy with non-
economic aspects of social life remains inside a black box, this strategy abstracts from many 
social phenomena that strongly affect costs and available techniques for economic action. Ex-
cluding such phenomena is risky if prediction is the goal. […] The disciplines that neighbor 
economics have made considerable progress in unpacking the dynamics of social phenomena, 
and a more efficient strategy would be to engage in interdisciplinary cooperation of the sort that 
trade theory commends to nations. My goal here has been to suggest some such linkages, which 
remain largely unexplored, and pose one of the greatest intellectual challenges to the social sci-
ences”.  
The interdisciplinary set-up is further motivated by Dant’s (2008, p. 93) argument for worth-
while diversity in research perspectives, as he notes, “Authors are beginning to examine re-
search questions from a phenomenological perspective rather than within the confines of single 
theoretical frameworks”. Combining economic and network perspectives precedes the ability to 
observe the effects tested here (“insights follow method”). As Brown and Dant (2008, p. 6) 
point out, “Strong contributions to the retailing literature [...] stem from the new insights pro-
vided by those [different] methods”. 
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The first three chapters in this thesis focus on franchising networks. They employ a social capi-
tal/social network perspective to the analysis of performance effects in a way that is new to the 
franchising context. Accordingly, the first three chapters are inspired by the question of whether 
and how theories that have not yet been applied to franchising networks can expand our knowl-
edge of franchising. They further apply a variety of measures and mathematical tools from so-
cial network analysis, prompted by the question of what research methods or empirical tech-
niques could provide advancements to franchising research. Chapter IV combines team diversity 
research and team social capital research with an economic approach to performance outcomes, 
Chapter V combines the analysis of economic outcomes and Superstar theory based on a focus 
on consumers’ social networks. 
Contribution II: Analysis of Determinants of Network Members’ Individual Performance.  
Research has often concentrated on beneficial effects of networking (Labianca & Brass, 2006). 
As a result, dysfunctionalities and costs of networking activities still remain underexplored. 
This shortcoming in network research exacerbates an in-depth understanding of how collective 
action should be organised (Parkhe et al., 2006). Adler and Kwon (2002) and Lin (1999) argue 
that research would benefit from a more systematic assessment of risks as well as benefits of 
social capital to understand better the downsides of social relationships, both for the focal actor 
and for others. Therefore, they deem research on the differential access to resources as well as 
positive and negative effects of social structure a high priority: “while we understand a lot about 
market failures and bureaucratic failures, more research on the distinctive forms of social capital 
failure would be an important antidote to romantic illusions about Gemeinschaft” (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002, p. 35). Accordingly, Chapters II-IV consider positive as well as negative effects of 
social structure on network units’ performance to provide implications with respect to under 
what structural and relational conditions networking benefits outweigh networking costs, and 
when this situation is reversed.  
In addition, individual performance of franchisees is a major underexplored issue: Dant (2008, 
p. 92) argues, “much of what we know about franchising is based on investigations of the fran-
chisors to the virtual exclusion of research focused on the franchisee perspective”. Although 
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franchisees are essential ingredients in successful franchise chains and franchising is so impor-
tant in today’s economy, few studies examine determinants of franchisee performance (Dant, 
2008; Michael & Combs, 2008). Chapters I-III extend research on franchisee performance, ad-
dressing the core question of what makes a franchisee successful.  
For analysing performance effects, researchers must keep in mind the inherent network charac-
teristic of structure-player duality. Lin (2001, p. 12) explains, “social capital contains three in-
gredients: resources embedded in a social structure; accessibility to such social resources by 
individuals; and use or mobilisation of such social resources by individuals in purposive actions. 
Thus conceived, social capital contains three elements intersecting structure and action: the 
structural (embeddedness), opportunity (accessibility) and action-oriented (use) aspects”. In a 
similar vein, Parkhe et al. (2006) illustrate the importance of both individual members and their 
configuration in the overall network by the following example: consider carbon atoms, which 
can be structured in different ways. One arrangement yields graphite, the soft, greasy, black 
substance used in pencils. Another yields diamonds, the hardest known substance found in na-
ture. And an even harder substance (called “buckeyballs”, or C60) can be manufactured. The 
different outcomes depend on differences in linking the individual atoms to form an overall 
structure. Yet, while the bonds between the atoms are important, so are the atoms themselves – 
are they of carbon or hydrogen or nitrogen? Parkhe et al. (2006, p. 562) point out that such al-
ternative views “are often treated in passing, if at all”, and systematic recognition “will help 
delineate the scope and mission of network theory in the coming years”. Accordingly, Chapters 
II and III focus on opportunities induced by network structure and provide some implications 
for how these opportunities must be consciously used by network members to realise beneficial, 
and avoid disruptive, effects on performance. 
Contribution III: Focus on Cultural Aspects in Network Research.  
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to cultural aspects of network research; particularly, to 
the cross-cultural, cross-national aspects of networks. Boyacigiller and Adler (1991) emphasise 
that organisation science in the United States is a “parochial dinosaur”, where empirical re-
search tends to concentrate on North American organisations, limiting the generalisability of 
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current theories to firms not in North America and to firms embedded in cultures not derived 
from an Anglo-Saxon heritage; yet, in a world economy where international networks are thriv-
ing, network theory must accept and more fully embrace the phenomenon of globalisation 
(Parkhe et al., 2006). 
For Chapters IV and V, the focus shifts from franchising in non-cultural industries to networks 
in cultural industries, i.e. in motion pictures and deluxe cuisine. Chapter IV concentrates on 
cross-cultural aspects of network performance. Chapter V completes the analyses by examining 
effects of feedback from consumer networks on business activity in general, that may also affect 
network performance along each lifecycle stage examined in the previous chapters.  
Methodological Approach.  
To analyse these issues in detail, mathematical and methodological groundings of social net-
work analysis can be employed. To describe a network’s actors and structure, sociologists have 
developed numerous quantitative measures. Social network measures originated in the sociol-
ogy literature exploring social groups, social cohesion (the extent to which people “stick to-
gether”), positions, status, dominance, conformity, social exchange, reciprocity, influence, and 
other forms of relationships among individuals (Lavie, 2006). These theories gained mathemati-
cal appeal with the development of the distinction between strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 
1973); the notion of structural holes (Burt, 1992); network density (Burt, 1992, 1997; Coleman, 
1988; 1994); centrality measures of network positions (Bonacich, 1987; Freeman, 1979; Ibarra, 
1993; Podolny, 1993); cohesion (Coleman, Katz & Menzel, 1957); and structural equivalence, 
the similarity in actors’ patterns of ties (Burt, 1987; Lavie, 2006).3 Based on Granovetter’s 
(2005) work, the central concepts are explained in the following:   
(1) Strong Ties and Weak Ties. Investments in terms of time, capital and affection vary over an 
actor’s network ties. Those ties that receive more investments are termed “strong ties”; in net-
work logic, these ties are usually ties to people considered as “friends”, whereas “weak ties” are 
ties to people who are merely “acquaintances”. Granovetter’s (1973; 1983) idea of “the strength 
                                                     
3 For detailed descriptions of these concepts, see De Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005. 
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of weak ties” is an influential concept that describes how weak ties are better sources of infor-
mation when individuals need to go beyond what their friends know, for example, to find a job 
or obtain a scarce service. Here, the idea is that less redundant information can be acquired 
through weak ties than through strong ties, as acquaintances know people that the information-
seeking actor does not know. Thus, acquaintances can provide more novel information, whereas 
close contacts tend to move in the same circles as the focal actor, so the information they share 
overlaps considerably with what the actor already knows. The novelty effect arises in part be-
cause acquaintances are typically less similar to the focal actor than friends, and in part because 
they spend less time with this actor. Thereby, acquaintances connect the focal actor to the wider 
world. Viewed on a broader scale, if each person’s close contacts know each other, they form a 
closely knit clique. Due to individual time restraints e.g., individuals are then connected to other 
cliques through weak rather than strong ties. Thus, from a “bird’s-eye view” on the overall net-
work, weak ties determine the extent of information diffusion in large-scale social structures. 
One manifestation of this idea is that in scientific fields, new information and innovative ideas 
are more efficiently diffused through weak ties (Granovetter, 1983). There are many more weak 
ties in social networks than strong ones, and often, weak ties may carry information of limited 
significance. But the important point is that such ties are much more probable than strong ones 
to transmit unique, nonredundant information across otherwise disconnected segments of social 
networks (Granovetter, 2005). 
(2) Structural Holes. Burt (1992) extends the “weak tie” argument by emphasising that it is not 
the quality of particular ties that is centrally important, but rather the way different parts of a 
network are linked. He emphasises the strategic advantage that those individuals may enjoy who 
have ties into multiple networks that are largely separated from one another. These persons can 
access resources from unique parts of their network, can hear about impending threats and op-
portunities more quickly than others, and can better find out about the quality of exchange part-
ners (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Such actors are in a privileged position for both resource acquisition 
and transmission: they can both make informed decisions, and play a broker role by strategically 
transferring or holding back information. Thereby, they benefit from information arbitrage 
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(Burt, 2004). Insofar as such individuals constitute the only route through which resources, like 
information, may flow from one part of a network to another part, these actors benefit from 
“structural holes” in the network (Granovetter, 2005).  
(3) Network Density. If a social network consists of n actors, “density” refers to the proportion 
of the possible n*(n–1)/2 connections among these actors that actually exist. The denser a net-
work, the more different paths are there along which information and ideas can travel between 
any actor pair. For instance, greater density makes norms of “proper behaviour” more likely to 
be encountered repeatedly, be discussed and agreed upon; it also renders free-riding in terms of 
deviance from such norms harder to hide and, thus, punishment more probable. As an upside 
effect, collective action that depends on overcoming free-rider problems is more likely to hap-
pen in dense social networks, since actors in such networks typically come to share norms that 
discourage free-riding and emphasise trust. On the downside, in dense structures, actors tend to 
confirm each others’ views and opinions, as they all have similar input at their disposal (termed 
“echo-room problem”; Burt, 2005). Such a homogeneous information base bears the risk of 
losing touch with market developments (“collective blindness”; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Redundant input then prevents actors from realising and acting on challenges to performance. 
All else equal, larger groups will have a lower network density because people have cognitive, 
emotional, spatial and temporal limits on how many social ties they can sustain (Granovetter, 
2005). 
In applying these and other social network measures to the study of firm performance, scholars 
often focus on the firm’s “ego-network”, which encompasses the focal firm (termed “ego”), its 
set of partners (“alters”), and their connecting ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Some studies 
establish the different effects of strong ties and weak ties on firm performance (Delmestri, Mon-
tanari & Usai, 2005; Lavie, 2006; Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000). Ahuja (2000) exam-
ines the effects of ties and structural holes on innovation output. Meiseberg, Ehrmann and Dor-
mann (2008) analyse how the number of contacts and structural holes influences movie per-
formance. De Carolis et al. (2009) and Lee, Lee and Pennings (2001) show that the number of 
ties to other organisations and to venture capital firms is associated with new venture creation 
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and sales growth of start-up firms. Baum et al. (2000) demonstrate that the number of alliance 
partners and the structural equivalence of firms explain differences in the performance of start-
up firms. Others explore effects of network centrality or density on outcomes (Provan & Mil-
ward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998; Tsai, 2001).  
One limitation of all network research, that also applies here, arises from the fact that empirical 
studies must use quantitative measures to estimate information that is essentially qualitative and 
cumulative in nature. The problem refers to data collection as well as data evaluation (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986; Witt, 2004). In the following chapters, where possible, the studies attempt to in-
corporate qualitative aspects of exchange relations, to ensure that opportunities of network 
structure are adequately used by network members.  
Furthermore, Lavie (2006) points out that network studies have often utilized performance 
measures other than economic rents, which would provide a better understanding of perform-
ance effects of social structure. Chapters I-III combine objective measures like sales and sales 
growth, as variables that are close proxies for profit (Buzzell & Gale, 1987), with subjective 
measures of business success, to provide a more reliable account of business performance.  
First, in the following, this thesis will have a closer look at the networks of individual actors, 
concentrating on resources (revenues and information) that new franchisees can gather external 
to the franchise network from their social relations to customers (Chapter I). Subsequently, the 
focus shifts to social networks of franchisees inside the franchise network, where resources 
(mainly information) are acquired using social relations to fellow system franchisees (Chapters 
II and III). The first three chapters quantify individual performance effects of networking activi-
ties, which means the focus is on each individual franchisee’s relationships. Extending this per-
spective, in Chapter IV, all relations among a team of network actors to other network teams 
within the overall industry network, and the performance effects of individual teams’ (instead of 
individual persons’) networking activities are examined. For the analyses in Chapters I-IV, a 
number of measures from social network theory are employed; the application of several of 
these measures is innovative, especially to the franchising context. To “create a truly networked 
point of view” (Witt, 2004, p. 392), Chapter V deals with feedback from consumers’ social net-
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works on business activity in general. The next section summarizes the chapters and provides 
more detail on the specific research questions addressed by each chapter. 
 
 III. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS – PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
1. Selection of Network Participants: 
Social Capital Transfer and Performance in Franchising 
“Just as for a child, the conditions under which an organization is born and the course  
of its development in infancy have important consequences for its later life”  
(Boeker, 1989, p. 490) 
The entrepreneurship literature has long assumed that entrepreneurial success can be attributed 
to some set of demographic factors, personality traits, or psychological variables that hold 
across different contexts. But as equivocal research results show, most characteristics have dif-
ferent effects on performance in different environments. Accordingly, Low and Abrahamson 
(1997, p. 435) point out that so far, “Entrepreneurship research has paid insufficient attention to 
the context in which new businesses are started. Consequently, efforts to identify factors that 
consistently lead to entrepreneurial success have failed. This is because what works in one con-
text will not necessarily work in another. Even worse, factors that lead to success in one context 
may lead to failure in another”. 
A newer stream of research emphasises the importance of networks, and the social capital in-
herent in them, for new firms. Social capital is understood as “the sum of the actual and poten-
tial resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relation-
ships possessed by an individual” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243), that “creates entrepre-
neurial opportunities for certain players and not for others” (Burt, 1992, p. 7). Yet often, rela-
tionships provide potential benefits only (Srivastava et al., 1998), by offering access to re-
sources like information, emotional support, or legitimacy. Such resource access explains per-
formance only to the extent that entrepreneurs capture the economic value that these resources 
create (Crook et al., 2008). However, resources obtainable from customer relationships – in 
terms of revenues – provide actual benefits to entrepreneurs and are central to profit generation 
across different contexts (Gupta, Lehmann & Stuart, 2004; Srivastava et al., 1998; Yli-Renko & 
Janakiraman, 2008).  
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Accordingly, this chapter examines the role of the entrepreneur’s social capital with customers 
for the performance development of new ventures in franchising. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that under conditions of quality uncertainty, when a well-reputed seller leaves the firm and starts 
an entrepreneurial venture, customers may choose to continue patronizing the seller rather than 
the seller’s former firm. Sellers that can transfer customers from their former occupation into 
the franchise environment have a starting advantage, since their established customer base pro-
vides some “certain” sales and referrals. Like for other entrepreneurs, such customer capital 
may offer a head start for new franchisees as well.  
Based on panel data from 175 franchise outlets, the study results show a strong connection be-
tween the franchisee’s customer capital and short-term performance after system entry. The 
effect is even stronger if franchisees understand utilizing customer relationships as a source of 
information. However, transferring customer capital does not provide long-term advantages: 
benefits of transferred customer relationships cease over time as other system franchisees catch 
up in building a customer base and acquiring know-how. The empirical results offer practical 
implications for franchisees and franchisors and entrepreneurs in general. 
The contribution of the first chapter is the following:  
 First, prior studies on social capital with customers examine primarily technology-based 
firms (Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008) and selected relationships like “key customers” 
(Abratt & Kelly, 2002; De Clercq & Rangarajan, 2008; Venkataraman, Van De Ven, 
Buckeye & Hudson, 1990; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001a; Yli-Renko, Sapienza 
& Hay, 2001b), and do neither address transfer of social capital nor consider the fran-
chising context. Thus, the study adds to the broader discourse on the role of customer 
relationships for start-up performance and development in general, by focusing on fran-
chising in particular. Combining the literature on social capital, especially with custom-
ers, and new venture performance, is innovative to franchising research. Therefore, the 
study sheds some light on the question of whether and how theories that have not yet 
been applied to franchising networks can expand our knowledge of franchising. 
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 Second, few studies have analysed the determinants of franchisee performance (Dant, 
2008; Michael & Combs, 2008). This study extends research on franchisee perform-
ance.  
 Third, the findings on determinants of franchisees performance provide insight into the 
question whether there are attributes that franchisors should look for in applicants when 
selecting network members, and what these attributes might be. The few existing em-
pirical studies on franchisee selection criteria focus on demographic factors like age, 
and business or industry experience, on personality, or on financial strength (Altinay & 
Miles, 2006; Clarkin & Swavely, 2006; Jambulingan & Nevin, 1999; Wang & Altinay, 
2008; Williams, 1999). Yet, there is little empirical support for which criteria in fact 
lead to desired results (Birley & Westhead, 1994; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999; 
Saraogi, 2009). Previous studies have pointed out that successful franchisee selection 
calls for further research (Clarkin & Swavely, 2006; Saraogi, 2009; Wang & Altinay, 
2008). Jambulingam and Nevin (1999, p. 364) argue, “the ideal in building and main-
taining a high quality network of franchisees is a selection method that would qualify 
prospective franchisees based on their likely future performance”. Gibb and Davies 
(1990, p. 16) set out that “it is perhaps an unrealistic expectation that it will be possible 
definitely to pick winners or indeed to produce a comprehensive theory that leads to 
this. But arguably it is better to make further strides towards better understanding of the 
factors that influence the growth process”. This study offers some normative implica-
tions for more successful selection. 
 Additionally, the results indicate that consumers do not necessarily choose the franchi-
sor brand before choosing a specific franchise outlet to purchase. Loyalties can rather be 
based on the entrepreneur, who makes consumers choose the brand. Directing attention 
to the question of whether “consumers indeed choose the brand before patronizing a 
specific franchised outlet as widely believed”, Dant (2008, p. 93) points this issue out as 
another major research gap.  
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Thereby, this chapter offers managerial implications to both franchisors and franchisees, and 
entrepreneurs in general, for how social capital with customers can enhance performance, by 
exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. “How can theories that have not yet been applied to franchising networks expand our 
knowledge of franchising?”   
2. “What makes a franchisee successful? Are there biographical, personality, or behav-
ioural attributes that franchisors should look for in franchisees?” 
3. “Do consumers indeed choose the brand before patronizing a specific franchised outlet 
as widely believed?” 
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2. Configuration of Network Participants: 
The Impact of Communicative Efficiency on Franchisee Perform-
ance 
“Never give a party if you will be the most interesting person there” 
Mickey Friedman, Novelist 
Research in strategic management emphasises the functionality of networks for managing re-
source dependencies and fostering learning and knowledge exchange (Podolny & Page, 1998). 
With respect to these activities, networks can provide efficiency advantages that markets or 
hierarchies do not possess. Yet, realising these advantages depends on interaction between net-
work members. Thus, network partners play a significant role in shaping the resource-based 
competitive advantage of the firm (Afuah, 2000; Lavie, 2006; Lee et al., 2001; Stuart, 2000). 
This idea applies also in the franchising context (Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000). 
The objective of this study is to examine how franchise network members can organise net-
working activities efficiently, to enhance franchisee performance and to reinforce the superiority 
of the network form of organisation to alternative organisational designs. Conceptualising the 
franchise organisation as a social network arrangement, this research argues that efficient re-
source transmission among franchisees is essential in the quest for competitive advantage and 
economic rents, and is the key to higher individual (and in aggregation, collective) performance. 
The analysis is based on the premise that interfranchisee communication is the strategic means 
for efficient exchange. For analysing the way to efficient exchange, the study proposes the con-
cept of “communicative efficiency”. This concept addresses franchisee opportunities and efforts 
to use networking efficiently – i.e. to match the acquisition of network resources and benefits 
thereof with networking investments in the most rewarding way. Communicative efficiency 
builds on two properties. The first property is network configuration: franchisee network posi-
tioning, as relationship embeddedness, determines communication opportunities. Yet, the qual-
ity of an organisation depends on the quality of the individuals that make it up. Hence, the sec-
ond property is communication efforts of franchisees. 
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The study analyses how the system management can act on these two properties to substantiate 
the network’s superiority to alternative organisational designs and how franchisees can build 
their networks to realise individual performance gains. Applying concepts and measures from 
social network analysis, several hypotheses on the linkages between efficiency’s two properties 
and franchisee performance are tested, using 121 fashion retail franchisees. The results clearly 
demonstrate that efficient exchange renders linked units more astute collectively than they are 
individually.  
The contribution of the second chapter is the following:  
 First, social network theory and the empirical techniques that this theory provides are 
innovative to franchising research, thus the chapter sheds some light on whether and 
how theories and empirical techniques that have not yet been applied to franchising 
networks could provide advancements to franchising research. 
 Second, few studies examine franchisee performance (Dant, 2008; Michael & Combs, 
2008). The study provides some insights in franchisee performance. 
 Third, networks can provide efficiency advantages for managing resource dependencies 
that markets or hierarchies do not possess. Yet, few studies analyse aspects of efficiency 
in franchising (Kubitschek, 2001). This research examines how resource exchange 
among network members can be organised efficiently. Thereby, the study offers impli-
cations concerning under what conditions potential efficiency advantages inherent to the 
network form of organisation can actually be realized, so that the network form of or-
ganisation tends to constitute the superior organisational design for conducting the 
business activity at hand.  
 Fourth, research has investigated the use of interfirm communication for effective inter-
action (Tikoo, 2002). Mohr, Fisher and Nevin (1996) point out that communication is 
the most important element to successful interfirm exchange. Mohr and Sohi (1995) fur-
ther note that studies tend to focus on positive effects of communication, whereas det-
rimental flows remain an important research issue. Moreover, in franchising, communi-
cation has been examined largely with respect to the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
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only (Kidwell, Nygaard & Silkoset, 2007). This chapter focuses both on positive and 
negative effects of communication and concentrates on the franchisee level. Thereby, it 
offers some results concerning the research gap emphasised by Nebus (2006, p. 615), 
which is “when needing knowledge, whom people should contact in forming their ad-
vice network”. 
 Fifth, Lavie (2006) points out that studies have often focused on the impact of direct ties 
only, although indirect ties can affect the competitive advantage of the interconnected 
firm as well. Benefits may result from a second-order effect in which a firm has access 
to the network resources of a partner of its alliance partner. Then, the firm may even use 
a partnering strategy in which it allies with a partner that does not possess valuable re-
sources, but that provides access to others owning desirable resources. Lavie (2006, p. 
651) highlights that, “Social network theories offer a promising approach for pursuing 
this avenue, insofar as they acknowledge the role of indirect ties” (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati 
et al., 2000). This chapter considers the influence of both direct and indirect ties simul-
taneously.  
Thereby, to both franchisors and franchisees, this chapter offers managerial implications for 
how to promote communicative efficiency, exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. “How can theories that have not yet been applied to franchising networks expand our 
knowledge of franchising? What research methods or empirical techniques could provide 
advancements to franchising research?” 
2. “What makes a franchisee successful?” 
3. “Under what conditions can potential efficiency advantages inherent to the network form 
of organisation actually be realized, so that the network form of organisation tends to be 
the superior organisational design for conducting business activity?” 
4. “How can communication be organised efficiently on the franchisee-level? What posi-
tive and negative effects of communication do occur among franchisees? When needing 
knowledge, with whom should franchisees communicate in their network?”  
5. “What is the impact of direct ties vs. indirect ties?” 
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3. Network Expansion:  
Inner Strength against Competitive Forces – Successful Site Selec-
tion for Franchise Network Expansion  
“There is often a large gap between theory and practice...  
Furthermore, the gap between theory and practice in practice is much larger 
 than the gap between theory and practice in theory” 
Jeff Case, SNPM Research 
For every franchise system, a major step in the leap from the unknown to the commonplace is 
developing a strategic plan for growth. That growth requires the management of the franchise 
chain to adopt a location strategy, which will ideally maintain and extend the chain’s competi-
tive advantage. Therefore, choosing locations that provide new system outlets with high per-
formance prospects appears promising. Addressing this location issue in the context of retail 
franchising, this chapter deals with ways to enhance system expansion success.  
Location decisions can be based on strengths found in local markets – following the market 
perspective – or on the expanding system’s own strengths – following the firm perspective. The 
exogenous market perspective holds that evaluating market conditions is most relevant to de-
termine promising spots because there are location-specific direct economic effects on perform-
ance (i.e. demand effects in Hotelling’s model; e.g. see Christensen & Drejer, 2005; Ingene & 
Yu, 1982; James, Walker & Etzel, 1975; Lee & McCracken, 1982; Powers, 1997; Simons, 
1992). The endogenous firm perspective, i.e. the resource-based view that considers a firm’s 
internal resources (Barney, 2001; Peteraf, 1993), has recently been extended using the social 
network approach that regards a firm’s externally available resources (Lavie, 2006). Thereby, 
the firm perspective and the social network approach together provide what this study calls an 
“inner strength perspective” on interconnected firms. The inner strength perspective holds that 
firms can combine internal and external resources to achieve competitive advantage. Following 
this perspective, resource access offered at a certain spot can determine a location’s attractive-
ness rather than location-specific market factors. 
This research combines the literature strands on the market and the inner strength perspective 
and posits hypotheses, first, to explore which perspective dominates location decisions for ex-
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pansion in practice, and second, to provide clarification as regards the relevance or otherwise of 
the decisive criteria for outlet performance. Using concepts from social network analysis, hy-
potheses are tested on a sample of 201 German franchisees.  
Results show location decisions rely on both perspectives; yet, franchisee performance depends 
rather more on inner strength factors. Providing a shield against competitive forces, inner 
strength renders franchisees relatively independent of market characteristics. Based on the study 
results, prior definitions of promising locations might benefit from a re-evaluation. Further, 
there is evidence that expansion is better served by following a geographically dispersed cluster-
approach, than by growing steadily from a baseline location. 
The contribution of the third chapter is the following:  
 First, so far, the resource-based view (RBV) has tended to envision firms as independ-
ent entities, where individual resources belong exclusively to each independent firm. In 
an increasingly networked business world, featuring significant sharing and/or exchange 
of resources, such an assumption is tenuous; individual firms’ inputs into network or-
ganisations can comprise shared and nonshared resources, which together generate rents 
(Parkhe et al., 2006). By combining the RBV and social network theory, this research 
proposes an “inner strength perspective” on interconnected firms. Lavie (2006) and 
Parkhe et al. (2006) point out that the meshing of network theory with the RBV deepens 
and enriches both perspectives. This combined perspective is innovative in its applica-
tion to franchising research. 
 Second, few studies examine franchisee performance (Dant, 2008; Michael & Combs, 
2008). The study provides some insights in franchisee performance by providing clarifi-
cation as regards the relevance or otherwise of location decision criteria actually applied 
in practice for outlet performance. 
 Third, this research picks up the gap between theory and practice: Clarke, Mackaness 
and Ball (2003) note that despite its practical importance, researchers still ignore the es-
sential role of pragmatic judgement, which thus is largely underplayed in the academic 
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literature on outlet forecasting. From a practitioner’s standpoint, it is notable that aca-
demic literature on location strategies continues to focus on largely theoretical, unap-
plied scenarios in technique development rather than practical usage within the organ-
isational context of the firm (Dasci & Laporte, 2005; González-Benito, 2002; Sakashita, 
2000; Wood & Tasker, 2008). This study explores which of two theoretical approaches, 
i.e. market-based location theory, or the inner strength perspective, dominates decisions 
during expansion in practice.  
Thereby, this chapter offers managerial implications to franchisors and franchisees as regards 
how to organise location decision-making to enhance outlet success, by exploring these specific 
gaps in the literature: 
1. “How can theories that have not yet been applied to franchising networks expand our 
knowledge of franchising?” 
2. “What makes a franchisee successful?” 
3. “Does market-based location theory, or the inner strength perspective, dominate prag-
matic decisions, i.e. do exogenous location factors or endogenous network characteris-
tics have more effect on judgements? Which criteria are more useful for forecasting out-
let performance?” 
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4. Network Internationalisation:  
Opposites Attract – Effects of Diverse Cultural References and In-
dustry Network Resources on Film Performance  
“We know that an announcement ‘British Film’ outside a  
movie theatre will chill the hardiest away from its door” 
(Joseph Schenck, former President of United Artists; 
cited by Low, Richards & Manvell, 2005, p. 298) 
This study offers a new framework for organising a motion picture in a way that enhances 
chances for box-office success in export markets without jeopardizing domestic performance. In 
an increasingly global economy, an issue imperative to consider when launching a product in-
ternationally is the receptiveness of members of a culture to objects and ideas that originate 
from other cultures. For international success, movies as cultural content products need to pro-
vide a certain amount of cultural familiarity and identification potential to diverse audiences, so 
that audiences understand what they are offered, while still being provided with sufficient nov-
elty to enjoy it. This research is based on the following premise: (1) the composition of the 
movie team, as the basis for contributing different cultural backgrounds along with creativity 
and talent to movie creation, and as a highly visible movie ingredient, as well as (2) essential 
movie characteristics will need to suit audiences not only in the home market, but in culturally 
diverse export markets. The study suggests that capitalizing on diversity in these two “input 
categories” helps provide ample points of reference, that is, higher familiarity, to audiences in 
diverse markets.  
This research combines and expands two strands of research for the moviemaking industry: the 
economic approach to movie performance (Litman, 2000; Marvasti & Canterbery, 2005; Scott, 
2004), and the team diversity approach to team performance (Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Stew-
art, 2006; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). A number of hypotheses on the relation of movie team 
composition – considering team members’ deep-level diversity attributes (cultural background, 
tenure, connectivity, education), and surface-level diversity attributes (status, age, gender) – and 
of movie characteristics (sets, movie content) to a movie’s domestic and export performance are 
tested, using a sample of German top-ten movies of 1990-2005. Thereby, the study explores 
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differences in factors that determine motion picture success at home and abroad. Further, the 
relation of composition and characteristics to total performance is examined.  
Results show that offering familiarity to export markets, particularly in a cultural context (cul-
tural background, movie sets), is strongly rewarded abroad. Yet, for domestic success, diversity 
in social network resources is essential. Such diversity reduces the danger of “groupthink” and 
enhances creative potential available for movie creation. In general, both domestic and overall 
success depend on the other deep-level and the surface-level attributes apart from cultural vari-
ables, whereas export success does marginally so. The findings demonstrate that despite the 
unpredictable shifts in the structure of consumer preferences for motion picture entertainment 
often claimed, there clearly is a distribution of success in the movie industry that can be im-
pacted by management.  
The contribution of the fourth chapter is the following:  
 First, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the cross-national, cross-cultural as-
pects of networks; yet, in a world economy where international networks are thriving, 
network theory must accept and more fully embrace the phenomenon of globalisation 
(Parkhe et al., 2006). Since movie producers can rarely build on systematic research 
when attempting to customize movies to different cultural settings, this chapter seeks to 
provide some findings on the cross-cultural aspects of network design and performance. 
The study provides managerial implications for how to target international audiences 
more effectively. 
 Second, Oh, Labianca and Chung (2006) note that the two concepts of groups and social 
capital have rarely been paired together, with the result that a simultaneous understand-
ing of intragroup and intergroup relationships, and of group effectiveness, has remained 
beyond reach (Parkhe et al., 2006).4 Chapter IV combines team diversity research and 
the idea of team social capital with an economic approach to performance. So, the chap-
                                                     
4 The terms “team” and “group” are treated as equivalents here, as the majority of small group and team 
researchers have used the two terms interchangeably (Ilgen, 1999). 
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ter sheds some light on whether and how the merger of these theories can extend the 
understanding of rent streams in cultural industries. 
 Third, in a similar vein, Joshi (2006) advances research on personal networks by focus-
ing on teams instead of individuals, based on the observation that teams are increasingly 
used in the workplace. He notes that when “examining the outcomes of team diversity, 
researchers have typically focused on the internal functioning of teams […]. This ap-
proach limits our understanding of the complex nature of a team’s interactions and does 
not allow a full appreciation of the processes by which diversity can influence team 
functioning. Diversity in a team allows for access to a diverse array of external net-
works” (p. 583) that are sources of diverse perspectives, knowledge, and information 
that can enhance a team’s social and knowledge-based capital and improve team per-
formance (Parkhe et al., 2006). Guimerà, Uzzi, Spiro and Nunes Amaral (2005, p. 697) 
argue that “research shows that the right balance of diversity on a team is elusive. Al-
though diversity may potentially spur creativity, it typically promotes conflict and mis-
communication […]. It also runs counter to the security most individuals experience in 
working and sharing ideas with past collaborators”. This chapter provides some insights 
on the impact of team diversity, including diversity in culture and social network re-
sources, on team performance. 
Thereby, this chapter gives heed to a more sophisticated understanding of movie success factors 
in an intercultural context, which may be of use to economic actors in motion pictures and re-
lated industries, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. “How can motion picture entertainment be customized to different cultural settings?” 
2. “How can theories that have rarely been applied to the relationship structures of teams 
expand our knowledge of the (economic) effects of team relationships?” 
3. “How does team diversity (in cultural backgrounds and social network membership 
e.g.) affect team performance?” 
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5. Feedback from External Networks on Firm Performance:  
Superstar Effects in Deluxe Gastronomy – The Impact of  
Performance Quality and Consumer Networks on Value Creation  
“In the future everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes” 
Andy Warhol (1928-1987) 
We live in a world centred on stardom and hits. A surprisingly large number of markets are 
developing, or have already developed, into so-called “winner-take-all” markets, where rewards 
tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few top performers, with small differences in talent or 
effort giving rise to enormous differences in incomes (Frank & Cook, 1995). 
Research provides evidence that these star effects occur in mass markets. In mass markets, of-
ten, a large number of people are willing to pay a premium to consume the services of those few 
individuals whom they perceive as the “best” performers. Here, Rosen (1981) was first to ex-
plain a strong connection between a person’s talent and income. In contrast to mass markets, 
deep-pocket markets remain underresearched. A “deep-pocket” market is characterized by the 
fact that a relatively small number of consumers are willing to pay a large premium to consume 
the services of the few “best” performers. Then, in deep-pocket markets too, Superstars may 
command high rents. 
This study analyses whether Superstar effects (disproportionate income effects) exist in the 
deep-pocket market for quality gastronomy in Germany, and what factors determine the stars’ 
rents. In quality gastronomy, the stars can be the restaurant chefs. Building on Rosen’s (1981) 
and Adler’s (1985) central theories on star effects, two potential sources of stardom are ex-
plored. Following Rosen (1981), this research tests if quality differences between the chefs’ 
performances have a direct effect on financial rewards (termed “direct Superstar effect”). Fol-
lowing Adler (1985), it assesses the income effect of a media presence of chefs (termed “classi-
cal Superstar effect”). Chefs who use the media to attract attention to their cooking and to pro-
mote discussion in consumer networks about their activities could become stars rather than oth-
ers who are less present in the media. Thereby, the study deals with an economic issue of gen-
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eral interest: does it pay more to develop your skills in your core business to perfection, or to 
maintain the current level of skills and invest in self-marketing?  
Analysing a sample of 288 restaurants, for potential star effects by differences in quality, the 
results show that higher quality increases chefs’ revenues. Yet, revenues do not increase dispro-
portionately, and achieving higher quality requires substantial investments in exquisite ingredi-
ents, excellent staff and prime ambience. This problem, also called the “agony of the stars”, has 
manifested itself in the bankruptcies of European three-star restaurants in recent years. As re-
gards potential star effects by differences in media presence, there is a positive impact of TV 
appearances on financial rewards. Yet, these income effects are moderate as well, so there is 
neither a direct, nor a classical Superstar effect in quality gastronomy. The findings suggest that 
although both perfection of skills and self-marketing have similarly positive income effects, 
self-marketing seems both the less risky and the less stressful way to enhance income.  
The contribution of the fifth chapter is the following:  
 First, adding to the merging of different theories, the study investigates the impact of 
feedback from consumer networks on business activity and the explanatory value such 
networks may have for understanding economic outcomes in deluxe gastronomy. 
 Second, research demonstrates that star effects in cultural industries occur in mass mar-
kets. Chung and Cox (1994), Hamlen (1994) and Sochay (1994), and Lucifora and 
Simmons (2003) provide evidence for Superstar effects in the music industry and the 
film industry, as well as in professional soccer. Complementing research on cultural 
mass markets, this study provides insights on the occurrence of such effects in cultural 
deep-pocket markets, too, as these have remained underresearched so far.  
 Third, by analysing two potential explanations for superior income – actual skills and 
media presence –, the study addresses an economic issue of general interest, which is 
whether it “pays more to develop one’s skills in one’s core business to perfection, or to 
invest in self-marketing”. 
Summary of Chapters – Perspectives and Empirical Evidence 
 
 37 
Thereby, the chapter provides implications concerning effects of feedback from consumer net-
works on business activity in general, by exploring these specific gaps in the literature: 
1. “Does an impact of consumer networks on business activity help explain economic out-
comes in deluxe gastronomy?”  
2. “Are there Superstar effects in deep-pocket cultural markets?” 
3. “Does it pay more to develop one’s skills in the core business to perfection, or to main-
tain the current level of skills and invest in self-marketing?” 
 
 IV. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The core of this dissertation contains five modular chapters. These chapters are woven together 
by the idea of analysing the impact of social structure on performance in different stages of a 
network’s lifecycle, through expanding economic reasoning with sociological approaches. Fig-
ure 3 displays the framework that integrates the five chapters. The left hand side of the figure 
acknowledges the central importance of examining the impact of social structure on perform-
ance in different lifecycle stages. The column headings organise the studies according to the 
sources of resources that actors seek to acquire. Also, they consider the origin of the data that is 
analysed in terms of their cross-sectional vs. longitudinal character. Cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal methods complement each other in producing insights on economic outcomes being 
subject to social structure. As the chapters are modular in nature, they can be read solitarily 
according to individual foci of interest. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Integrative Framework 
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 PART B 
I. SOCIAL CAPITAL TRANSFER AND PERFORMANCE IN FRANCHISING  
1. Abstract 
This chapter examines the role of franchisees’ social capital with customers for the performance 
development of new franchising ventures. Entrepreneurs that can transfer customers from their 
former occupation into the franchise arrangement have a starting advantage, since an established 
customer base provides some “certain” sales and referrals. Using panel data from 175 outlets, 
the empirical analysis shows a strong connection between a franchisee’s customer capital and 
short-term performance after system entry. Effects are even stronger if franchisees understand 
utilizing customer relationships as a source of information. However, benefits of transferred 
customers cease over time as others catch up in acquiring customers and know-how. 
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2. Introduction 
 “Just as for a child, the conditions under which an organization is born and the course  
of its development in infancy have important consequences for its later life”  
(Boeker, 1989, p. 490) 
The franchise system of distribution better suits the needs of some prospective entrepreneurs 
than others. Some franchisees prosper, stay within their system, and make major contributions 
to the system’s success – other franchisees fail in all areas (Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999). Only 
a small proportion of entrepreneurs has the potential for substantial wealth creation (Birley & 
Westhead, 1994; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon & Woo, 1994; Gilbert, McDougall & Audretsch, 
2006; Reynolds, 1987). Chains would greatly benefit if franchisors were more able to detect 
future high-performing franchisees in the pool of applicants and accept them into the system, 
rather than low performers (Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999). Yet, to date, although franchisees are 
an essential ingredient in successful chains and franchising is so important in today’s economy, 
few studies have analysed the determinants of franchisee performance (Dant, 2008; Michael & 
Combs, 2008). This chapter addresses the question of what makes a franchisee successful.  
The entrepreneurship literature has long assumed that entrepreneurial success can be attributed 
to some set of demographic factors, personality traits, or psychological variables that hold 
across different contexts (De Carolis & Saparito, 2006; Low & Abrahamson, 1997). But as 
equivocal research results show, most characteristics are context-dependent, thus have different 
effects on performance in different environments. Another stream of research emphasises the 
importance of networks, and the social capital inherent in them, for new firms (Aldrich & 
Zimmer, 1986). Social capital is “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an indi-
vidual” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243) that creates “entrepreneurial opportunities for cer-
tain players and not for others” (Burt, 1992, p. 7). Yet, as De Carolis, Litzkie and Eddleston 
(2009) point out, not all well-connected, aspiring entrepreneurs are able to successfully launch a 
business. Thus, relationships differ in their usefulness for reaching entrepreneurial ends (Combs 
& Ketchen, 1999). Focusing on performance ends, of all the social capital firms have in terms of 
relationships with other actors, customer relationships are the most central to their profit gener-
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ating purpose (Gupta, Lehmann & Stuart, 2004; Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey, 1998; Yli-Renko 
& Janakiraman, 2008). 
Drawing on De Carolis et al.’s (2009) and De Carolis and Saparito’s (2006) work on the impact 
of social capital and personal factors in exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities, and on De 
Clercq and Rangarajan’s (2008) and Reuber and Fischer’s (2005) work on how customer rela-
tionships affect new firms, this study focuses on social capital with customers for explaining 
start-up success. The thinking is that positive effects of a steady inflow of customers are less 
context-dependent than other factors’ effects.   
In customer relationships, entrepreneurs build up reputation (Reuber & Fischer, 2005). The 
value of a good reputation and social ties with customers is the following: first, a good reputa-
tion motivates customers to continue a relationship with a firm (Dollinger, Golden & Saxton, 
1997). Second, social ties transfer expectations about people’s behaviour from a prior social 
setting to a new business transaction (Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1996). Following these in-
sights, the idea is that entrepreneurs can use their customer relationships – those that they have 
built in another occupation, prior to system entry – as an asset for starting as a franchisee. En-
trepreneurs who can transfer customers from their previous into their subsequent occupation 
have a starting advantage, since an established customer base provides “certain” sales and refer-
rals. Here, “social capital transfer” describes the entrepreneur’s ability to transfer social capital 
in terms of customer relationships into the franchise arrangement. 
Consistent with the literature on how entrepreneurs use relationships for competitive advantage, 
this study is based on the premise that economic explanations for entrepreneurial success are 
incomplete and undersocialized. By combining the literature on social capital and new venture 
performance for the franchising context, this chapter makes several contributions. First, it ex-
tends research on franchisee performance (Dant, 2008; Michael & Combs, 2008). Second, prior 
studies on new firms’ relationships with customers examine primarily technology-based firms 
(Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008) and selected relationships like “key customers” (Abratt & 
Kelly, 2002; De Clercq & Rangarajan, 2008; Venkataraman, Van De Ven, Buckeye & Hudson, 
Social Capital Transfer  
 
 
 59 
1990; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001a; Yli-Renko, Sapienza & Hay, 2001b), and do nei-
ther address transfer of social capital nor consider the franchising context. Thus, this study adds 
to the broader discourse on the role of customer relationships for start-up performance and de-
velopment. Third, the few empirical studies on franchisee selection (Altinay & Miles, 2006; 
Clarkin & Swavely, 2006; Wang & Altinay, 2008; Williams, 1999) provide little evidence for 
how to select potentially better performing franchisees (Birley & Westhead, 1994; Jambulingam 
& Nevin, 1999; Saraogi, 2009). The results offer some implications for more successful selec-
tion. The next section outlines the literature on entrepreneurial performance and social capital 
with customers. Then, hypotheses on performance effects of social capital transfer are devel-
oped. In section 4 data and methods are described, section 5 reports the results. Section 6 con-
cludes. 
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3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
To date, few studies have analysed the determinants of franchisee performance (Dant, 2008). 
Research has addressed the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities in terms of starting a 
franchised or an independent firm, but little is known about the success of these exploitation 
attempts (De Carolis & Saparito, 2006; Kaufmann, 1999; Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 2005; Wil-
liams, 1999).  
However, studies have analysed performance differences among independent founders. The 
belief that the entrepreneurial firm is an extension of the entrepreneur has led many researchers 
to examine the entrepreneur’s personal characteristics (Gilbert et al., 2006). A plethora of fac-
tors has been considered (e.g. Box, White & Barr, 1993; Cooper et al., 1994; Davidsson & 
Honig, 2003; Ensley, Pearson & Amason, 2002; Sapienza & Grimm, 1997; Shrader & Siegel, 
2007; Siegel, Siegel & MacMillan, 1993; Vanaelst, Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Moray & 
S’Jegers, 2006). Demographic studies examine characteristics like the entrepreneur’s age, gen-
der, family background, education and experience. Personality and psychological studies exam-
ine variables like the need for achievement, risk aversion, self-reliance, values and beliefs. Be-
havioural studies consider behaviour and decision-making based on communicative, manage-
rial, manufacturing, marketing, organisational, or technical skills (Chrisman, Bauerschmidt & 
Hofer, 1998; Gilbert et al., 2006; Shrader & Siegel, 2007). By examining these factors, research 
demonstrates that entrepreneurs are in fact heterogeneous. Yet, results concerning the link be-
tween these factors and performance (in terms of sales, growth, ROI, or survival e.g.) are am-
biguous, since the performance impact of many factors is context-dependent (Low & Abraham-
son, 1997; Newbert, 2005; Shrader & Siegel, 2007; West & Noel, 2009). Factors that lead to 
success in one context can lead to failure in another, which may also apply to franchising ven-
tures (Low & Abrahamson, 1997). Still, identifying potentially better performing franchisees is 
central to each chain’s prospects in the marketplace. Jambulingam and Nevin (1999, p. 364) 
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argue, “the ideal in building and maintaining a high quality network of franchisees is a selection 
method that would qualify prospective franchisees based on their likely future performance”.5 
Another stream of research emphasises the importance of networks, and the social capital inher-
ent in them, for new firms (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Low and Abrahamson (1997, p. 437) 
point out that “entrepreneurship is a social process”, where organisations emerge because criti-
cal stakeholders commit to the organisation’s concept and their support is required for venture 
success. Researchers use the notion of social capital to refer both to the relationships that exist 
among individuals and to the assets that are mobilised through social relationships (Burt, 1992; 
Gant, Ichniowski & Shaw, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 1993). Burt (1992, p. 7) 
links social capital and performance by characterizing social capital as a resource that creates an 
advantage in “the way in which social structure renders competition imperfect by creating en-
trepreneurial opportunities for certain players and not for others” and brings a higher rate of 
return on investments. Both the entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Uzzi, 1996; 
Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997) and the social capital literature (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 
1992; De Carolis & Saparito, 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) empha-
sise the importance of social capital as the primary link to resources necessary for firm survival 
and growth (Morse, Fowler & Lawrence, 2007).6 Social capital can enhance performance di-
rectly by providing entrepreneurs with access to information, financial capital, emotional sup-
port, legitimacy, or competitive capabilities, and can offer indirect benefits by leveraging the 
productivity of internal resources (Florin, Lubatkin & Schulze, 2003; Stam & Elfring, 2008).  
Yet, as De Carolis et al. (2009) point out, not all well-connected, aspiring entrepreneurs are able 
to successfully launch a business. So, social capital is not universally beneficial for performance 
                                                     
5 Empirical studies on franchisee selection criteria focus on demographic factors like age and business or 
industry experience, personality, or financial strength (Altinay & Miles, 2006; Clarkin & Swavely, 
2006; Jambulingan & Nevin, 1999; Wang & Altinay, 2008; Williams, 1998). Yet, there is little empiri-
cal support for which criteria lead to the desired results (Birley & Westhead, 1994; Jambulingam & 
Nevin, 1999; Saraogi, 2009). Successful franchisee selection calls for further research (Clarkin & 
Swavely, 2006; Saraogi, 2009; Wang & Altinay, 2008).  
6 Two mechanisms explain why social ties provide access to resources under information asymmetry 
(Podolny, 1994). First, ties create social obligations that cause parties to behave generously towards 
each other (Gulati, 1995). Second, decision makers may be interested in preserving the exchange of 
private information, to be able to remove some ambiguity from decisions (Burt, 1992). The first ratio-
nale offers a socialized view of decision-making; the second is consistent with a self-interested perspec-
tive. 
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either – for example, because of investments involved in building and maintaining relationships, 
or since available resources are redundant or irrelevant (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Gho-
shal, 1998; Nasrallah, Levitt & Glynn, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). As Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 26) 
observe, “In life we cannot expect to derive any value from social ties to actors who lack the 
ability to help us”. Hence, relationships differ in their usefulness for reaching entrepreneurial 
ends.7 
Focusing on performance ends, of all the social capital firms have in terms of relationships with 
other actors, customer relationships are the most central to their profit generating purpose 
(Gupta et al., 2004; Srivastava et al., 1998; Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008). Often, relation-
ships provide potential benefits only (Srivastava et al., 1998), meaning obtainable resources – 
like information access, emotional support, or legitimacy – explain performance only to the 
extent that organisations capture the economic value that they create (Crook, Ketchen, Combs & 
Todd, 2008). Yet, resources obtainable from relationships with customers in terms of revenues 
provide actual benefits to the entrepreneur (in addition to potential benefits like access to infor-
mation that the entrepreneur may be able to exploit and convert into revenues in the future). 
Thus, social capital with customers is relevant for performance across multiple contexts.8 Re-
search shows that social capital in terms of customer relationships and the assets mobilised 
thereby, “customer capital” (Bontis, 1999; Duffy, 2000; St-Onge, 1996), serves as a barrier 
against customer switching (Jones, Mothersbaugh & Beatty, 2000). Reichheld (1996) identifies 
six economic benefits of retaining customers: (1) savings on customers’ acquisition or replace-
ment costs, (2) guaranteed base profits as existing customers are likely to have a minimum 
spend per period, (3) growth in per-customer revenue as over time, existing customers are likely 
to earn more, have more varied needs and spend more, (4) reductions in relative operating costs 
as firms can spread costs over more customers and over a longer period, (5) free of charge refer-
                                                     
7 “A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even 
harmful for others” (Coleman, 1990, p. 302). 
8 Sveiby (1989; 1997) pioneers the inclusion of customer capital as intangible assets of firms. He classi-
fies three customer types according to their contributions to value creation. The first type improves em-
ployees’ learning and ideas; the second enhances external structure through referrals to new customers 
or establishment of prestige; the third enhances the internal structure through leveraging R&D or 
knowledge transfer. 
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rals of new customers from existing customers, and (6) price premiums as existing customers do 
not usually wait for promotions before deciding to purchase, particular with new versions of 
products. Thus, sustained customer relationships increase performance (Dawkins & Reichheld, 
1990; Reichheld, 1996). 
In customer relationships, over time, the entrepreneur can build a reputation (Wickham, 2001). 
Reputation is the extent to which an actor is held in high regard by external stakeholders and is 
determined by the value of the actor’s previous efforts (Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002). A well-reputed firm is believed to have the ability and willingness to maintain 
promised quality standards (Erdem & Swait, 2004). Two basic insights on the value of reputa-
tion and ties with customers are that first, a good reputation motivates customers to continue a 
relationship with a firm (Dollinger et al., 1997), and second, social ties between parties transfer 
expectations about people’s behaviour from a prior social setting to a new business transaction 
(Shane & Cable, 2002; Uzzi, 1996).  
Building on these insights, the idea is that entrepreneurs can use customer relationships that they 
have established in another occupation, prior to system entry, as an asset for starting as a fran-
chisee. Entrepreneurs who can transfer customers from the previous into their subsequent occu-
pation have a starting advantage, since an established customer base provides “certain” sales 
and referrals. Here, “social capital transfer” describes the entrepreneur’s ability to transfer social 
capital in terms of customer relationships into the franchise arrangement. Social capital transfer 
can occur because there are information asymmetries in markets. Entrepreneurs possess infor-
mation about their business that others do not. Customers face risks when selecting among firms 
as firms vary in the ability to provide good service and may act opportunistically towards them. 
If the entrepreneur has met customer expectations particularly well before, customers may 
choose to continue patronizing the entrepreneur after start-up rather than the entrepreneur’s 
former firm. 
There is anecdotal evidence that customers in fact follow a seller when the seller leaves the firm 
and starts in or founds another. The first customer of SAP, the British chemical company ICI, 
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was previously an IBM customer that had been served by a member of the SAP founders’ team 
at IBM. When the Saatchi brothers left Saatchie & Saatchi and founded M & C Saatchi in 1995, 
they took along top clients. In 2000, UTA Telecom followed their creative advisors from Lintas 
to BBDO. One (telecommunications) and mobilcom austria accompanied creative directors who 
had served them before to new agencies. Marketing Director S. Mathony (Booz & Company) 
states, “Giving up a cooperation involves risks. Thus, for some customers, it is worthwhile to 
follow a trusted seller” when this seller moves to another firm (extradienst, 2009, p. 4; translated 
from German).9 Similarly, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2004) note that in the insurance indus-
try, customers are often more loyal to the salesperson than to the company. Cooper and Dunkel-
berg (1986) find that entrepreneurs are oriented towards the same or similar customers like their 
former firms, and often stay in the same geographical area, which facilitates customer transfer. 
Benefits of sustained customer relationships can be even stronger when customers provide criti-
cal information (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Social capital with customers can enhance the 
entrepreneur’s ability to obtain (nonpublic) information by offering better timing, relevance, and 
quality of information and lower information-gathering costs (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Podolny, 1994; Uzzi, 1996). For example, customers can refine 
entrepreneurs’ knowledge about customer preferences which helps to provide satisfactory ser-
vices (Gupta & Zeithaml, 2006; Ramani & Kumar, 2008; Rayport & Jaworski, 2005; Sriniva-
san, Anderson & Ponnavolu, 2002). Customers also provide information to other consumers, as 
they tend to spread word of mouth if they feel good about the relationship with a firm and be-
lieve that a firm offers economic value (Ramani & Kumar, 2008; Reichheld, 2006). Thereby, 
they bring in new customers. 
H1a: Social capital transfer enhances franchisee start-up performance.  
H1b: The effect of social capital transfer on performance is stronger 
 if customers serve as an important source of information. 
                                                     
9 In advertising, customers are often more loyal to those who handle the customer contact than to the 
creative personnel, because the latter produce unobservable input, but the contact persons work directly 
alongside the customer. Customer transfer enhances sellers’ career prospects, “With a big budget up his 
sleeve, a newcomer [...] has a different standing and different [i.e. much better] career prospects” 
(extradienst, 2009, p. 4; translated from German). 
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Initial resources may predispose entrepreneurs to certain paths or equip them with unequal abili-
ties to meet challenges, but they do not predetermine the future. Rather, the subsequent unfold-
ing of events, including key decisions and management practices of the entrepreneur, shapes the 
new firm’s performance (Cooper et al., 1994). Yet, reputation differences are quite stable over 
time, and an entrepreneur’s good reputation with customers is difficult to replicate in the short 
term (Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). So, a good reputation with custom-
ers at start-up may bind customers over a longer term, with all the positive effects of customer 
retention on performance. The reputation-performance-effect may even operate in both direc-
tions (McGuire, Schneeweis & Branch, 1990): a firm’s reputation with its customers increases 
its performance and in turn, sound performance affects its reputation positively, which rein-
forces existing relationships and helps to attract more and more new customers. Then, social 
capital transfer is not just a starting advantage, but a lasting advantage.  
H2: Social capital transfer enhances franchisee long-term performance. 
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4. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
4.1 Sample 
The sample comprises 175 franchisees of two chains in pet retail and pet supplies. Retail is the 
largest German industry in franchising (in 2008 sales, 36%). The context selected for the study 
possesses multiple desired characteristics, including customer motivation, uncertainty and ex-
perience properties. Fischer and Reuber (2007) argue that consumers are motivated to pay closer 
attention to a firm when they perceive that important outcomes depend on it.10 The sample con-
text is a high-motivation context because of the emotional component involved for consumers. 
So, customers are motivated to monitor the seller’s efforts. The seller’s efforts are particularly 
important in industries that are characterized by consumer uncertainty. The sample context is 
characterized by uncertainty because quality differences in the offering may initially be hard to 
spot, but consumers will learn about the quality of their purchase later. This study prefers a con-
sequential context because risk-free exchanges are less relevant to trust development and reputa-
tion-building, and it prefers an experience context because such contexts enable consumers to 
observe and evaluate behaviours of sellers (Sirdeshmukh, Singh & Sabol, 2002). Thus, in the 
sample context, consumers have both the motivation and the opportunity to decide to stick to a 
seller because of previously satisfactory services. As there are industry-specific effects on per-
formance (Short, Ketchen, Palmer & Hult, 2007), this research focuses on a single industry to 
control for that fact. 
Common wisdom holds that industry experience is not essential for franchisees as the franchisor 
provides training and support. Yet, transfer will rather occur when entrepreneurs are in the same 
industry as their former firm. Many sample franchisees (51%) have been active in the industry 
before system entry. Thus, the context provides a good background for analysing the hypothe-
ses.  
                                                     
10 They further point out that in high-motivation contexts, a firm’s individual reputation is more important 
than the overall reputation of the category to which the firm belongs. So the entrepreneur’s reputation 
can count more than the franchisor’s reputation. Additionally, franchisor reputation is the same for all 
franchisees, so differences depend on the entrepreneur. 
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The first (second) system was founded in 1994 (2004) and has 230 (25) franchisees. Self-
administered postal questionnaires with a letter assuring franchisees of anonymity and a univer-
sity address for responses were distributed among all outlets in late 2007. The formulation of the 
questionnaire items emerged from a qualitative-explorative pre-study involving franchisors, 
consultants, and franchisee focus groups. Responses arrived until February 2008. In four rounds 
of follow-up calls, non-respondents were contacted for telephone interviews. The response rate 
is 65% (100%) in the first (second) system. In case of multiple ownership, franchisees were 
asked to focus on their first outlet.11 For the first system, the study includes data from a larger 
project on franchisor quality by the International Centre for Franchising and Cooperation. This 
data enables to track system development and conduct more stringent tests on sample represen-
tativeness (see also Chrisman, Chua & Steiner, 2002; Chrisman and McMullan, 2000). Due to 
missing data, the analysis is based on 157 franchisees. 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
Research suggests that capturing the multidimensionality of new firm performance requires 
objective and subjective measures to achieve triangulation (Baron & Tang, 2009; Brush & Van-
derwerf, 1992; Chandler & Hanks, 1993; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Zahra, Neubaum & El-
Hagrassey, 2002). So, this study uses both.  
Following Zahra et al. (2002), this study uses the objective performance criteria of total sales 
and growth. Sales are the most common indicator of new venture performance (Birley & 
Westhead, 1994; Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg, 1989; Dess & Rob-
inson, 1984; Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Stam & Elfring, 2008). Although 
sales volume is only a short-term measure of a store’s competitive strength, long-term implica-
tions suggest a strong linkage of sales and profitability (Buzzell & Gale, 1987). The most com-
mon indicators of new venture growth are growth in sales, employment, and market share (Gil-
bert et al., 2006). Empirical studies show strong links among these measures (Baron & Tang, 
                                                     
11 Some research on customer relationships in entrepreneurial contexts (Reuber & Fischer, 2005; Yli-
Renko et al., 2001b) prefers to focus on companies that are no more than ten years old (yet, for exam-
ple, De Clerq & Rangarajan (2008) do not follow this approach). Here, 91% of franchisees joined later 
than 1996. 
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2009). Following Amason, Shrader and Tompson (2006), Chrisman and Leslie (1989), Covin, 
Green and Slevin (2006), Covin, Slevin and Heeley (1999); Florin et al. (2003), and Sapienza, 
Smith and Gannon (1988), this research uses sales growth, which is consistent with previous 
research on network forms of organisations (Collins & Clark, 2003; Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; 
Park & Luo, 2001; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil & Aulakh, 2001; Singh & Mitchell, 2005; Stu-
art, 2000).  
For measuring sales and growth, respondents filled in a series of blanks, as done in prior studies 
(Zahra, 1996b, 1996c; Zahra & Bogner, 2000; Zahra et al., 2002). Brush and Vanderwerf (1992) 
and Chandler and Hanks (1993) establish high accuracy and reliability of such founder reported 
performance data. Franchisees were asked for sales volume for one year after start-up, for ana-
lysing the short-term effect of social capital transfer. For addressing lasting effects, a three year 
time lag is chosen, in line with the literature (Homburg, Droll & Totzek, 2008; McGee, Dowling 
& Megginson, 1995; Reinartz, Krafft & Hoyer, 2004; Rust, Moorman & Dickson, 2002). For 
sales growth, this study uses a three-year compounded annual rate, as the literature suggests 
(McGee et al., 1995; West, 2007).  
Because this research collects self-reported data from a single source, there are concerns of 
common method bias. Prior research recommends comparing primary and secondary data to 
establish validity of survey-based measures (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Chandler & Hanks, 
1993, McDougall & Robinson, 1990; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Zahra, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Zahra 
et al., 2002). Corroborating data on past performance for a subsample of 25 firms could be ob-
tained from system sources. Results somewhat alleviate concerns; correlations are 0.97 for first 
year sales, 0.91 for growth (both p < 0.01). 
Perceived performance is measured with the previously validated scale used by West (2007; 
based on Dess & Robinson, 1984; see also, West & Noel, 2009). Although manager personality 
and aspiration levels could affect perceived performance evaluations, subjective measures have 
shown strong reliability and validity (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Stam & Elfring, 2008). The 
scale’s first item assesses the percentage of ideal performance being achieved in the first year 
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after system entry (“ideal” is 100%); its other two items assess initial growth and overall per-
formance in the first year “relative to competitors in the system who are comparable in age” 
(Abeele & Christiaens, 1986; Dess & Robinson, 1984; Sapienza et al., 1988; West, 2007; West 
& Noel, 2009). Porter (1980) argues that firms are aware of their competitors’ activities, a posi-
tion substantiated by Brush and Vanderwerf (1992). In both systems, sales data is shared in the 
system, so franchisees can assess relative performance. In line with West and Noel (2009) and 
Stam and Elfring (2008), the items use a seven-point agreement scale (for the latter two items, 
anchored by the performance descriptors of 1, “much worse,” to 7, “much better”; the first 
item’s percentages are transformed on a 7-point scale). A composite scale is built by summing 
and averaging the item scores, using equal weights. Reliability of the scale is assessed by Cron-
bach’s alpha. The alpha value of 0.96 is well above the lower acceptability limit of 0.60 (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). Item-to-total and inter-item correlations confirm construct 
reliability. When factor analysed, all factor loadings are highly significant, which also indicates 
convergent validity (Bagozzi, Yi & Phillips, 1991; Homburg et al., 2008). A substantially simi-
lar scale has been reliably used in other research on new ventures (Lumpkin & Dess, 1995).  
4.3 Independent and Control Variables 
Social Capital Transfer. This research uses franchisee-reported data as real time data on all 
customers of all entrepreneurs of both systems prior to and after system entry is not obtainable. 
To assess social capital transfer and information, this study uses items from previously validated 
scales, adapted to the study context. As indicators of social capital with customers, retention and 
loyalty measures are used most often (Chang & Tseng, 2005; Duffy, 2000; Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997). Dawkins and Reichheld’s (1990) seminal paper on retention suggests measuring 
the number of customers staying as a percentage of the original number over a specific period. 
Duffy (2000) measures customer capital as the number of customers present and the annual 
sales per customer. Wiesel, Skiera and Villanueva (2008) propose a model to monitor customer 
assets by the number of total, new, and lost customers, the cash flow per customer, and the re-
tention rate. Hitt, Shimizu, Uhlenbruck and Bierman (2006) quantify „relational capital” with 
Social Capital Transfer  
 
 
 70 
clients in law firms by the number of clients, a percentage value of the client’s sales of total 
sales, and annual compensation received from the client. Following these approaches, franchi-
sees were asked to assess customer capital in the first year after system entry in terms of (1) the 
number of transferred customers, (2) the percentage of transferred customers of the previous 
customers (present in the year prior to system entry), (3) the percentage of transferred customers 
of their franchise outlet customers, and (4) the transferred sales volume. Answers are trans-
formed into categories from 1-5 (1 – low, 5 – high values). A composite scale is built by sum-
ming and averaging the four items’ scores, using equal weights. Scale reliability is assessed by 
Cronbach’s alpha (0.82), item-to-total and inter-item correlations, all of which confirm construct 
reliability. When factor analysed, all factor loadings are highly significant, indicating conver-
gent validity (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Homburg et al., 2008).12  
Information. Ramani and Kumar (2008) develop a comprehensive model of a firm’s “interaction 
orientation”. The model reflects a firm’s ability to interact with customers and take advantage of 
information provided by them. Measures of entrepreneurs’ ability to benefit from customer in-
formation used here correspond to items used in their study. Franchisees rate “I encourage my 
customers to share opinions of my products and/or services with me” and “I encourage my cus-
tomers to share opinions of my products and/or services with other customers” (see also Macy, 
Farias, Rosa & Moore, 2007; Macy & Moore, 2004; Ramani & Kumar, 2008; Sorensen, Folker 
& Brigham, 2008). Gains from interaction are addressed with the items “I use information from 
my customers, like feedback on products, to improve my business activities”, “My current cus-
tomer contacts help me attract new customers”; previous studies use related items to assess the 
impact of customer information on outcomes (De Clercq & Rangarajan, 2008; Dyer, 1997; Ra-
mani & Kumar, 2008; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a).13 Franchisees indicate agreement with each item 
                                                     
12 The situation is more complex when customers have multiple suppliers or a few customers spend dis-
proportionately. The study does not attempt to specify these issues. Franchisees were confident as re-
gards their ability to observe customer transfer. Measuring transfer based on entrepreneurs’ percep-
tions follows Roberts and Dowling (2002) who explain that using perceptional measures poses no 
problem per se (see also Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Dowling, 2001). One third of sample franchisees 
could not transfer any customer. 
13 Survey-based measures of knowledge acquisition have previously been effectively used by Simonin 
(1997), Yli-Renko et al. (2001a), Zahra et al. (2000) and Zander and Kogut (1995). 
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on a 7-point scale (7 – strongly agree, 1 – strongly disagree). The composite scale’s Cronbach’s 
alpha (0.91), item-to-total and inter-item correlations support reliability.  
Franchisees interviewed in the pre-stage all suggested that the approaches taken were appropri-
ate for gathering information on the study context. The study further controls for common 
method bias in the self-reported variables using Harman’s single factor test. The test yields 
more than one factor, no factor accounts for most of the variance; thus, following Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie and Lee (2003), common method bias should not be an issue.  
Control Variables. The study controls for effects of variables that are commonly used in entre-
preneurial and franchising research (Baron & Tang, 2009; Cooper et al., 1994; Jambulingam & 
Nevin, 1999; Low & Abrahamson, 1999; Newbert, Kirchhoff & Walsh, 2007): franchisee age 
and education measured in years; gender (1 – male, 0 – female), prior self-employment, prior 
leadership position and prior industry experience are dummies (1 – yes, 0 – no); franchisee 
“background” counts family members and friends who were self-employed prior to the franchi-
see’s system entry. The study includes each franchisee’s year of system entry, so that perform-
ance is comparable over time, a system dummy (1 – larger, 0 – smaller system), outlet size 
(measured by the number of employees, following Yli-Renko and Janakiraman (2008), in cate-
gories of 1-3, 4-6, etc.), GDP of the outlet’s area, and the competitive situation in terms of the 
number of other system outlets in the area, at system entry.14 
4.4 Methods 
Cross Sectional Data. Initial investigation reveals that the dependent variables are not normally 
distributed. Following Chrisman et al. (2002) and Kennedy (1979), this research takes natural 
logarithms to examine the relationship between social capital transfer and performance (H1a). 
Following Shane, Shankar and Aravindakshan (2006), nonlog variables are used for robustness 
checks: the regression results do not show substantive differences from the regression with log 
variables. For testing the implications of customer information on the relationship postulated in 
                                                     
14 The analysis also controls for non-system competition on a yearly basis, using 2003 to 2006 data; there 
are no significant results. It further examines if franchisees start their business in the geographical area 
in which they were active before system entry. Starting a business in the home market correlates with 
customer transfer (0.48, p < 0.1), but neither with the information variable, nor with sales.  
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H1a, the study estimates moderated OLS regressions (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 
1986). These are appropriate to reveal whether a moderator variable has an influence on the 
strength and/or form of the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable. Fol-
lowing the methodology by Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie (1981), to examine interaction ef-
fects, information input is treated as a moderator based on the argument that leads up to H1b. 
The interaction term used in the regressions is the product term of the mean-adjusted scales for 
social capital transfer and information. The analysis controls for absence of multicollinearity 
with Variance Inflation Factors (all below three), and for normal distribution of disturbances 
with Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Tests. 
Balanced Panel Data. For testing H2, following Roberts and Dowling (2002), a first-order auto-
regressive model is used to capture the intertemporal effects of the regressors on sales perform-
ance:  
PERFORMANCEit = a0 + a1*SCTRANSFERit-1 + a2*INFORMATIONit-1  
+ a3*SCTRANSFERit-1*INFORMATIONit-1 + b0*PERFORMANCEit-1 + eit,  
where PERFORMANCEit (PERFORMANCEit-1) is third (first) year performance of firm 
i.15   
A fundamental assumption of regression analysis is that the independent variables are uncorre-
lated with the disturbance term. Otherwise, OLS coefficients can be biased. Here, it is expected 
that the independent variables that influence first year performance influence third year per-
formance as well, and first year performance is included as a regressor variable. So, potential 
simultaneity issues arise. The standard approach in cases where a regressor variable is correlated 
with the residuals is to estimate the equation using instrumental variables regression (Maddala, 
2001). As instrumental variables regression, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is employed. Prior 
industry experience is used as an instrumental variable. The variable fulfils the criteria of rele-
vance and exogeneity (Maddala, 2001) since it influences first year performance (see Models 0-
1), and does not influence third year performance directly according to correlations and auxil-
iary regressions, but only indirectly via first year performance. The logic is that experience pro-
vides new franchisees with a know-how advantage at start-up, but that this advantage erodes as 
                                                     
15 Higher initial performance allows investments in additional marketing or customer acquisition and 
binding activities e.g., which can affect future performance. 
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other new franchisees acquire the same skills over time. OLS and 2SLS results concur. A 
Hausman test that indicates that 2SLS results are more reliable. So, 2SLS results are reported. 
The analysis uses White period estimates as a coefficient covariance method to make sure stan-
dard errors are robust to serial correlation (Arellano, 1987; White, 1980).16 
The study compares both systems’ average sample observation with the average outlet-owner 
computed from each system’s population along the dimensions age, gender, years in business, 
and prior self-employment. Therefore, it uses previously collected data, and to obtain further 
information on the populations, officials in the chains were contacted. No evidence of nonre-
sponse biases emerged. 
 
                                                     
16 The two most important controls from Models 0-3 are also included in Model 4 (system dummy and 
year of entry). 
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5. Results 
Table 1 displays the coefficient estimates of the OLS and 2SLS Models. Table 2 presents the 
variables’ statistics and correlations. H1a is supported, social capital transfer enhances perform-
ance (Models 1, 2). For sales performance, H1b is supported as well, social capital transfer par-
ticularly enhances franchisee performance if customers serve as an important source of informa-
tion (Model 1). H2 is not supported: although franchisee performance is path-dependent, mean-
ing that higher first year sales correspond to higher later sales (here, in t = 3), social capital 
transfer and interaction effects at start-up do not lead to higher performance in later years 
(Model 4). In fact, growth rates for franchisees who realise social capital transfer are lower than 
for other franchisees who do not have that sort of starting advantage (Model 3). Thus, those 
franchisees who could not transfer social capital will catch up with those who could in later 
years; after three years, sales performance is about to even out among the two groups. To illus-
trate this result, in the first year, franchisees who transfer less social capital than the average 
franchisee have a mean sales disadvantage of 4% compared with those whose transfer is average 
or more. After three years, they catch up, reaching 99% of the other group’s sales performance. 
Although 4% seems only a small difference, retail profit margins are traditionally very low in 
Germany. Often, margins are less than 4% (Deloitte, 2009). Thus, social capital transfer can 
strongly influences the franchisee’s ability to generate a positive margin.  
Besides, there is a substantial correlation between sales in the first (third) year and a variable 
indicating whether a franchisee owns multiple outlets today (0.28, p < 0.01 (0.44, p < 0.001)). 
So, initially better performing franchisees tend to have more outlets later. 
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Table 1: Results 
 
 Model  0  Model  1     Model 2      Model 3   Model 4 
Dependent  
Variable 
Sales Performancet=1  Sales Performancet=1    Perceived Performance      Growth Sales Performancet=3 
Method                  OLS OLS     OLS      OLS             2SLS 
C -82.775** (26.708) -16.828  (17.104) -100.278 (61.064) -14.351 (8.757) -43.416** (13.166) 
Social Capital Transfer   0.155*** (0.032) 0.259** (0.088) -0.036** (0.013) 0.012 (0.045) 
Information   0.156*** (0.029) 0.389*** (0.092) -0.062*** (0.013) -0.051 (0.042) 
Social Capital Transfer x 
Information 
  0.038* (0.016) 0.048 (0.006) -0.018* (0.008) -0.016 (0.015) 
Sales Performancet=1         0.486† (0.252) 
Age 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003) -0.014 (0.012) -0.003 (0.002)   
Gender 0.103 (0.085) 0.008 (0.059) 0.167 (0.189) -0.036 (0.027)    
Education -0.016 (0.012) -0.007 (0.007) -0.042 (0.026) 0.002 (0.004)     
Self-Employment -0.182** (0.069) -0.039 (0.046) 0.016 (0.159) 0.044† (0.023)    
Leadership 0.251*** (0.070) -0.035 (0.051) -0.012 (0.172) 0.017 (0.025)   
Industry Experience 0.304*** (0.070) 0.110* (0.042) 0.081 (0.164) -0.021 (0.024)    
Background 0.021 (0.021) 0.007 (0.014) -0.051 (0.046) -0.008 (0.007)   
Competition -0.001 (0.016) -0.000  (0.010) -0.006 (0.036) -0.000 (0.005)    
GDP -0.051 (0.070) -0.066  (0.048) 0.082 (0.160) 0.022 (0.023)   
Year (System Entry) 0.047*** (0.013) 0.014† (0.009) 0.053† (0.030) 0.007† (0.005) 0.022** (0.007) 
Outlet Size 0.149* (0.065) 0.086* (0.039) 0.142 (0.145) -0.018 (0.021)   
System 0.555*** (0.142) 0.688*** (0.094) 0.999** (0.321) -0.090† (0.046) 0.212 (0.194) 
F 7.312*** 27.613*** 10.428*** 10.296*** 24.402*** 
R2 0.379 0.746  0.526 0.523 0.580 
Adj. R2 0.327 0.719  0.476 0.472 0.563 
N = 157. Beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Sales Performancet=1 12.75 0.50                                 
(2) Sales Performancet=3 13.03 0.59 0.69***                              
(3) Growth  0.17 0.17 -0.79*** -0.12                             
(4) Perceived Performance 4.07 1.22 0.67*** 0.59*** -0.43***                           
(5) Social Capital Transfer 2.75 1.40 0.68*** 0.42*** -0.60*** 0.64***                          
(6) Information  4.29 1.30 0.64*** 0.33*** -0.61*** 0.63*** 0.78***                        
(7) Age  44.15 6.85 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.17* -0.16† -0.16†                      
(8) Gender   0.13 -0.01 -0.18† 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.05                     
(9) Education 15.52 3.13 -0.18* -0.02 0.06 -0.16* -0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.16†                   
(10) Self-Employment   -0.12 0.12 0.21* -0.15† -0.35*** -0.39*** 0.21* -0.15 -0.02                 
(11) Leadership   0.24** 0.10 -0.24** 0.23** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.05 -0.14 0.05 -0.02               
(12) Industry Experience    0.30*** 0.07 -0.23** 0.26** 0.34*** 0.20* -0.03 -0.30 0.02 0.10 0.20*             
(13) Background 2.17 1.66 0.12 0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.70 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.19* -0.07 -0.06          
(14) Competition 3.71 2.26 0.10 0.12 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.10 -0.08 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.22*        
(15) GDP 0.56 0.50 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.14† 0.06 0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 0.20* 0.05 0.23**    
(16) Year (System Entry) 2000.48 3.22 0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.26** 0.41*** 0.38*** -0.26** 0.18* -0.04 -0.33*** 0.00 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 0.20*   
(17) Outlet Size 1.42 0.66 0.19* 0.12 -0.11 0.09 -0.12 -0.11 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.31*** -0.07 0.06 0.26** 0.05 0.07 -0.30***  
(18) System   0.24** 0.14† -0.02 0.01 -0.31*** -0.29*** 0.14† 0.00 -0.08 0.44*** -0.04 0.07 0.29*** 0.30*** -0.06 -0.60*** 0.47*** 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1 
Social Capital Transfer  
 
77 
6. Limitations and Discussion 
6.1 Research Limitations 
There are some limitations to the study that also provide avenues for future research. First, be-
cause real time measures are unavailable, the analysis relies on self-reported survey data. To 
guard against the issues related to such data, the study checks for common method bias, verifies 
self-reported data with previously collected data and system data, and uses previously validated 
scales when possible. Further research could examine social capital transfer from the customer’s 
perspective. Another limitation is survivor bias that is a common restriction to economic re-
search. 
6.2 Discussion 
Based on the premise that entrepreneurs differ in their potential for wealth creation and that 
chains benefit if franchisors are more able to select potentially better performing franchisees 
from the pool of applicants, this research addresses the question of what makes a good franchi-
see. As the performance effects of many entrepreneurial characteristics, like demographic or 
personality characteristics, are context-dependent, the study focuses on entrepreneurs’ social 
capital with customers. The literature explains that social capital with customers is most central 
to profit generation, thus will affect performance across multiple contexts. The thinking is that 
entrepreneurs can use customer relationships that they have established in another occupation, 
prior to system entry, as an asset for starting as a franchisee. Transferring customers from a 
previous occupation into the franchise arrangement provides advantages like “certain” sales and 
referrals.  
The study tests the impact of social capital transfer using panel data from 175 franchise outlets. 
The franchise context is particularly useful for testing this impact as (nearly) “all other things 
are equal”, meaning that the conditions under which a system’s entrepreneurs start are much 
more homogeneous – regarding the business concept, product portfolio, initial investments, 
franchisor support etc. – than those for independent entrepreneurs. The empirical results show 
that social capital transfer enhances initial performance and thus offers a starting advantage. 
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Social capital transfer increases sales particularly if customers serve as a source of information 
for the entrepreneur and for other consumers. First, the entrepreneur learns to better adjust to 
customers’ expectations, and second, spreading word-of-mouth about the entrepreneur’s good 
service brings in new customers. Yet, benefits of social capital transfer seize over time: franchi-
sees who perform better at start-up still tend to perform (a little) better than others later on, but 
social capital transfer and interaction effects at start-up themselves do not lead to higher per-
formance in later years. Growth rates for franchisees who realise social capital transfer are 
lower than for other franchisees who do not have that sort of starting advantage. At the end of 
the third year, 75% of first year performance differences among customer-transferring and non-
transferring franchisees have evened out. Thus, social capital transfer offers a strong short-term, 
but not a strong lasting, advantage. Following these results, although entrepreneurs realise gains 
in the beginning, bandwagon effects of comparably high initial demand are rather small. 
The fact that performance evens out over time may be attributed to outlet capacity or customer 
lifecycle arguments. First, most likely, there is a maximum capacity to serve customers for 
every outlet, for instance, because of technical reasons or the franchisor’s territorial strategy. 
The degree of initial capacity used is higher for customer-transferring franchisees, while the 
others have to acquire customers over time. Successively, the others catch up, until they reach a 
similarly strong capacity utilisation. Second, customer relationships exhibit lifecycle features, so 
transferred customers will not patronize an outlet for ever. Over time, they will stop, for exam-
ple, because they come to prefer another seller or stop buying the product category. The litera-
ture on customer switching behaviour yields numerous reasons for churn behaviour (Keaveney, 
1995; Reichheld, 1996), like service failure, pricing, competition, inconvenience (like waiting 
times), even in cases where customers are basically satisfied.  
If customers stop patronizing, they are likely to also stop making referrals to other consumers. 
So, transferred customers become less important as a source of information over time; there are 
no referral “cascades” that make customer transfer a strong lasting advantage. In addition, the 
value of customer information for franchisees may decline because know-how accumulation 
shows decreasing returns to scale (Tikoo, 2002). Successively, the franchisee learns about the 
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system’s product portfolio and the new customers, so additional input is less valuable later on 
than at start-up. Successful franchisees’ motivation to acquire and adjust to information may 
further decrease over time – as Shepherd and DeTienne (2005, p. 104) explain, “prior knowl-
edge leads to the identification of more opportunities [...], but over time and with tenure in a 
particular firm some individuals may allow themselves to become entrenched in mental ruts”.  
This study provides a diagnostic framework for entrepreneurs and franchisors to evaluate per-
formance prospects based on social capital with customers. The study results have implications 
for both. First, entrepreneurs must create and exploit opportunities for building customer capital, 
and understand customer relationships as learning opportunities. Individuals who plan to join a 
system can intensify customer-binding activities before system entry to enhance career perspec-
tives. 
A premise in much of the network literature is that the higher the number of external relation-
ships, the more benefits the firm can realise (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000). Some studies 
examine if there is an upper limit to this argument, and emphasise the importance of focusing on 
a limited number of high-value relationships because of transaction costs and managerial effort 
required for maintaining and utilizing relationships (Lettl, Herstatt & Gemuenden, 2006; Yli-
Renko & Janakiraman, 2008). As the relationship marketing literature points out, small sellers 
will find it challenging to engage in relationships with all customers and thus, must selectively 
allocate their attention across external activities (including spending time with customers) and 
internal activities (Cooper, Ramachandran & Schoorman, 1997; De Clerq & Rangarajan, 2008). 
Here, there is not an upper limit regarding franchisees’ customer relationships: the more, the 
merrier. Yet, possibly, inverted effects do not occur since obtaining information does not neces-
sitate extensive managerial efforts or, again, due to capacity arguments – as franchisors exert 
territorial control, outlets never come to interact with “infinite” numbers of customers, but serve 
a certain number and if more customers come, another outlet will open proximately. 
Good news for franchisees who cannot transfer customers is that at last, they will catch up with 
those who can. Good news for those who can transfer customers is that because initially suc-
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cessful franchisees tend to have more outlets later, good initial performance still pays off in later 
years, if not in the initial outlet, by being allowed to open more outlets over time. 
Second, franchisors must consider that they do not only choose the franchisee, but they may 
also choose an integral part of their new customer base when accepting a franchisee into the 
system. As customer-transferring franchisees provide higher sales and thus higher profits to the 
system centre for several years after start-up, franchisee screening and selection should be re-
sponsive to franchisee’s abilities to transfer customer capital. Customer-transferring franchisees 
may further cause less costs for initial support. Possibly, it pays off to provide them with a 
broader initial product portfolio than the average new franchisee, or to let their outlets test inno-
vative products, because they may receive more valuable feedback from customers and may be 
more able to promote product diffusion in the market than less successful system members. 
Because of higher revenues, these franchisees can also pay back entry fees faster, so offering 
better financial conditions to attract them into the particular system could be an option. As Burt 
(1992, p. 6) observes, “To the extent that people play an active role in shaping their relation-
ships, then a player who knows how to structure a network to provide high opportunities knows 
whom to include in the network”. Gibb and Davies (1990, p. 16) argue that “it is perhaps an 
unrealistic expectation that it will be possible definitely to pick winners or indeed to produce a 
comprehensive theory that leads to this. But arguably it is better to make further strides towards 
better understanding of the factors that influence the growth process”. Additionally, results indi-
cate that consumers do not necessarily choose the brand before patronizing a specific outlet as 
widely believed (Dant (2008) points this issue out as an important research question), but loyal-
ties can rather be based on the entrepreneur, who makes consumers choose the brand. 
Proposing that economic explanations for entrepreneurial success are incomplete and underso-
cialized, this study contributes to the field by showing that social capital transfer is an important 
mechanism that affects entrepreneurial success. So, there is general support for the premise of 
this research. 
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 II. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATIVE EFFICIENCY ON FRANCHISEE  
PERFORMANCE 
1. Abstract 
The objective of this study is to examine how franchise network members can organize net-
working activities efficiently. Conceptualising the franchise organisation as a social network 
arrangement, this chapter argues that efficient resource transmission among franchisees is es-
sential in the quest for competitive advantage and economic rents, and is the key to higher indi-
vidual (and in aggregation, collective) performance. Thus, efficient exchange reinforces the 
superiority of the network form of organisation to alternative organisational designs. The study 
suggests that interfranchisee communication is the strategic means for efficient exchange. Hy-
potheses are tested on a sample of 121 fashion retail franchisees.  
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2. Introduction 
 “Never give a party if you will be the most interesting person there” 
Mickey Friedman, Novelist 
Research in strategic management emphasises the functionality of networks for managing re-
source dependencies and fostering learning and knowledge exchange (Podolny & Page, 1998). 
With respect to these activities, networks can provide efficiency advantages that markets or 
hierarchies do not possess. Yet, realising these advantages depends on interaction between net-
work members. Thus, network partners play a significant role in shaping the resource-based 
competitive advantage of the firm (Afuah, 2000; Lavie, 2006; Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; Stu-
art, 2000). This idea applies also in the franchising context (Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000). 
Franchising is an organisational arrangement midway between a price-determined market ex-
change and vertically integrated firm activities. The network organisation secures resource 
availability for its members, which is essential in the quest for competitive advantage and eco-
nomic rents (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Crook, Ketchen, 
Combs, & Todd, 2008; Koka, Madhavan & Prescott, 2006). Resources are made available first, 
by contracts that establish franchisor-franchisee exchange. Second, by building interfranchisee 
relationships, franchisees can form social networks in the system. In social networks, personal 
relationships can offer privileged access to resources like knowledge, information and best prac-
tices, that help individuals to become more productive (Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006; 
Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). As Granovetter has shown in seminal papers (1973; 1985), 
such intermixing of economic and non-economic activities brings about that “non-economic 
activity affects the costs and the available techniques for economic activity” (Granovetter, 2005, 
p. 35).  
For resource acquisition, the system’s franchisees must communicate with each other. Koza and 
Dant (2007, p. 281f.) argue, “Information should be viewed as an investment that one channel 
member makes in another […], and communication provides the means of transfer of knowl-
edge between channel member firms. Therefore, communication should be thought of in a stra-
tegic sense, […] members […] strive to put in place integrating mechanisms that enable effec-
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tive interaction, hence allowing the greatest chance for each to succeed […]. Communication is 
a strategic integrating mechanism”.  
The performance impact of interfranchisee communication raises the question how franchise 
network members can organise communicative activity efficiently. To examine this question, 
from both a franchisor and a franchisee perspective, this study proposes the concept of “Com-
municative Efficiency”. The concept refers to franchisee opportunities and efforts to use net-
working efficiently – that is, to match the acquisition of network resources and benefits of these 
resources with networking investments in the most rewarding way.17 The study suggests that 
communicative efficiency is based on two aspects. The first aspect is network structure: franchi-
see network positioning determines communication opportunities. Thus, by building an ade-
quate network structure, the franchisor can promote the development of franchisees’ “connec-
tive capital”. “Connective capital” is the stock of human capital that an individual can access 
through connections to others, that is developed with the purpose of tapping into the knowledge 
of co-workers via communication links (Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003; Ichniowski, Shaw & Gant, 
2003). In addition, the quality of an organisation depends on the quality of the individuals that 
make it up. Hence, the second aspect is communication efforts of franchisees. This research 
examines how the franchisor can manage these two aspects to empower network functioning 
and how franchisees can build their networks to realise performance gains.  
These issues are underexplored since although franchisees are essential ingredients in successful 
franchise chains and franchising is so important in today’s economy, few studies examine de-
terminants of franchisee performance (Dant, 2008; Michael & Combs, 2008). Also, few studies 
analyse aspects of efficiency in franchising (Kubitschek, 2001). Further, research on planning 
and management of networks has widely treated the “human factor” of organisational design 
implicitly (Inkpen, 1996; Jarillo, 1988; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry & Pinch, 2004; Tsai, 2001), 
                                                     
17 For this study, the idea of “efficient exchange” refers to the fact that networking is organized efficient-
ly, i.e. networking benefits and investments are matched most rewardingly; the implication is not that 
costs of resource acquisition are definitely lower in the network mode than in other organisational de-
signs. Yet, it is suggested that efficient networking increases the likelihood that the network mode can 
provide the lowest costs and represent the superior design. 
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although the superiority of networks to other organisational designs depends on individuals who 
convert organisational potential into reality.  
The next section outlines communication benefits for franchisees as social network members, 
and links efficiency to network structure. Then, hypotheses on performance effects of position-
ing characteristics that promote or hinder efficient communication are developed (section 4). 
Section 5 describes data and methods, section 6 reports results. Section 7 concludes. 
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3. Theoretical Background 
So far, social networks largely represent a sociological concept. Yet, Granovetter (1985, p. 482) 
has pointed out early that the “intermixing of [economic and non-economic] activities” is the 
social “embeddedness of economic behavior“, which hints at the interpenetration of the two 
spheres of economic and non-economic action. Granovetter’s “embeddedness” refers to the 
process by which social relations shape economic action in ways that some mainstream eco-
nomic schemes overlook. The economist Robert Gibbons (2005) gives a forward-looking inter-
pretation of interdisciplinary work in this field by pointing out that sociology adds new inde-
pendent variables (networks) to the economic (performance) equation. So, social network theory 
can advance economic approaches. This paper enriches economic reasoning with a social net-
work perspective to drive the understanding of performance implications of communication 
structures in franchise networks. The study is motivated by Dant’s (2008, p. 93) research that 
notes, “Authors are beginning to examine research questions from a phenomenological perspec-
tive rather than within the confines of single theoretical frameworks”. Combining economic and 
network perspectives precedes the ability to observe the effects tested here (“insights follow 
method”). As Brown and Dant (2008, p. 6) point out, “Strong contributions to the retailing lit-
erature [...] stem from the new insights provided by those [different] methods”. 
Social networks form when individuals engage in transitive connections that integrate exchange 
processes in a personal context. Social network logic implies that cooperation is not only based 
on mutual advantage, but also on reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). That is, social networks are par-
ticularly relevant when neither price signals nor monitoring sufficiently ensure the implementa-
tion of certain activities, like of resource transfer.18 In franchising, social networks can provide 
resources that complement the franchisor’s “blueprint”. They can direct attention to franchisee-
developed best practices, transmit information on local markets and on network partners’ or 
franchisor qualities, offer “strategic knowledge” on business opportunities, or “knowledge of 
knowledge”, i.e. knowledge where specific expertise can be found. Thereby, embeddedness in
                                                     
18 For this study, a social network is defined as a durable form of connective capital that is created and 
maintained by social history and ongoing collective action, that is underpinned by a strategic orienta-
tion, a sense of common interest, and the expectation of gains (similar, Olsen, 1965). 
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personal relationships serves as a coping response to individual resource scarcity, which is es-
sential in the quest for competitive advantage and economic rents (Baum et al., 2000; Goerzen, 
2007; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000). However, Windsperger (2004) notes that the acquisition 
of knowledge resources is challenging: acquisition costs escalate the more knowledge is embod-
ied in individuals and needs extensive personal contacts for transmission. Lawson and Lorenz 
(1999) argue that franchisees must interact to make knowledge go through moments where it is 
articulated and recombined. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) highlight that acquisition requires 
time-consuming interaction and regular face-to-face contacts. De Berranger and Meldrum 
(2000) observe that personal interaction fosters exchange much better than electronic communi-
cation. 
Research has investigated the use of interfirm communication for effective interaction (Tikoo, 
2002). Mohr, Fisher and Nevin (1996) point out that communication is the most important ele-
ment to successful interfirm exchange. They suggest that “collaborative communication”, 
viewed as intensive, relationship-building communication and cooperative attitudes, creates an 
atmosphere of performance-enhancing mutual support. Mohr and Nevin (1990) argue that col-
laborative communication matches the increased needs for information sharing in more closely 
linked relationships. Mohr and Sohi (1995) further note that research tends to focus on positive 
effects of communication, whereas detrimental flows remain an important research issue. In 
franchising, communication has been examined largely with respect to the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship only (Kidwell, Nygaard & Silkoset, 2007).       
Mohr and Nevin (1990) suggest that the impact of communication on outcomes is a function of 
the conditions under which it is used. Following this idea, this study proposes the concept of 
“Communicative Efficiency”. Communicative efficiency is understood as matching resource 
acquisition with network investments in the most rewarding way. Communication is rewarding 
as long as networking costs do not exceed benefits received. Naturally, entertaining social rela-
tions does not come at zero cost. For franchisee performance, networking and managing outlet 
duties matter. So, there is a trade-off between time allocation to outlet management and net-
working. Following the idea of diminishing returns, over a certain time period and with the 
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“right” network partners, networking provides benefits as the franchisee acquires essential new 
input. Yet, benefits cease rapidly when acquired resources become redundant. Beyond a thresh-
old, networking is inefficient, and concentrating on outlet duties would be more rewarding.19 
Thus, when franchisees fail to organise communicative activities efficiently, overinvestment in 
network activities can transform a potentially productive asset into a constraint and a liability 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
The first aspect on which efficiency is based is network structure. The idea is that franchisees’ 
opportunities to use networking efficiently depend on their individual network positions. Burt 
(1992, p. 5) notes that “people and organizations are not the source of action so much as they 
are the vehicles for structurally induced action”. Hence, opportunities induced by network struc-
ture matter. In this vein, social network literature emphasises that a unit’s network position has a 
fundamental influence on productivity. Many tasks cannot be accomplished without serious 
cooperation from others; they are too complex and subtle to be done “by the book” and require 
the exercise of “tacit knowledge” that is appropriable only through interaction with knowledge-
able others (Granovetter, 2005). For example, a network position that offers many communica-
tion opportunities, or that offers access particularly to well-connected others, can promote effi-
cient resource acquisition by providing a variety of easily accessible information sources. Re-
source exchange may also be stronger in dense networks where peer pressure enforces coopera-
tive exchange.  
Realising the advantages of a network structure that offers efficient communication opportuni-
ties depends on network members. As the franchisor cannot contract on interfranchisee ex-
change, making adequate efforts to convert organisational potential into reality rests with the 
franchisees. Hence, the role of the very actors composing the network is essential to understand-
ing performance outcomes (network terminology refers to this issue as “structure-player-
duality”). Thus, the second aspect on which efficiency is based is communication efforts made 
                                                     
19 Costs of networking, i.e. of building and using connective capital, are opportunity costs of time when 
putting other work aside and investments like logistics costs of contacting others. Benefits received 
depend on the requesting franchisee’s previous knowledge level and on knowledge and efforts of the 
respondent franchisee. For example, if the respondent franchisee does not cooperate, the requesting 
franchisee’s communicative activities are inefficient as costs exceed benefits. 
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by franchisees. Efforts can be shaped directly by franchisees, and indirectly by the franchisor’s 
actions. As a precondition that efforts take effect, the franchisor must create network positions 
that offer opportunities for efficient communication. To analyse what network positions have 
best effects on performance, the examination is based on the following general hypotheses: 
Franchisee_performancei = f (network_positioni), where i stands for a franchisee.  
Figure 4 summarizes the concept, section 4 offers specific hypotheses that follow the general 
hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4: The Concept of Communicative Efficiency 
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4. Hypotheses 
Regional Embeddedness. Some retailers are more successful when outlets are clustered (Kelly, 
Freeman & Emlen, 1993). Clustering promotes the development of franchisees’ connective 
capital, since it facilitates face-to-face-interaction and exchange and promotes trust-building. 
Trust reduces transaction costs of cooperation, which makes communication more efficient. 
Electronic communication cannot foster exchange as much as face-to-face interaction (De Ber-
ranger & Meldrum, 2000). Since knowledge resources are also context-specific, franchisees that 
are located proximately are possibly the most relevant sources of input. As having many per-
sonal contacts further improves information processing capacity (Hansen, 1999), particularly 
many proximate communication opportunities can be useful to enhance performance.  
Moreover, most people tend to free-ride if they are able to get away with it (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). Free-riding refers to undersupplying quality by withholding effort to decrease individual 
costs at the expense of other system members. Yet, repeated interaction restrains such opportun-
ism as franchisees perceive an increased level of visibility of their actions (Fama, 1980; Kidwell 
et al., 2007). Opportunism then becomes costly due to reputational effects. Although Axelrod 
(1984) focuses on the evolution of cooperation based on rational self-interest, researchers in the 
sociology of collective action emphasise affective bonds that develop during interaction: inter-
action promotes a common spirit, a norm of “fair dealing”, and unwritten mutual expectations 
among network members, which minimise free-riding (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993). When oppor-
tunism is limited, franchisees can benefit from customer retention and interunit customer trans-
fer. As free-riding has negative effects on the opportunistic franchisee’s performance as well, 
every franchisee profits from reduced free-riding (Kidwell et al., 2007).  
Clustered franchisees increase the system’s regional market presence and regional advertising 
budget, which helps to make the system’s offering attractive to consumers. Demand increases 
can result from higher consumer propensity to spend on the product kind (form demand), and 
from higher competitiveness relative to other systems (brand demand). Ghosh and Craig (1991) 
argue that despite enhanced local competition, higher form and brand demand can enhance net 
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sales. Joint success may then reinforce motivation to cooperate. Further, clustered franchisees 
can efficiently identify and articulate common interests towards the franchisor.  
Costs of overcoming distance, like transport and communication costs, imply a spatial limit over 
which all of these benefits accrue (Gordon & McCann, 2000). Here, this radius is termed a “re-
gional cluster”. The idea is that a network position that provides many interaction opportunities 
in the regional cluster offers better chances to realise the benefits outlined.  
H1a: Many communication opportunities in a franchisee’s regional cluster 
positively influence this franchisee’s performance. 
Yet, relationships in business networks are characterized by cooperation as well as competition. 
Evidence on whether positive or negative effects of proximity prevail is contradictory. Some 
studies show that higher intersystem competitiveness offsets individual losses of increased 
competition; others highlight the cannibalisation of sales (“encroachment”) when new outlets 
are located close to existing ones (Kalnins, 2004). Kaufmann and Rangan (1990) argue that each 
existing franchisee will either lose sales after the introduction of a new outlet, or, at best, retain 
sales at the previous level. Moreover, prior to complete market development, franchisees often 
draw customers from beyond their “usual” trading areas. Franchisees’ future revenue expecta-
tions are based on these customers (Farrell, 1984). Then, also the perception that cannibalisation 
occurs can cause demotivation and conflicts that hamper exchange. If resource exchange is re-
duced to safeguard one’s market position, interfranchisee communication is less efficient. Fur-
ther, networking turns out costly in terms of time and capital needed for communicating with 
many others. Beyond a threshold, networking costs outweigh benefits. Then, communication 
will be inefficient and performance decreases.  
H1b: Many communication opportunities in a franchisee’s regional cluster 
 negatively influence this franchisee’s performance. 
Supraregional Embeddedness. Since franchisees in the supraregional area have similar and dif-
ferent market experience, they can provide complementary input. Then, they offer opportunities 
for efficient communication. Franchisees using supraregional opportunities further avoid intel-
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lectual lock-in in regional structures. The latter process arises if over-reliance is placed on re-
gional knowledge, which slows down innovation and the detection of changing needs. Also, 
high supraregional market coverage and joint marketing efforts can increase form and brand 
demand. These effects can enhance motivation to cooperate, and performance.  
H2a: Many communication opportunities in a franchisee’s supraregional cluster 
 positively influence this franchisee’s performance. 
Yet, consumers decide on merchandise locations on the basis of time and effort necessary to 
accomplish buying tasks. Ghosh and Craig (1991) argue that similar to the reservation price 
concept, there is a reservation distance which consumers maximally travel. Besides, customers 
switch more readily between brands they evaluate as similar since people behave similarly to-
wards things they perceive as similar. As offerings in a system are alike, customers may not 
exhibit loyalties towards an outlet they used to patronize once a new outlet is located more con-
veniently. Thus, many supraregional franchisees can intensify cannibalisation. When many buy-
ing options are available to consumers, drawing patronage from beyond the usual trading area is 
less probable. So franchisees may reduce cooperation to safeguard their individual market posi-
tions. 
Using communication opportunities in a supraregional network is also costly due to longer 
travel distances for personal interaction. Relationships (“ties”) are weaker when network in-
vestments are spread over many relationships. Then, motivation to share is lower and incentives 
for opportunism are stronger. Information received may even be less relevant as franchisees 
operate in different market environments. These effects can decrease efficiency of communica-
tion.  
H2b: Many communication opportunities in a franchisee’s supraregional cluster 
 negatively influence this franchisee’s performance. 
2StepTies. In a multiunit organisation, a unit can access knowledge via a network of interunit 
links (Hansen, 1999). In network logic, franchisees to whom a focal franchisee has no direct 
contact, but who have contacts to any of the focal franchisee’s direct contacts (thus they can be 
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approached via this contact chain) are part of the franchisee’s connective capital (in network 
terminology, these more distant franchisees are “second-order contacts”). As in different cir-
cumstances, different resources may be required, “knowledge of knowledge” promotes competi-
tive advantage: a franchisee who has many contacts who can help identify and access knowl-
edge of many others, is in a good position for efficient acquisition. Here, “opportunities multi-
ply as they are seized” applies in the context of communication.  
H3: Many second-order communication opportunities of a franchisee 
 positively influence this franchisee’s performance. 
Relevance. Franchisees in a central network position can perform better, because they have ac-
cess to ample and diverse knowledge. “Central” franchisees are those who are highly relevant 
for the information flow through the network. These actors access resources from unique parts 
of their network, can hear about impending threats and opportunities more quickly than others, 
and can better find out about the quality of exchange partners (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). High rele-
vance thus provides a vision of options otherwise unseen and offers an essential advantage in 
detecting and developing rewarding opportunities. Central actors are in a privileged position for 
both resource acquisition and transmission: they can both make informed decisions, and play a 
broker role by strategically transferring or holding back information. Thereby, they benefit from 
information arbitrage (Burt, 2004). They further enjoy scope economies of sharing knowledge 
developed by others (Tsai, 2001). Also, when others depend on a central actor’s input, they may 
invest disproportionately into the relationship, which decreases the central actor’s networking 
costs.  
H4: High relevance of a franchisee in the regional cluster 
positively influences this franchisee’s performance. 
Interaction. Knowledge generation does not proceed in isolation, but when different ideas and 
practices unite and are discussed. When many contacts of a focal franchisee communicate with 
each other, exchange may benefit from different perspectives. In such dense structures, source 
credibility increases: innovative ideas are given the credibility they need to be regarded valuable 
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and productively used by others (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Additionally, Ahuja (2000) argues that 
dense structures reduce the possibility that network members misinterpret the other network 
members’ actions, which decreases the likelihood of mutually destructive competitive practices. 
H5a: A high level of interaction between a franchisee’s contacts 
positively influences this franchisee’s performance. 
Yet, acquired input is valuable only if it extends the franchisee’s previous knowledge level. 
Information needs to be reflected, evaluated and constantly brought up to date. If a network 
lacks new input and retreats to ideas which have been circulating for a longer term, input be-
comes redundant (“collective blindness”; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In dense structures, actors 
tend to confirm each others’ views as all have similar input at their disposal (“echo-room prob-
lem”, Burt, 2005). A network position that implies such a homogeneous information base bears 
the risk of losing touch with market developments. Redundant, inefficient communication then 
prevents franchisees from realising and acting on challenges in the market. As Adler and Kwon 
(2002, p. 26) observe, “In life we cannot expect to derive any value from social ties to actors 
who lack the ability to help us”. 
H5b: A high level of interaction between a franchisee’s contacts 
negatively influences this franchisee’s performance. 
Hubquality. Most likely, franchisees do not possess input of identical value to performance. 
Possibly, contacts to franchisees who interact with other well-connected ones yield more, and 
more diverse, information. In network terminology, the quality of a franchisee’s contacts is re-
flected in the franchisee’s own quality as an “information hub”.  
H6a: A franchisee’s high hubquality positively influences this franchisee’s performance. 
Yet, people who become targets of more interaction requests than they can handle have a hard 
time responding under assumptions of bounded rationality. Due to this time-allocation exercise, 
the potentially most useful actors have a queue for their attention, which reduces their overall 
usefulness as a source (Nasrallah, Levitt & Glynn, 2003). Thus, it can be more efficient to seek 
communication with less popular individuals to minimise the chances of being overlooked. 
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H6b: A franchisee’s low hubquality positively influences this franchisee’s performance. 
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5. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
5.1 Sample 
The sample comprises 121 franchisees of two chains in fashion retail. Retail is the largest Ger-
man industry in franchising (in 2008 sales, 36%). The efficiency of retail stores is a constant 
challenge for every retailer’s competitiveness, as the performance of every chain enterprise 
depends on the performance of its parts (Barros & Alves, 2003). Uzzi (1996) states that the need 
of keeping up with trends is nowhere more paramount for competitive advantage than in fashion 
retail, where constant innovation has created a multi-billion dollar industry. Particularly in this 
industry, efficient exchange on the latest industry developments is crucial to success (Uzzi, 
1996). Thus, this study focuses on the fashion retail industry. As there are industry-specific 
effects on performance (Short, Ketchen, Palmer & Hult, 2007), the analysis concentrates on 
only one industry to control for that fact.  
The population of fashion retail franchise outlets in Germany is around 2100. In Germany, fran-
chise systems in general are small – the mean number of franchisees per systems is 60 (Perlitz, 
2007).20 The sample systems are two of the largest German systems in fashion retail. The first 
(second) system’s sampling frame is 92 (130) franchisees. The sampling frame covers over 10% 
of the fashion franchise population. Thus, following Cochran (1977), the study results should be 
representative for the sector.  
Self-administered postal questionnaires with a letter assuring franchisees of anonymity and a 
university address for responses were distributed among all the system franchisees in December 
2006. The formulation of the questionnaire items emerged from a qualitative-explorative pre-
study with franchisors, consultants, and franchisee focus groups. Responses arrived in the first 
three months of 2007. In three rounds of follow-up calls, non-respondents were contacted for 
telephone interviews. The response rate is 47% (60%). The study further uses data from a larger 
project on franchisor quality by the International Centre for Franchising and Cooperation. This 
                                                     
20 Griffin and Hauser (1993) argue that survey results do not vary much once a relatively homogeneous 
sample of 20-30 units is given as in fact, 90% of all the information obtainable from a larger, relatively 
homogeneous population can be found in such a sample. 
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data enables to track system development and conduct more stringent tests on sample represen-
tativeness (Chrisman, Chua & Steier, 2002; Chrisman & McMullan, 2000). Due to missing data, 
the regression analysis is based on 100 franchisees. 
5.2 Dependent Variables 
Objective Performance. Typical measures of retail success are sales and profits. An ideal meas-
ure for market-based performance would include profitability data. Yet, researchers commonly 
cannot obtain profitability data, but sales information is often available as a performance metric 
(Singh & Mitchell, 2005). Sales volume is only a short-term measure of a store’s competitive 
strength. However, long-term implications suggest a strong linkage of sales and profitability 
(Buzzell & Gale, 1987). Using sales as regressand is consistent with previous research on col-
laborative relationships (Collins & Clark, 2003; Lee et al., 2001; Park & Luo, 2001; Sarkar, 
Echambadi & Harrison, 2001; Singh & Mitchell, 2005; Stuart, 2000). The idea is that franchi-
sees can directly convert input obtained from others into sales. To measure (previous year) 
sales, respondents filled in blanks, as done in prior studies (Zahra, 1996a, 1996b; Zahra & 
Bogner, 2000; Zahra, Neubaum & El-Hagrassey, 2002). Brush and Vanderwerf (1992) and 
Chandler and Hanks (1993) establish high accuracy and reliability of such entrepreneur reported 
performance data. 
Subjective Performance. Research suggests that capturing the multidimensionality of firm per-
formance requires objective and subjective measures to achieve triangulation (Baron and Tang, 
2009; Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Chandler & Hanks, 1993; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Zahra et al., 
2002). Although manager personality and aspiration levels could affect performance evalua-
tions, subjective measures have shown strong reliability and validity (Dess & Robinson, 1984; 
Stam & Elfring, 2008). So, both kinds of measures are used here. To quantify subjective suc-
cess, four items measure the extent of “satisfaction with performance”. The items ask respon-
dents to evaluate their recent performance relative to different comparison levels. Comparison 
levels are (1) alternative activities, (2) average industry sales growth, (3) own income expecta-
tions, and (4) own sales objectives. Anchoring success by reference to comparison levels is in 
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line with Anderson and Narus (1990, 44).21 The results of a principal component factor analysis 
show that the four items load highly on one factor (all loadings > 0.886). A scale is built by 
averaging the sum of the scores on the four items, using equal weights. Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.891. The inspection of item-to-total and inter-item correlations provides further support for 
scale reliability. Convergent scale validity is verified via the correlation between the summated 
scale and a single item assessing franchisees’ overall satisfaction with performance (wording: 
“How satisfied are you overall with your performance?” 1 – “very satisfied”, 7 – “very dissatis-
fied”). The correlation is substantial (table 4). The analysis further uses this single item as an 
additional measure for subjective performance to check result robustness. 
5.3 Independent and Control Variables 
Regional Embeddedness. For assessing regional embeddedness, interviews with the systems’ 
franchisees on their interaction structures were conducted. Franchisees described their relation-
ships to other network partners, the frequency of exchange, and the distance to others in which 
substantial personal exchange took place. Franchisees indicated that other system franchisees in 
a maximum range of 40 to 50km were those with whom they engaged in substantial exchange 
on business issues. So this research uses 45km (ca. 28m) as a cut-off distance for interaction 
effects. This distance matches Kalnins’ (2004) distance measure for interaction effects. In this 
cut-off distance, each franchisee’s (in network terminology, each “vertex’s”) “degree” is meas-
ured, i.e. the number of communication opportunities. The variable ranges from 0 to 5. The 
analysis further uses items from Uzzi’s (1997), Schlüter’s (2001) and Stein’s (1996) interview-
based research on features and functions of exchange to check result robustness as regards the 
proposed link between interaction and performance (table 5).  
Supraregional Embeddedness. To span a larger area, supraregional embeddedness measures 
franchisee degrees in double the radius, i.e.  90km (ca. 56m). The variable ranges from 0 to 7. 
                                                     
21 The wording of the items is, “Within another activity and with the same level of effort I could realise an 
income which is…” (1-7; lower-higher); “Compared to the average development of sales in my indus-
try I would rate my last period’s sales as being…” (1-7; higher-lower); “Compared to my expectations 
my last period’s income was…” (1-7; higher-lower); “Compared to my last period’s sales objectives 
my last period’s sales were…” (1-7; higher-lower). 
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2StepTies. Expressed as a percentage of all system franchisees, the franchisees (“alters”) in two 
links of a focal franchisee (“ego”) are counted. In network logic, ego can approach alters to 
whom ego does not have a direct contact, but who have a direct contact to one (or more) of 
ego’s direct contacts, to obtain input. These franchisees form the “second-order-network” (De 
Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005). 
Relevance. Another measure from social network analysis assesses ego’s relevance in the re-
gional network: the “number of weak components” (De Nooy et al., 2005). The measure shows 
how many separated (networks of) vertices occur without the connections provided by ego. So, 
it describes the resulting network structure when ego is removed from the network. The measure 
shows ego’s centrality, i.e. the potential to benefit from information arbitrage (Burt, 1992). 
Interaction. Following Uzzi and Spiro (2005), Holland and Leinhardt (1971) and Feld (1981), 
another network measure quantifies the connectedness of vertices in ego’s regional network: the 
“clustering coefficient”. The coefficient measures density in ego’s regional network. Density is 
given by the relationships (“ties”) that exist in the ego-network expressed as a proportion of the 
maximum possible number of ties. The measure indicates the redundancy of available input.  
Hubquality. Hub weight is a proxy for the quality of obtainable input. Using the network analy-
sis program Pajek 1.24, weights are computed in an iterative algorithm process that analyses 
system-wide contact chains of franchisees (De Nooy et al., 2005). 
Control Variables. Controls are in line with previous research (Baron & Tang, 2009; Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon & Woo, 1994; Jambulingam & Nevin, 1999; Low & Abrahamson, 1997; New-
bert, Kirchhoff & Walsh, 2007). The study uses a system dummy (0 – large, 1 – small system), 
outlet size (measured by employee numbers; see Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008; in categories 
of 1-3, 4-6, etc.), each franchisee’s year of system entry, and the competitive situation (the 
number of non-system competitors in the regional area). 
5.4 Methods 
For objective performance and for the subjective performance scale, the analysis uses OLS re-
gressions. Initial investigation reveals that the objective performance variable is not normally 
The Impact of Communicative Efficiency  
 
 113 
distributed. Following Chrisman et al. (2002) and Kennedy (1979), the study takes the natural 
logarithms of sales. Following Shane, Shankar and Aravindakshan (2006), nonlog variables are 
used for robustness checks: regression results do not show substantive differences from the re-
gression with log variables. From a modelling perspective, the single-item subjective perform-
ance variable is an inherently ordered multinomial-choice variable. To capture the discrete or-
der, an Ordered Probit Model is used (Greene, 2003; McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975). The model is 
estimated by maximum likelihood and takes the following form: 
                         iii uxY  '  with (i = 1, 2, … , n),                                             (1) 
where Y represents the underlying response variable, x is set of exogenous variables, ui is the 
residual. An observation belongs to the jth category if 
jj Y  1  with (j = 1, 2, …, m).                                            (2) 
Assuming that the latent variable is normally distributed, the probability of belonging to a cer-
tain category j is 
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where   stands for the cumulative standard normal distribution. Using a dichotomous variable 
Zij, which takes a value of 1 if Yi falls in the jth category and a value of 0 otherwise, the likeli-
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Maximizing the latter equation yields the model’s parameters that help to determine the prob-
ability that an actor displays a certain overall performance satisfaction level (Maddala, 1983).  
To trace nonresponse bias, the study first uses the “lastwave” method and examines whether 
results are driven by differences between respondents and nonrespondents. The analysis com-
pares early and late responders (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). It further compares the average 
sample observation in both systems with the average outlet-owner computed from the popula-
tion of each system along the dimensions age, years in business, and prior self-employment. 
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Therefore, it uses previously collected data, and to obtain further information on the popula-
tions, officials in the chains were contacted. As promoted by the high response rates, no evi-
dence of nonresponse biases emerged. 
  
The Impact of Communicative Efficiency  
 
 115 
6. Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the OLS and Ordered Choice Models. Table 4 exhibits descriptive 
statistics. Table 5 contains responses to items on network interaction. Hypothesis 1a is sup-
ported: regional communication opportunities increase performance. Hypothesis 2b correctly 
suggests a negative impact of many franchisees in the supraregional cluster. Hypothesis 3 ar-
gues that a large second-order-network promotes performance, which is not supported; possibly, 
as the positive and negative effects of regional and supraregional opportunities are combined in 
this variable. Hypothesis 4a correctly proposes that a franchisee’s high relevance for resource-
flow in the network enhances performance. Hypothesis 5 suggests that interaction among re-
gional contacts influences performance. There is no evidence, which may be explained by the 
fact that the variation in connectivity is not very high in the sample. Hypothesis 6a is supported, 
being connected to particularly well-connected other ones, i.e. high hubquality, enhances per-
formance.22 
Results are stable when applying different dependent variables as well as different methods 
(OLS and Probit). For the OLS regressions, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs), correlations, 
White-, Newey-West-, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Tests are used to control for absence of mul-
ticollinearity, for homoscedasticity and normal distribution of noise. VIFs are all below the tol-
erance limit of ten (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). As the correlation between re-
gional opportunities and the other independent variables is high (although VIFs do not indicate 
multicollinearity), each model is estimated once with and once without the regional variable. 
Results for the hypotheses stay the same. The correlation table backs the OLS and Probit results. 
The Probit Models show a satisfactory goodness-of-fit as regards the Pseudo-R2 values 
(McFadden, 1974). Inspection of the Probit classification tables establishes that over 50% of the 
models’ quality rank predictions are correct. To further test result robustness, parametric t-tests 
and non-parametric rank-tests are used to compare sample means for each category for the inde-
pendent variables. For H1, H2, H4 and H6, robustness checks affirm the proposed relations. As 
                                                     
22 One would expect that transfer of ideas between outlets of the same franchisee was more frequent than 
between different franchisees’ outlets. So, the study also controls for multiunit-ownership (and for 
GDP of the area), but without observing significant results. 
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there are groups (where the dependent variable has a value of 1 or 6) with few observations, 
adjacent groups are combined and the model is re-estimated. The significance of coefficients is 
identical to the results presented here; 75% of the predictions are correct, R2 increases to 
42.75%. Still, the first model is reported because this model is based on the original data.  
For additional validation, the results are checked in interviews with the franchisors and several 
system franchisees. They support the findings. Interviewees believed that communication op-
portunities granted to franchisees directly affected social and economic behaviour, that opportu-
nities for rewarding interaction varied among franchisees, that valuable exchange occurred in 
the limited spatial radius of regional areas and that the input obtained could indeed enhance 
sales performance. In pre-studies to another project, three other retail franchisors reported 50km 
(31m) as the appropriate radius in which they believed their franchisees could interact effi-
ciently. 
Turning to franchisee’s efforts to use the communication opportunities provided, it must be 
noted that the analysis cannot be based on real communication data for all franchisees of both 
systems over time. In theory, such real data could provide “exact” results on the relation be-
tween communication opportunities and performance. Yet, for producing exact results, data 
would need to include the specific content of all conversations among all franchisees, the use-
fulness of the information received by a franchisee for the particular business situation at hand 
(also compared with the franchisee’s previous knowledge level), individual absorptive capaci-
ties as regards valuing, assimilating and applying obtained input, as well as individual capabili-
ties to explicate knowledge. These aspects seem prone to measurement error. As an indicator of 
franchisees’ efforts to use communication opportunities provided by network structure, the 
analysis thus relies on franchisees’ evaluations of network interaction. Based on franchisees’ 
evaluations, the study checks whether franchisees in fact use (at least to a certain extent) the 
opportunities offered. For instance, if franchisees perceive the availability of others for assis-
tance as low, interaction and reciprocity are likely to be low as well, and vice versa (first item, 
table 3). Here, regional communication opportunities correlate highly with availability (-0.4; p < 
0.01; “availability” is reverse-coded, so the more opportunities, the better the availability; the 
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same result holds for 2StepTies and availability). These results indicate that interaction with 
proximate franchisees is strong in the system, which backs the franchisees’ statements that the 
relevant distance for substantial exchange is the regional radius. As items like “availability of 
other franchisees’ assistance” (first item), “discussing business matters with others” (third item), 
and “meeting others privately” (fifth item) also correlate strongly with sales performance (-0.5; -
0.4; -0.5; p < 0.01; all items are reverse-coded), business-oriented franchisees apparently seize 
the communication opportunities offered. The next section concludes. 
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Table 3: Results 
 
 
 
 Model  0 Model  1a       Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b       Model 3a Model 3b 
Dependent  
Variable 
Subjective Performance 
(Scale) 
                     Sales Performance Subjective Performance 
(Scale) 
       Overall Satisfaction 
             (Item) 
Method OLS                               OLS OLS           Ordered Probit 
C 51.304* (25.344) 9.713** (3.389) 10.065** (3.438) 49.050 * (20.849) 47.154* (21.047)      
Regional Embeddedness   0.064† (0.032)   -0.343 † (0.199)   -0.448† (0.245)    
Supraregional  
Embeddedness 
  -0.058***(0.010) -0.055***(0.010) 0.010 (0.059) -0.011 (0.059) 0.180** (0.070) 0.156* (0.068) 
2StepTies   -0.002 (0.010) -0.007 (0.009) 0.073 (0.059) 0.102† (0.059) 0.030 (0.070) 0.063 (0.064) 
Relevance   0.124** (0.046) 0.198***(0.026) -0.610 * (0.280) -1.010***(0.159) -0.971* (0.418) -1.479*** (0283) 
Interaction   -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.060 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 
Hubquality   0.240* (0.106) 0.281† (0.106) -1.210 † (0.653) -1.431* (0.648) -2.233** (0.748) -2.369** (0.751) 
System -0.612* (0.257) 0.073† (0.038) 0.064† (0.039) -1.275 *** (0.235) -1.229***(0.236) -1.595***(0.415) -1.507*** (0.409) 
Outlet Size -0.204† (0.109) 0.010 (0.015) 0.012 (0.015) -0.092 (0.089) -0.100 (0.090) -0.130 (0.101) -0.143 (0.103) 
Year (System Entry)  -0.024† (0.013) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.022 * (0.011) -0.021* (0.011) -0.010  (0.010) -0.009  (0.010) 
Competition 0.010  (0.019) -0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 0.019 (0.015) 0.021 (0.015) 0.041* (0.017) 0.044** (0.017) 
F/LR statistic 6.799*** 9.772*** 10.106*** 10.230*** 10.800*** 79.207*** 76.522*** 
R2 0.223 0.523  0.503 0.535 0.519   
Adj. R2 0.190 0.470  0.453 0.483 0.471 0.266 0.257 
N = 100. Beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1.  
Note that the “Subjective Performance” and “Overall Satisfaction” variables are reverse-coded (1 – “very satisfied”, 7 – “very dissatisfied”).  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Sales Performance 13.93 0.19                       
(2) Subjective Performance 3.36 1.27 -0.51***                     
(3) Overall Satisfaction 2.88 1.23 -0.56*** 0.81***                    
(4) Regional Embeddedness 1.32 1.21 0.36*** -0.30** -0.26**                  
(5) Supraregional Embeddedness 3.22 1.86 -0.17† -0.15 0.06 0.51***                
(6) 2StepTies 1.93 2.27 0.19† -0.26** -0.35*** 0.28** 0.42***               
(7) Relevance  0.83 0.71 0.44*** -0.39*** -0.38*** 0.82*** 0.48*** 0.42***             
(8) Interaction 0.31 0.45 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.64*** 0.29** 0.13 0.29**           
(9) Hubquality 0.09 0.19 0.23* -0.21* -0.27** 0.31** 0.33** 0.60*** 0.25* 0.27**         
(10) System  0.09 -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.43*** -0.26* 0.06 -0.31** -0.32** -0.14       
(11) Outlet Size 2.58 1.12 0.19† -0.35*** -0.33** -0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.00 -0.19† 0.09 0.39***    
(12) Year (System Entry)  1992.34 9.02 0.16 -0.30** -0.21* -0.09 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.03 0.19† 0.26** 0.28**   
(13) Competition 7.61 6.17 0.01 0.12 0.18† 0.18† 0.06 0.02 0.22* 0.09 0.04 -0.30** 0.02 0.01 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. 
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Table 5: Features and Functions of Exchange 
 
 
Questionnaire Item 
Agreement 
1. System 2. System 
I can turn to other franchisees for assistance whenever I have a problem. 80% 80% 
I know many other system franchisees on a personal basis. 60% 70% 
I regularly discuss business matters with other system franchisees. 65% 70% 
I am very satisfied with my relationships to the other network members. 95% 80% 
Apart from franchisor-organised meetings, I meet other system franchisees also privately. 55% 55% 
When problems with the franchisor arise, franchisees stick together. 55% 55% 
The franchisees use every possibility to exert influence on the franchisor via councils and committees. 70% 70% 
None of the system franchisees acts primarily to his/her own advantage. 45% 50% 
In general, all system franchisees fulfil their duties. 75% 70% 
As a system member, I am a lone wolf.  vs.   
As a system member, I am part of a community. 
55%  
“community” 
60%  
“community” 
Items measured on a 7-point scale: 1-7 “strongly agree”, 7 – “strongly disagree”. The three affirmative answers represent “agreement”. 
The Impact of Communicative Efficiency  
 
 
 121 
7. Limitations and Discussion 
7.1 Research Limitations 
This research examines the impact of opportunities for efficient communication on franchisee 
performance. Real time efforts that franchisees undergo to use these opportunities over time 
cannot be measured. To test whether franchisees use the opportunities offered, the study uses 
interview information and franchisee-reported proxy data. Future research could strive to collect 
real time data. Another methodological problem is survivor bias that is common to performance 
studies. Further, network characteristics are dynamic, which alters a position’s attractiveness 
over time.  
7.2 Discussion 
Conceptualising a franchise system as a social network, this research argues that efficient re-
source transmission among franchisees increases franchisee performance, and that interfranchi-
see communication is the means for exchange. For analysing the path to efficient exchange, the 
concept of “Communicative Efficiency” is proposed that refers to franchisee opportunities and 
efforts to match the acquisition of network resources with networking investments most reward-
ingly. Each franchisee’s position in the network structure offers certain communication oppor-
tunities. Having these opportunities is the precondition for communication efforts to take effect. 
So, this study examines performance effects of network positions to find out how to design net-
work structure best.  
The analysis establishes that many communication opportunities in a franchisee’s regional clus-
ter enhance this franchisee’s performance. Proximity enables personal interaction and trust-
building, which promotes efficient acquisition of network resources. Here, strategic effects of 
connective capital can outweigh demand effects, as communication benefits offered by proxi-
mate franchisees outweigh eventual patronage losses to these franchisees. Moreover, a position 
that makes a franchisee central to resource transfer in the network promotes performance. A 
central position allows to make informed decisions, and to benefit from information arbitrage by 
strategically transferring or holding back information. In addition, communication opportunities 
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with well-connected others are more rewarding, as these franchisees have more, or more di-
verse, resources they can share. 
Yet, many franchisees in the supraregional area decrease performance. The puzzle of counter-
vailing effects of regional and supraregional embeddedness can be interpreted as follows: a 
regional cluster that centres on a larger community is a point of attraction that drags demand 
into the cluster (Ferber, 1958). Yet, population is not uniformly distributed in space. Total popu-
lation increases with diminishing returns to scale from the cluster’s centre, as densely populated 
regions are less likely to span a large (supraregional and above) rather than a small (regional) 
radius. Thus, supraregional clusters can hardly drag demand from the outside into the cluster; 
once franchisees are positioned on a supraregional scale around the regional cluster, they attract 
those customers that have travelled into the regional cluster before. To illustrate the idea, one 
can assume that customers are distributed on a straight line from 0 to 1. First, franchisees are 
located in the most densely populated areas of expectedly high demand that span a regional 
cluster radius. Franchisees occupy positions around the line’s “middle” (0.3 to 0.7; 0.5 is the 
cluster’s centre). They drag demand into the cluster. Clustering increases form and brand de-
mand, which encourages motivation to jointly advance system success. Hence, positive effects 
of clustering prevail. Over time, new franchisees are positioned more remotely, so regional clus-
ters develop into supraregional ones. The regional cluster loses its customers from the edges to 
these franchisees. That is, the reason for choosing a position in the “middle” becomes slowly 
obsolete as exogenously, demand-dragging into the regional cluster is weakened. Thus, negative 
competitive effects prevail. These combine with negative communicative effects as cultivating 
distant contacts is costly and as exchange is reduced in face of enforced competition. So 
endogenously, communication becomes less efficient. Then, demand effects outweigh strategic 
effects.  
The results offer several implications. Concerning franchisor implications, common wisdom has 
it that some organisations, such as the military, are most effective when their parties adhere to 
strict guidelines for how they should communicate with each other. Other organisations tend to 
thrive better when individuals are free to choose when and with whom to communicate (Nasral-
The Impact of Communicative Efficiency  
 
 
 123 
lah et al., 2003). As reciprocal exchange requires personal, voluntary interaction, strict guide-
lines are useless in the franchising context. But even if efficient interaction is hard to enforce, it 
can be encouraged by building an adequate network structure. Following S.R. Covey (1991), an 
“empowered organisation” is one in which individuals have the knowledge, skill, desire, and 
opportunity to personally succeed in a way that leads to collective organisational success. So, 
for positioning strategies, providing opportunities for efficient communication can be an addi-
tional criterion that may help in location decisions beside demand and other operational vari-
ables.  
While the franchisor designs network structure, communication efforts rest with franchisees 
(“structure-player-duality”). Incentivising cooperative behaviour can encourage efforts. Credit 
assignment like making knowledge sources visible can provide demonstration effects that lower 
psychological costs of sharing. Establishing a “managerial culture” that emphasises paying at-
tention to other system members and offering fair rewards can result in positive peer pressure to 
perform. Franchisee screening and selection may pay more attention to applicants’ cooperative 
orientations. As Burt (1992, p. 13) observes, “To the extent that people play an active role in 
shaping their relationships, then a player who knows how to structure a network to provide high 
opportunities knows whom to include in the network”.  
On the franchisee level, franchisees may prefer positions that offer adequate opportunities (at 
least, judging at the time of system entry). Further, they can increase efforts to cultivate inter-
franchisee exchange. Apart from individual cooperative dispositions, cooperation is conditioned 
by the social context: since each franchisee’s actions solicit responses by network partners, who 
then receive reactions in return, behaviour is balanced by the network’s self-regulating system. 
As individuals tend to invest in connective capital when many others also participate (Ich-
niowski, Shaw & Gant, 2003), franchisees can reduce peer pressure by sharing more, and exert 
pressure on others to contribute more to system success.   
The study results demonstrate that efficient exchange enhances outcomes at the unit level, 
which together form the evolutionary path of the system. Since communicative efficiency 
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makes linked units more astute collectively than they are individually, also in the franchising 
context, the whole can be greater than the sum of the component parts. 
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 III. INNER STRENGTH AGAINST COMPETITIVE FORCES – SUCCESSFUL SITE 
SELECTION FOR FRANCHISE NETWORK EXPANSION 
1. Abstract 
For every franchise system, making the leap from the unknown to the commonplace requires a 
strategic plan for growth. The exogenous market perspective holds that evaluating market condi-
tions is central to defining promising outlet locations since there are direct economic effects on 
performance arising specifically from location. The endogenous firm perspective (the resource-
based view) and the social network approach together provide an inner strength perspective on 
interconnected firms; this perspective holds that access to internal and external resources offered 
at a certain spot determines site attractiveness, rather than location-specific market factors. This 
chapter combines both literature strands and, using a sample of 201 German franchisees, tests 
hypotheses (1) that explore which perspective dominates location decisions in practice, and (2) 
that seek to clarify the relevance of the decisive criteria for outlet performance. Results show 
that location decisions rely on both perspectives, yet, franchisee performance depends rather 
more on inner strength factors. The analysis further indicates that expansion is better served by 
following a geographically dispersed cluster-approach, than by growing steadily from a baseline 
site. 
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2. Introduction 
 “There is often a large gap between theory and practice... 
Furthermore, the gap between theory and practice in practice is much larger 
 than the gap between theory and practice in theory” 
 Jeff Case, SNPM Research 
For every franchise system, a major step in the leap from the unknown to the commonplace is 
developing a strategic plan for growth. That growth requires the management of the franchise 
chain to adopt a location strategy, which will ideally maintain and extend the chain’s competi-
tive strength. Kaufmann (2007, p. 86) argues, “There can be no doubt that store-location deci-
sions are of critical importance […] Site selection expertise within a retail firm is a significant 
competitive advantage”. Location decisions can be based on strengths found in local markets – 
following the market perspective – or on the expanding chain’s own strengths – following the 
firm perspective.  
To begin with the market perspective, location theory anecdotally suggests that there are three 
key determinants of firm performance: “location, location, and location” (Jones & Simmons, 
1987; Park & Khan, 2006). Classic and neo-classic location theory identifies the evaluation of 
market conditions as the most relevant factor in determining attractive spots, because of the 
direct economic effects on performance (i.e. demand effects in Hotelling’s model (1929)) attrib-
uted to location (Christensen & Drejer, 2005; Ingene & Yu, 1982; James, Walker & Etzel, 1975; 
Lee & McCracken, 1982; Powers, 1997; Simons, 1992). From this perspective, market knowl-
edge at the system centre is essential to guide expansion. 
Research in strategic management, however, has a long history of using the firm perspective, 
that is, the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) to explain differential firm performance 
(Barney, 2001; Peteraf, 1993). Tying resources to competitive advantage, the RBV suggests that 
resources enable the generation of Ricardian rents and quasi-rents (Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993). Yet, the RBV focuses its attention almost exclusively on those resources and capabilities 
contained within the firm. That is, the RBV envisions firms as independent entities, which does 
not cover exchange patterns in a network of entrepreneurs whose intra-network relationships 
function as privileged channels delivering resources, conveying knowledge, information, or best 
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practice. Consequently, the RBV provides only a partial account of firm performance, given the 
accumulated evidence on the proliferation and significance of interfirm alliances in recent years 
(Lavie, 2006). Accordingly, scholars have drawn on network literature to stress the performance 
impact of external resources available to the firm through its networks (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001; Gulati, 1999; McEvily & Marcus, 2005).  
To account for external resources transmitted by self-organisation among (more or less) inde-
pendent entrepreneurs, the RBV has recently been extended using the social network perspec-
tive (Lavie, 2006). Together, the RBV and the social network approach provide what this study 
calls an inner strength perspective on interconnected firms, which holds that firms can combine 
internal and external resources to achieve competitive advantage (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 
2000). This inner strength perspective holds that it is the resource access offered by network 
embeddedness at a certain spot that determines the attraction of a location, rather than location-
specific market factors. This implies that when planning expansion, central planning compe-
tency may not be superior to network self-organisation. 
From a practitioner standpoint, it is notable that the thrust of academic literature on location 
strategies continues to focus on largely theoretical, unapplied scenarios in technique develop-
ment rather than practical usage within the organisational context of the firm (Dasci & Laporte, 
2005; González-Benito, 2002; Sakashita, 2000; Wood & Tasker, 2008). In practice, many sys-
tems rely on intuition guided by experience and common sense, instead of sophisticated model-
ling (Hernandez & Bennison, 2000). Here, “location planning is often undertaken on the basis 
of subjective rules of thumb” (Pioch & Byrom, 2004, p. 225). Clarke, Mackaness and Ball 
(2003) note that despite its importance, researchers ignore the essential role of pragmatic 
judgement (often organised along the lines of experience-based checklist factors) that is largely 
underplayed in the academic literature on outlet forecasting.  
When expansion decisions should result in the choice of profitable locations, how does location 
decision-making balance the market perspective with the inner strength approach in practice: 
does market-based location theory, or the inner strength perspective, dominate pragmatic deci-
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sions? In other words, do exogenous location factors or endogenous network characteristics 
have more effect on judgements, and which criteria are more useful for forecasting outlet per-
formance? How can franchisors organise decision-making to enhance outlet success – is central 
planning or encouraging network self-organisation the better route? 
To examine these questions and extend the literature on successful expansion strategies in fran-
chising, this research combines the literature strands on traditional location factors and the inner 
strength perspective. Using concepts from social network analysis, it tests several hypotheses on 
two German franchise chains. First, this study explores how location decisions are made in 
practice, i.e. which theoretical perspective prevails, and second, it sheds light on the relevance 
or otherwise of the criteria applied for location decisions to outlet performance. The paper has 
managerial implications, in terms of showing how best to organise expansion to achieve benefi-
cial performance outcomes. 
The paper is organised as follows: next, expansion-related literature on location planning that 
assumes direct economic effects is reviewed, and inner strength benefits for franchisees as so-
cial network members are specified. These benefits are then linked to network structure. In sec-
tion 3, hypotheses on market and network characteristics that affect franchisee performance are 
developed. Section 4 describes data and methods, section 5 covers the results, and section 6 
reports conclusions. 
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3. Theoretical Background 
Management literature emphasises that franchising facilitates rapid growth (Castrogiovanni & 
Justis, 2002; Dnes, 1991; Huang, Phau & Chen, 2007; Preble & Hoffman, 2006; Watson, 2008). 
Rapid growth is desirable for franchisors as it yields high outlet share, which generates high 
market share, and high market share stands to yield high profit. As most services and physical 
outputs that franchise systems provide are difficult to protect from imitation (Thompson, 1994), 
optimal exploitation of the product offering necessitates expansion to deter copycats and pre-
empt competitors entering the market. 
A key challenge for expanding franchise systems is to identify the factors that make attractive 
locations – what defines a “promising spot”? Because location decisions are a critical variable in 
every system’s long-term profitability, in a nutshell, strategically planned expansion is para-
mount to future success. Yet, literature on franchise expansion is dominated by research on why 
to use franchising as a strategy to expand rather than grow a business through company-owned 
outlets (Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Dant, Paswan & Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). 
Although research has often addressed retail store location strategies, the problem of positioning 
franchise outlets receives little attention (Kolli & Evans, 1999).  
From a practitioner standpoint, it is notable that academic literature on location strategies con-
tinues to focus on largely theoretical, unapplied scenarios in technique development rather than 
practical usage within the organisational context of the firm (Dasci & Laporte, 2005; González-
Benito, 2002; Sakashita, 2000; Wood & Tasker, 2008). Although the majority of the literature 
portrays the site selection process as a complex data manipulation and modelling challenge, it is 
in fact a blend of “art and science” (ReVelle & Eiselt, 2005; Wood & Tasker, 2008, p. 142). 
That is, despite the simultaneous advent of low cost computing and increasing availability of 
data – giving managers the opportunity to take a much more rational approach to decision-
making – research on retailers’ site assessment procedures reveals that there are many who rely 
on intuition, guided by experience and common sense, instead of sophisticated modelling 
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(Hernández & Bennison, 2000).23 So, “location planning is often undertaken on the basis of 
subjective rules of thumb” (Pioch & Byrom, 2004, p. 225). While recognising the benefits that 
highly quantitative, technological and data-rich methods can bring to decision-support, the fact 
that models by definition remain simplifications of reality, renders subjective experience and 
judgement still essential to successful site selection (Rogers, 1992). This may particularly apply 
to small and medium sized retailers that lack sufficient management resources for extensive data 
modelling. Following Wood and Tasker (2008, p. 152), data modelling processes do not provide 
the sole solution to forecasting challenges anyway: “Knowledge management initiatives […] 
easily fail if they are conceived as technology problems. The difficult thing, of course, is that 
knowledge management then requires a broad understanding of social, technical, and cognitive 
aspects of human organizations”. Clarke et al. (2003) note that despite its practical importance, 
researchers still ignore the essential role of pragmatic judgement, which thus is largely under-
played in the academic literature on outlet forecasting. So, what criteria drive, and should drive, 
pragmatic decisions? 
Location decisions require the balancing of the costs and benefits of a location in the present 
and the future. Based on the market perspective, location theory suggests that there are differ-
ences in location quality.24 Some spots have a greater potential to be profitable than others. Tra-
ditional retail location models stress the profit impacts of structural determinants that lie beyond 
individual firm control, particularly, of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
local or regional area, of traffic infrastructure, competition, and costs (Ghosh & McLafferty, 
1982; Ingene & Yu, 1982; Khan, 1999; Lee & McCracken, 1982; Park & Khan, 2006; Peterson, 
2003; Simons, 1992).  
Turning to the firm perspective, strategic management research has long used the RBV to ex-
plain differences in firm performance (Barney, 2001; Peteraf, 1993). Rooted in the early contri-
                                                     
23 Some regard the late 1980s as the golden age of store location analysis, characterized by the abandon-
ment of intuitive approaches to location decision-making. Yet in practice, the application of sophisti-
cated models has always been limited (Birkin, Clarke & Clarke, 2002). 
24 See Huff’s (1964) early contribution; Craig, Ghosh & McLafferty, 1984; Ghosh & McLafferty, 1987; 
Jones & Simmons, 1990; Kelly, Freeman & Emlen, 1993; Christensen & Drejer, 2005; Park & Khan, 
2005. 
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bution of Penrose (1959), the RBV adopts an inward-looking view, conceptualising firms as 
heterogeneous entities. These entities are envisioned as bundles of idiosyncratic resources that 
improve competitive advantage by enabling the generation of Ricardian rents and quasi-rents 
(Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Yet, focusing on resources and capabilities internal to the firm 
does not capture network relationships that can include cooperative exchange. Thus, the RBV 
must be extended to account for the fact that by means of cooperative exchange, the embedded-
ness of firms in networks of relationships has significant implications for firm performance 
(Gulati et al., 2000). Lavie (2006) broadens the RBV framework by integrating the social net-
work perspective to explain how interconnected firms combine internal resource endowments 
and network resources for competitive advantage. In this vein, this research uses the social net-
work approach as part of the inner strength perspective. 
So far, social networks largely represent a sociological concept. But Granovetter (1985, p. 482) 
has pointed out early that the “mixing of [economic and non-economic] activities” is the “social 
embeddedness of economic behavior”, which hints at the interpenetration of the two spheres of 
economic and non-economic action. Embeddedness refers to the process by which social rela-
tions shape economic action in ways that some mainstream economic schemes overlook. As 
Granovetter has shown in his seminal papers (1973; 1985), it is in the mixing of economic and 
non-economic activities that “non-economic activity affects the costs and the available tech-
niques for economic activity” (Granovetter, 2005, p. 35). The economist Robert Gibbons (2005) 
provided a forward-looking interpretation of interdisciplinary work in this field by pointing out 
that sociology adds new independent variables (networks) to the economic (performance) equa-
tion. In making a new contribution to the field of franchising research, social network theory 
can advance economic insights. This study seeks to enrich economic reasoning with a network 
perspective to analyse the performance implications of expansion decisions in franchise net-
works.  
A social network is a relational structure of individuals tied by social relations. The social net-
work model features the key element of trust-based behaviour. Entrepreneurs benefit from trust-
based relationships as these often provide access to diverse knowledge that is relevant to the 
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entrepreneurial venture (Uzzi, 1996). Knowledge exchange can encompass best practices, stra-
tegic knowledge, or knowledge of knowledge, i.e. knowledge where specific expertise can be 
found (Burt, 1992).25 Interfranchisee relationships make up franchisees’ connective capital. 
Connective capital is the stock of human capital that an individual can access through connec-
tions to others and that is developed with the purpose of tapping into the knowledge of co-
workers via communication links (Ichniowski, Shaw & Gant, 2003). Because knowledge assets 
are often considered the foundation of competitive advantage, connective capital takes the role 
of an input to the system’s production function. Sydow (1998) argues that franchising has be-
come a means to transfer knowledge across organisational boundaries.  
Yet often, knowledge is sticky – relying on personal contacts to transfer it (Windsperger, 2004). 
Sharing knowledge then requires time-consuming personal interaction (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). Regular face-to-face contacts are more easily arranged in proximity. Also, trust as a basis 
for exchange tends to develop between proximate agents (Bachmann & Lane, 1996; William-
son, 1999). Thus, access to knowledge resources can be an essential driver of the choice of 
proximate sites.26 
These observations indicate that the degree to which franchisees can avail themselves of advan-
tages inherent to their social context depends on individual network positioning. The position in 
the network determines individual opportunities to form relationships and acquire resources via 
network embeddedness. Network positioning can vary in several ways, for example, by the 
number of relationships (in network terminology, ties) a franchisee (a vertex) can entertain, the 
strength of ties (time, capital, or emotional investments in a relationship), or the membership of, 
or exclusion from, subnetwork structures (e.g. regional clusters). For instance, maintaining 
                                                     
25 Examples of franchisees’ knowledge assets are local market know-how on marketing, human resources, 
quality control, or innovation capabilities that cannot easily be transferred and acquired by the franchi-
sor (Windsperger, 2003; 2004). 
26 In a globalized world, where capital and knowledge travel at high speed, one would expect economic 
activity to spread over space. Yet, a tendency for geographic concentration occurs (“location para-
dox”). The reason may be that competitive advantage is local: due to frequent interaction opportunities 
in the vicinity, trust and the informal barter of know-how are decisively encouraged: “informal conver-
sations were pervasive and served as an important source of up-to-date information about competitors, 
customers, markets, and technologies. Entrepreneurs came to see social relationships […] as a crucial 
aspect of their business. […] informal conversation was often of more value than more conventional 
but less timely forums such as industrial journals” (Enright, 2000; Saxenian, 1996, p. 33). 
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many ties can provide better access to key competencies through the large number or variety of 
information sources it brings. Thus, relational patterns play a vital role in shaping franchisee 
business outcomes. Hence, it is important to examine the effect of network structure on firm 
performance from a strategic perspective (Gulati et al., 2000). By making the right expansion 
decisions, the system centre can promote the development of a richer set of interfranchisee con-
nections. Following the inner strength perspective, effects of embeddedness may then determine 
a site’s performance prospects rather than location-specific direct economic effects.  
This study analyses, first, which criteria following the market and inner strength perspectives 
dominate pragmatic location decisions. Second, the analysis tests if the determinants of site 
decisions are relevant to performance, too. In the next section, specific hypotheses on market 
and inner strength criteria that may determine site attractiveness and affect performance are 
developed. 
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4. Hypotheses 
4.1 Market Perspective Criteria 
Conventional wisdom holds that there are three prerequisites for retail success; “location, loca-
tion, and location”. Location models account for structural determinants beyond individual 
firms’ control: for regional demographic characteristics, expenditure levels, income, traffic in-
frastructure, competition, and costs (Bush, Tatham & Hair, 1976; Ghosh & McLafferty, 1982; 
Khan, 1999). On the premise that population density closely parallels retail sales, and provides 
an indicator of outsiders’ propensity to shop in an area, data on the area’s total population helps 
to establish a “size of market effect” (Schmidt & Oldfield, 1999). Location models also include 
measures of how convenient it is for customers to access outlets, since distance strongly influ-
ences the probability of patronage (Lord, 1993; Rudd, Vigen & Davis, 1983). Accessibility can 
refer to the means of transport available, to the proximity of places of interest like work, homes, 
or leisure facilities, to outlet visibility, or to the time necessary to master driving distances in the 
trading area (Ghosh & McLafferty, 1982). In addition, low levels of competition from (non-
system) firms with a similar product offering, and low costs, can make an area attractive by 
presenting less threats to outlet performance than highly competitive, high-cost areas. Thus, 
potentially profitable economic conditions seem attractive for the positioning of franchise out-
lets. Then, clusters become large, as such areas lure franchisees in with the promise of high 
economic performance. 
H1: Potentially profitable market conditions positively impact a) cluster size,  
and b) franchisee performance. 
4.2 Inner Strength Perspective Criteria 
Network Strength: Franchisor Support. Evidence shows that most people have a tendency to 
free-ride if they are able to get away with it. In terms of franchise networks, this refers to fran-
chisees deriving benefits, such as reduced individual costs, from the franchise operation that are 
disproportionate to the contribution they make to its sustainability. Monitoring is a key strategy 
in restricting free-riding (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Lafontaine & Slate, 2001; Lal, 1990; McIn-
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tyre, Gilbert & Young, 2006; Michael, 1999), yet monitoring by the franchisor becomes more 
troublesome as networks expand and franchisees become broadly dispersed. However, franchi-
sees in the same vicinity can monitor each other (Fama, 1980), and given the plethora of ways 
in which franchisees can withhold effort to the detriment of their network, such franchisee 
monitoring can be key. Even without express monitoring, exposure to repeated interaction dis-
plays similar effects on free-riding tendencies as do heightened levels of monitoring. Firstly, 
franchisees who frequently interact realise their actions are visible; secondly, interaction with 
others promotes a common spirit; and thirdly, a norm of fair dealing can emerge when norma-
tive conformity evolves due to a set of unwritten mutual expectations (Kidwell, Nygaard & 
Silkoset, 2007). While Axelrod (1984) focuses on the evolution of cooperation based on rational 
self-interest, researchers in the sociology of collective action emphasise affective bonds that 
develop when parties in a relationship interact. Then, interaction provides a source of motiva-
tion that encourages team values and curbs free-riding (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993). When free-
riding, which almost inevitably decreases customer retention rates across the chain, is curtailed, 
franchisee performance can benefit from positive externalities, like inter-unit customer transfer. 
Research shows that free-riding also has adverse effects on the opportunistic franchisee’s per-
formance (Kidwell et al., 2007). Thus, all network members benefit from reducing free-riding. 
Therefore, it is in the interests of a franchisor to place distant outlets in close proximity to one 
another, as it helps to align the efforts of distant franchisees, promotes peer monitoring and pro-
vides an opportunity for interaction. Then, long distances from the franchisor imply large clus-
ters.  
Franchisor-supplied resources are further subject to scale economies. Costs of supervision or 
transporting supplies can be divided across multiple units if they are located proximately. Also, 
franchisees starting a distant outlet may prefer settling proximately to others to be able to ap-
proach others for support that the franchisor cannot offer from a distance. 
H2a: Long distances from the franchisor positively impact a) cluster size,  
and b) franchisee performance. 
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A contrasting hypothesis suggests that more risk-averse franchisors may prefer continuous ex-
pansion from their baseline location. Inma and Debowski (2006) find that new franchisors tend 
to limit expansion to the inception area because of a lack of system infrastructure and market 
knowledge in new territories that limits outlet performance. So, franchisors may not approve of 
opening distant outlets or only do so rarely (perhaps if applicants have exceptional entrepreneu-
rial abilities), then few franchisees will be encouraged to work remote outlets, so large clusters 
are probably near the head office. 
H2b: Long distances from the franchisor negatively impact a) cluster size, 
 and b) franchisee performance. 
Network Strength: Supraregional Embeddedness. An important criterion for positioning fran-
chisees can be the distance to other system franchisees. Distance determines opportunities for 
frequent face-to-face interaction. Interaction helps establish trusting relationships and to realise 
networking benefits like knowledge exchange. Also, shared resources like marketing budgets 
can be used more effectively when market presence is high, that is, when many outlets are lo-
cated proximately. Higher effectiveness can increase demand for the system’s product portfolio. 
Increases in demand can result from higher form demand, that is, from higher consumer propen-
sity to spend on the product kind vs. alternative income allocations, or from stronger brand de-
mand, i.e. from the system’s heightened competitiveness relative to other systems (Kaufman 
and Rangan (1990) term the latter effect “relative preference for the brand”). Ghosh and Craig 
(1991) argue that these demand increases lead to net sales increases despite higher intrasystem 
competition. Finding sufficient numbers of franchisees willing to set up near pre-existing fran-
chisees can thus be easier, and expansion may be faster than when franchisors seek to develop 
remote areas. Possibly the effects described above are limited to a certain geographical radius. 
Here, the area in which such effects may occur is called a supraregional cluster. 
H3a: A high degree of embeddedness in the supraregional cluster  
positively impacts a) cluster size and b) franchisee performance. 
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Yet, the continual conflict of the convenience-choice interplay suggests that consumers decide 
on merchandise locations in relation to the time and effort necessary to accomplish buying tasks 
(Mertes, 1964). Similar to the reservation price concept, there can be a reservation distance that 
is the maximum consumers are willing to travel (Ghosh & Craig, 1991). As franchisee offerings 
are alike, customers may not exhibit outlet loyalties once a more conveniently located new out-
let exists. Thus, too many franchisees in the supraregional area can intensify cannibalisation. 
Then, individual sales may decrease because demand spreads over more outlets (Du Toit, 2003). 
Lower performance, in turn, may reduce franchisee motivation to interact and cooperate. In 
addition, interaction on a supraregional scale can become costly due to investments in overcom-
ing distance (like transport and communication costs). Information gained through interaction 
may further be irrelevant as in the supraregional area, franchisees’ market environments may be 
quite different. Also, ties are weaker when individual network investments are spread over more 
relationships, because each relationship is less intense. Then, motivation to share resources 
tends to be low and incentives for opportunism tend to be strong. Thus, high supraregional em-
beddedness may negatively influence performance prospects and thus, location decisions. 
H3b: A high degree of embeddedness in the supraregional cluster  
negatively impacts a) cluster size and b) franchisee performance. 
Subnetwork Strength: Regional Embeddedness. As the input obtainable in the supraregional 
cluster may be of little relevance if franchisees operate in different market environments, it may 
be that the most important sources of knowledge are actually located close by. Here, this radius 
is termed a regional cluster. In the regional cluster, proximity promotes frequent face-to-face-
interaction and trust-building – said to be a prerequisite of cooperative exchange (Bachmann & 
Lane, 1996; Williamson, 1999). Cooperation in trusting relationships has lower transaction 
costs in terms of financial and time investments. Embeddedness in regional networks can fur-
ther effectively limit free-riding. Here, engaging in opportunistic acts becomes costly due to 
reputational effects, when losing the trust of network partners is sanctioned by receiving less 
cooperative input. Since proximity also results in greater transparency, it offers benchmarking 
opportunities which can motivate franchisees and amplify peer pressure on devoting efforts to 
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enhance performance. Also, well-connected franchisees can better lobby for their common in-
terests to the franchisor. Occupying a network position that offers high embeddedness in the 
regional structure thus facilitates realising network benefits.27 
H4a: A high degree of embeddedness in the regional cluster  
positively impacts franchisee performance. 
Some studies stress that heightened intersystem competitiveness offsets individual losses arising 
from increased competition. Yet, prior to complete market development, franchisees often draw 
customers, whose spending becomes the basis for revenue expectations, from beyond their usual 
trading areas (Farrell, 1984). Here, the perception that cannibalisation occurs can result in re-
duced motivation and conflicts detrimental to a smooth running network. Then, cooperative 
exchange is reduced to safeguard one’s market position. A further disadvantage in dense re-
gional structures can be intellectual inbreeding (“lock-in”), meaning that an over-reliance on 
regional knowledge develops. The latter process slows down the detection of changing needs. 
Then, embeddedness in regional relationships restricts performance. 
H4b: A high degree of embeddedness in the regional cluster 
 negatively impacts franchisee performance. 
For network expansion strategies to be effective, those criteria that determine franchisee posi-
tioning should be relevant to franchisee performance, as in the long run, individual performance 
determines system success. 
H5: Criteria that positively impact location decisions of franchise outlets  
also influence franchisee performance positively. 
                                                     
27 Since the number of ties a franchisee can entertain in the regional cluster directly depends on the num-
ber of franchisees present in the cluster, this network characteristic cannot be used to explain cluster 
size. Therefore, the analysis focuses on performance effects. 
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5. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
5.1 Sample 
The hypotheses are tested using cross-sectional data collected from franchisees from two Ger-
man franchise chains. In Germany, retail is still the largest industry using franchising (in sales 
2008, 36%), but services are increasingly becoming stronger (33%). This study covers one sys-
tem from each sector. The first system specializes in apparel retail. Fashion retailing is particu-
larly dependent on informal network exchange in order to keep up with the industry’s constantly 
changing trends (Uzzi, 1996). The second system specializes in travel services. Following pre-
vious research, the importance and complexity of vertical and horizontal cooperative relations is 
a dominant characteristic of the travel services industry (Fyall & Garrod, 2005; Tinsley & 
Lynch, 2007). These chains are selected as they have a long-standing relationship with the uni-
versity, which facilitates information access. Like many small and medium sized franchises, the 
chains follow rules of thumb when deciding on locations. Interviews with system officials, press 
releases and the chains’ websites, show that both systems acknowledge the importance of “pre-
mium” locations, but those are described vaguely in terms like “first-rate” sites with “access to a 
broad, solvent customer base”. Self-administered postal questionnaires, a cover letter assuring 
franchisees of anonymity and a university address for responses, were distributed to the apparel 
business franchisees (system 1) in 2006 and to the travel business franchisees (system 2) in late 
2007. The specific formulation of the Likert-type questionnaire items emerged from a qualita-
tive-explorative pre-study involving franchisors, consultants, and franchisee focus groups. A 
total of 201 responses arrived between 2007 and early 2008, giving response rates of 47% from 
the system 1 franchisees and 33% from the system 2 group. Due to missing data, subsequent 
performance regressions are based on the responses of 174 franchisees. The performance sam-
ple comprises 74% from the travel franchise and 26% from the apparel business.  
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5.2 Dependent Variables 
Cluster Size. The thinking is that location criteria affect cluster size: if the location criteria cause 
an area to be seen as attractive, franchisees connect that with high levels of economic return so 
set up in the area, in due course causing large clusters to form.  
A major problem for empirical studies on clustering is to implement the concept of proximity. 
Drawing boundaries is a matter of degree and understanding the linkages and complementarities 
across units that are relevant to competition (Porter, 2000). This study locates each franchisee at 
the centre of a series of concentric circles of different radii. Following Kelly et al. (1993), then, 
franchisee performance is measured against the number of franchisees within the diameter of 
each circle, and the radius with the highest strongly significant coefficient is chosen as an ap-
propriate cluster size. The cut-off distance is 45 kilometres (about 28 miles). This distance cor-
responds to Kalnins’ (2004) distance measure for interaction effects. In addition, interviews 
with the systems’ franchisees were conducted. Franchisees indicated that they had substantial 
contact on business issues with other system franchisees up to 40 or 50km away. So, for every 
franchisee, the number of vertices present in the 45km cut-off distance is measured. CLUSTER 
SIZE ranges from 0 to 15.  
Performance. Typical measures of retail success are sales and profits. Researchers commonly 
cannot obtain profitability data, but sales information often is available as a performance metric 
(Singh & Mitchell, 2005). Sales volume is only a short-term measure of a store’s competitive 
strength. Yet, long-term implications suggest a strong link between sales and profitability 
(Buzzell & Gale, 1987).  
By fostering mutual support, cooperation plays a central intervening role in the relation between 
organisational design and performance. Sales growth reflects the acquisition of new customers 
and increased purchases by existing customers. Both aspects are influenced by interfranchisee 
cooperation that helps meet customer demands. Thus, cooperation can enhance sales growth, as 
franchisees can directly convert input obtained from others into sales. Using sales growth as a 
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performance measure is consistent with research on collaborative relationships28 (Collins & 
Clark, 2003; Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; Park & Luo, 2001; Sarkar, Echambadi & Harrison, 
2001; Singh & Mitchell, 2005; Stuart, 2000). Consequently, this precise, location-specific per-
formance indicator is selected that reflects outlet sustainability and growth.29 
5.3 Independent and Control Variables 
Regional Economic Conditions. Market potential is assessed with a set of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables (data from the Federal Statistical Office): total population, GDP, num-
ber of income tax payers, income tax total, average working population, and business insolven-
cies (Ingene & Yu, 1982; James et al., 1975; Khan, 1999; Lee & McCracken, 1982; Park & 
Khan, 2006; Simons, 1992). The study uses data for those counties that are within each franchi-
see’s regional cluster boundaries, as cluster-specific data is unavailable. Factor analysis allows 
for a reduction in dimensions as all variables load heavily on the factor REC.30 
Accessibility. Ascribing general geographic attributes to accurate locations is difficult (“geo-
graphical fallacy”; Ingene, 1984). For each cluster, the time investment required to reach the 
nearest highway is measured. The variable TRAFFIC is a proxy for the convenience of infra-
structure available, which widens trading areas. Data comes from mapchart.com, a fee-charging 
geo-information system. 
                                                     
28 Some studies use sales growth in combination with data on market share, product innovation, or stock 
growth, none of which are useful in the case of the sample firms. 
29 For the first system, data on total sales of the previous business year and on franchisee satisfaction with 
their business performance could be obtained. This data is used as additional dependent variables. Sa-
tisfaction items ask respondents to evaluate their recent performance relative to different comparison 
levels. Comparison levels are (1) alternative activities, (2) average industry sales growth, (3) own in-
come expectations, and (4) own sales objectives. Anchoring success by reference to comparison levels 
is in line with Anderson and Narus (1990). The results of a principal component factor analysis show 
the four items to load highly on one factor. A scale is built that averages the sum of the scores on the 
four items, using equal weights. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.82. Inspections of item-to-total and inter-item 
correlations also provide support for scale reliability. The inner strength variables show the same sig-
nificant results for satisfaction as well as for total sales as for growth; there are no significant results 
for market conditions.  
30 The factor solution is robust (> 93% explained variance, eigenvalue >1, KMO 0.79, significant Bartlett-
test). Cronbach’s Alpha (0.73) and the inspection of item-to-total and inter-item correlations provide 
support for scale reliability. All variables are significant when introduced into Model 0 separately. 
Over 50% of the sample franchisees joined their system in the last ten years; over time, market condi-
tions may rather not vary dramatically. 
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Competition. The study uses the number of firms in the same industry in the area (from the na-
tional business directory) as an indicator of competitive intensity, COMP. 
Costs. Costs of business activity in each franchisee’s area are measured using an index of the 
respective area’s business tax as a proxy. 
Distance to the Franchisor. Following Brickley and Dark (1987) and Minkler (1990), geo-
graphic distance was calculated as the number of kilometres that lie in between a franchised 
outlet and the chain’s system centre (head office), DISTSC. 
Supraregional Embeddedness. The measure SEM assesses interaction opportunities between 
franchisees in the same chain by counting the vertex degree, i.e. the number of franchisees 
within the supraregional area (the study uses double the cluster size radius). The measure corre-
sponds to Minkler’s (1990) outlet density, calculated as the number of stores within a certain 
radius. Following De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj (2005), the study considers directed ties (i.e. 
degrees are doubled), as in each franchisee pair, there are two potential sources of contact initia-
tion (the two franchisees). 
Regional Embeddedness. The measure REM is how many ties a vertex can have in its regional 
cluster (the cluster size radius). In pre-studies, three other retail and services franchisors re-
ported a similar radius, 50km, as appropriate interaction radius. 
Controls. The study controls for the age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship, as franchisee 
experience may influence sales. The measure, AGE, is consistent with Dant and Nasr (1998). 
Franchisees indicated the year in which they opened their outlet. The analysis further controls 
for outlet size (Windsperger & Yurdakul, 2008), using the number of outlet employees as a 
proxy (SIZE). It further uses a dummy variable, SYSTEM, to control for differences between 
systems, with the travel franchise being coded as 0 and the apparel franchise as 1. Table 6 gives 
an overview of hypotheses and variables. 
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Hypotheses Perspective Variable 
1 Potentially profitable market conditions positively impact a) cluster size, and b) franchisee performance. Market 
REC, TRAF-
FIC, COMP, 
COSTS 
2a(b) Long distances from the franchisor positively (negatively) impact a) cluster size, and b) franchisee performance. 
“Inner 
Strength” 
DISTSC 
3a (b) 
A high degree of embeddedness in the supraregional clus-
ter positively (negatively) impacts a) cluster size and b) 
franchisee performance. 
SEM 
4a (b) A high degree of embeddedness in the regional cluster positively (negatively) impacts franchisee performance. REM 
5 
Criteria that positively impact location decisions of fran-
chise outlets also influence franchisee performance posi-
tively. 
 
Controls: Age of Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, Outlet Size, 
System Dummy 
 
 
AGE, SIZE, 
SYSTEM 
Table 6: Overview of Hypotheses 
5.4 Methods 
The chapter analyses, first, which criteria following the market and inner strength perspectives 
dominate pragmatic location decisions. The study employs a stepwise Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression (OLS) to examine the first general hypothesis: 
Cluster_sizei = f (regional_economicsj, customer_accessibilityj, competitionj, costsj, net-
work_strengthi), with network_strengthi = g (franchisor_supporti, supraregional_em-
beddednessi), j = cluster index, i = franchisee index. 
The empirical analysis controls for absence of multicollinearity, for homoscedasticity and nor-
mal distribution of disturbance terms, using Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) and correlations, 
White-, Newey-West- and Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Tests. VIFs are all lower than two. Second, 
the study tests if the determinants of site decisions are relevant to performance, too. The second 
general hypothesis is: 
Franchisee_performancei = h (regional_economicsj, customer_accessibilityj, competi-
tionj, costsj, network_strengthi, subnetwork_strengthi), with subnetwork_strengthi = m 
(regional_embeddednessi). 
For analysing the performance hypothesis, it must be noted that interaction opportunities in the 
regional cluster directly depend on the regional cluster size. So, potential simultaneity issues 
arise, since the other independent variables that affect performance are expected to affect cluster 
size as well. Then, OLS could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates. To correct for this is-
sue, the analysis uses two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), where regional embeddedness 
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is estimated based on the other independent variables that are expected to influence cluster size. 
The estimated values for regional embeddedness are then used in the second stage of the 2SLS 
regression. The first stage is:  
Regional embeddednessi = f (regional_economicsj, customer_accessibilityj, competitionj, 
costsj, franchisor_supporti, supraregional_embeddednessi).  
The second stage is:  
Franchisee_performancei = h (regional_economicsj, customer_accessibilityj, competi-
tionj, franchisor_supporti, supraregional_embeddednessi, regional_embeddednessi^), 
where regional_embeddednessi^ is the estimated value from the first stage regression.31  
To trace nonresponse bias, early and late responders are compared (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977) in each system. Late responders completed the questionnaire over three weeks after the 
first group. As suggested by the high response rates, Mann-Whitney-Tests do not show evidence 
for nonresponse bias. Also, the average sampled observation in each system with the average 
outlet-owner computed from the population of each chain is compared along the dimensions 
age, number of years in business, and performance. To obtain information on the characteristics 
of the populations, officials in the chains were contacted. No evidence of nonresponse biases 
emerged. 
 
                                                     
31 The variable COSTS is used as an instrument in the first stage of the 2SLS regression to estimate re-
gional embeddedness. This instrument fulfills the criteria of being both relevant and exogenous, as 
costs do influence location decisions – since tax affects franchisee profit –, but do not influence the 
performance measure (sales growth) directly. 
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6. Results 
Table 7 displays OLS and 2SLS results for H1-H5. Table 8 exhibits descriptive statistics. Table 
9 shows responses to items on franchisee network interaction.32 
Potentially profitable market conditions – in terms of good regional economic conditions and 
good site accessibility – positively influence decisions to locate franchisees at a certain spot, and 
thus they enhance cluster sizes. Highly intense competition and high costs negatively influence 
decisions and cluster sizes. So, H1 is supported. Long distances to the franchisor make distant 
franchisees locate proximately, so long distances lead to larger clusters (H2a). Many opportuni-
ties for interaction with other system franchisees on a supraregional scale correspond to larger 
regional clusters (H3a). Thus, market and inner strength perspective criteria both influence loca-
tion decisions. Yet, H5 is hardly supported: those criteria that affect location decisions do not 
determine franchisee performance. Only accessibility shows a significant impact on perform-
ance. The other market criteria, i.e. socioeconomic and demographic factors and competitive 
intensity, are insignificant (as is the network criterion of distance to the franchisor). Instead, 
inner strength criteria impact success: embeddedness in regional clusters (H4) enhances franchi-
see performance (table 7). The idea is that embeddedness can offer privileged access to others’ 
resources, like know-how and information. Yet, embeddedness in the supraregional cluster 
strongly decreases performance (H3b). Possibly, this effect occurs because dense structures of 
franchisees increase cannibalisation of sales and reduce motivation to cooperate. Following 
these results, success in franchising is much less influenced by market perspective criteria than 
by the inner strength of network structure.33 
To test if cooperative interaction as proposed by the network model is a feature of these sys-
tems, franchisees answered several items (table 9). For example, the availability of others for 
support provides a latent indicator for cooperative interaction: if perceived availability is low, 
                                                     
32 The analysis uses costs as an instrument in the first stage of the 2SLS regression to estimate regional 
embeddedness. Costs are measured using a business tax index as a proxy. This instrument fulfills the 
criteria of being both relevant and exogenous, as costs do influence location decisions – since tax af-
fects franchisee profit – but do not influence the performance measure (sales growth) directly. 
33 Still, most certainly, some “basic standard” of economic characteristics (for total population or GDP 
e.g.) must exist in clusters so that the benefits of network resources can be used profitably. 
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interaction and access to support should be low too, and vice versa. Although this indirect 
measure does not prove that available franchisees are positioned in the regional cluster, the 
probability is high that proximate franchisees are approached for support first. Also, regional 
embeddedness correlates highly with availability, so interaction is strong for many proximate 
relationship opportunities. Then, networking benefits can occur. 34  
Results are stable even when applying different methods (OLS, 2SLS) and components (factor 
solutions, single variables). A reduced form model (without REM) yields the same results with 
respect to signs and significance levels for effects of the other variables on performance. The 
highest correlation among independent variables (0.702) used in the same model is below the 
common 0.8 cut-off level (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). The correlation table sup-
ports the OLS and 2SLS results. Results were checked in interviews with the franchisor and 
system franchisees. They support the findings. Interviewees believed that market characteristics 
strongly affect the attractiveness of a location, that the structure of ties among system members 
affects social and economic behaviour, and that input obtained through interaction enhances 
success. 
                                                     
34 This idea is supported by franchisee statements on their interaction structures. The interaction levels in 
both systems are high. The items for access to others’ support (item 1) and knowing others personally 
(item 2) correlate strongly with performance (-0.402, p < 0.03; -0.367, p < 0.02; both items are reverse-
coded). 
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Table 7: Results 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent  
Variable 
Cluster Size Performance Performance 
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 
C -17.476 (27.189) -144310.878 (2737753.501) 10475.039 (2772543.522) 
REC 0.674* (0.289) 2309.349 (12863.452) -1313.412 (13748.007) 
TRAFFIC -0.182*** (0.039) -9515.990** (3540.803) -7911.318* (3820.258) 
COMP -0.026† (0.014) -246.711 (1062.424) 59.960 (1175.375) 
COSTS -0.830*** (0.156)     
DISTSC 0.002* (0.001) 39.104 (75.838) 29.302 (80.200) 
SEM 0.062*** (0.015) -3162.720*** (748.902) -3589.966*** (1071.443) 
REM   9040.829*** (2445.014) 11898.649* (5035.435) 
AGE 0.012 (0.014) 109.703 (1368.552) 14.573 (1390.271) 
SIZE -0.125* (0.073) -2289.015 (4584.938) -1583.475 (4826.526) 
SYSTEM -0.812* (0.463) 219351.011*** (35642.940) 229484.070*** (36571.007) 
N       191  174   174    
F 55.069*** 13.228*** 12.327*** 
R2 0.733 0.421 0.416 
Adj. R2 0.720 0.389 0.384 
Beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1.  
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Variable     Mean               S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   (11) 
(1) CLUSTER SIZE 3.503 3.362 1.000                
(2) PERFORMANCE 1148.352 178324.383 0.093 1.000               
(3) REC 0.000 1.000 0.390*** 0.014 1.000              
(4) TRAFFIC 12.060 3.704 -0.516*** -0.192** -0.111 1.000             
(5) COMP 9.389 8.835 -0.193** -0.235* -0.088 0.194** 1.000            
(6) COSTS 1.632 1.391 -0.755*** 0.052 -0.290*** 0.503*** 0.192* 1.000           
(7) DISTSC 306.965 175.058 -0.060 -0.001 -0.407*** 0.034 -0.138† 0.043 1.000         
(8) SEM 21.682 18.548 0.702*** -0.300*** 0.363*** -0.297*** 0.038 -0.618** -0.200** 1.000       
(9) REM 6.689 6.659 0.921*** 0.007 0.326*** -0.497*** -0.177* -0.809*** -0.053 0.663*** 1.000     
(10) AGE 1996.859 6.542 0.148* -0.067 0.001 -0.068 -0.008 -0.131† 0.028 0.136† 0.141† 1.000   
(11) SIZE 3.881 2.197 -0.003 -0.171* 0.070 0.073 0.049 -0.008 0.079 0.127† 0.014 -0.001 1.000 
12. SYSTEM    -0.436*** 0.517*** 0.017 0.136† -0.247*** 0.471*** -0.144* -0.464*** -0.416*** -0.165* -0.182* 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. 
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Questionnaire Item 
Agreement 
1. System 2. System 
I can turn to other franchisees for assistance whenever I have a problem. 80% 90% 
I know many other system franchisees on a personal basis. 60% 40% 
I regularly discuss business matters with other system franchisees. 65% 75% 
I am very satisfied with my relationships with the other network members. 95% 95% 
Apart from franchisor-organised meetings, I meet other system franchisees privately. 55% 90% 
When problems with the franchisor arise, franchisees stick together. 55% 80% 
The franchisees use every possibility to exert influence on the franchisor via councils and committees. 70% 70% 
None of the system franchisees acts primarily to his/her own advantage. 45% 80% 
In general, all system franchisees fulfil their duties. 75% 85% 
As a system member, I am a lone wolf. vs.   
As a system member, I am part of a community. 
55%  
(community) 
75%  
(community) 
Items measured on a 7-point scale: 1-7 “strongly agree”, 7 – “strongly disagree”. The three affirmative answers represent “agreement”. 
Table 9: Network Interaction and Cooperation 
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7. Discussion 
Based on the two theoretical streams of the market and the firm perspective, this study analyses 
which criteria drive decisions on franchisee location when a franchise chain expands. Further, 
this research sheds light on the relevance, or otherwise, for outlet performance of the decision 
criteria applied. Location decisions can be based on strengths found in local markets, following 
the market perspective, and the expanding system’s own strengths, following the firm perspec-
tive. Taking a market perspective, traditional location theory suggests that structural market 
conditions beyond individual firms’ control, like demographic and socioeconomic data of the 
area, accessibility, competition, or costs, have direct effects on performance. The firm perspec-
tive (RBV) however, suggests that resources and capabilities internal to the firm explain com-
petitive advantage. The RBV has recently been extended using the social network perspective to 
account for external resources available in networks of entrepreneurs (Lavie, 2006). This inner 
strength perspective suggests that access to resources in a certain spot determines the attractive-
ness of a location rather than location-specific market factors. 
The analysis establishes that in practice, location decisions are based on both perspectives: both 
exogenous market-based characteristics and endogenous inner strength criteria determine deci-
sions.  
Yet, market perspective criteria do not necessarily impact franchisee performance. Instead, inner 
strength criteria do, but only with respect to (supra)regional network structures: embeddedness 
in regional clusters enhances performance. The underlying logic is that in regional clusters, 
frequent face-to-face interaction facilitates cooperative exchange. Yet, many franchisees in the 
supraregional area decrease performance. The puzzle of these countervailing effects in regional 
and supraregional clusters can be disentangled as follows: let us assume that customers are dis-
tributed on a straight line from 0 to 1. At first, franchisees are located around the cluster’s cen-
tre, that is, on the line’s middle. Thereby, they try to capture the majority of customers (also, 
from the cluster’s edges). Clustering then heightens form and brand demand and can encourage 
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cooperation to jointly advance the system’s competitive edge. Hence, positive effects of coop-
eration prevail.  
Over time, new franchisees enter the system and take up more remote positions than their 
predecessors, and thus regional clusters develop into supraregional clusters. Then, a regional 
cluster loses its customers at the edges to these newer franchisees. That is, exogenously, de-
mand-dragging into the regional cluster is weakened.35 Thus, negative competitive effects occur. 
These are combined, endogenously, with negative cooperative effects because maintaining dis-
tant ties requires high networking investments and because cooperation is reduced to safeguard 
individual positionings in face of enforced competition. Then, demand effects outweigh strate-
gic effects.  
There are essential managerial implications for the franchisee level.36 Providing a shield against 
competitive forces, inner strength renders franchisees relatively independent of market condi-
tions. While independent ventures cannot but take market criteria into consideration when de-
ciding on the right location, because inner strength support does not exist here, franchisees who 
have a stake in deciding on their locations can and should consider site attractiveness on the 
basis of the performance implications of network structure. That is, although prospective fran-
chisees are aware of the advantages franchising has over independent ventures including finan-
cial and business benefits and a greater choice of sectors (Kaufmann, 1999), and accordingly, 
choose the franchise option instead of independence, they do not capitalize on franchising ad-
vantages early on when deciding where to set up. Hence, an earlier orientation towards adopting 
a consistent franchisee identity is desirable for franchisees to enhance individual performance 
                                                     
35 Distance to the nearest larger community is an explanatory variable for per capita sales for many city 
sizes (Ferber, 1958). Regional clusters centering on larger communities provide a point of attraction, 
dragging demand within cluster boundaries. Population, however, is not uniformly distributed in space: 
total population usually increases with diminishing returns to scale from the clusters’ centre, as dense-
ly-populated regions are less likely to span a large (supraregional and above) than a small (regional) 
radius. For supraregional clusters, demand-dragging is thus less probable to result in significant per-
formance-enhancing customer gains from outside the cluster. 
36 A word of caution seems in order as regards infering processes from spatial patterns: Place versus pe-
riphery definitions are clearly imperfect. The study explores mechanisms underlying superior perform-
ance of clustered franchisees, rather than tries to define exact cluster ranges. Also, network and site 
characteristics are dynamic and path-dependent, which may alter a site’s attractiveness. 
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prospects (as well as expansion success). Further, opportunities to benefit from inner strength 
must be seized by displaying adequate efforts, by cultivating interaction and fair exchange. 
Research has shown that for many franchise systems, unplanned growth has led to over-
expansion and performance decline (Grünhagen, DiPietro, Stassen & Frazer, 2008; Hoffman & 
Preble, 1991; Holmberg & Morgan, 2004). On the franchisor level, results suggest that chances 
for successful expansion are enhanced when focusing on optimizing network configuration. The 
results show that location planning cannot be reduced to central knowledge and data manage-
ment by the system centre: franchising, as a key strategy in business growth, depends much 
more on developing quality relationships in the network than on knowledge of the economic 
characteristics of geographical markets held at the centre. Due to the relevance of inner strength, 
providing franchisees’ with interaction opportunities is important. First, franchisee screening 
and selection must be responsive to cooperative orientations. As Burt (1992, p. 13) observes, 
“To the extent that people play an active role in shaping their relationships, then a player who 
knows how to structure a network to provide high opportunities knows whom to include in the 
network”. Second, franchisors can encourage intranetwork knowledge transfer (Hoffman & 
Preble, 1991) by incentivising cooperative behaviour. In practice, some franchisors have set up 
mentoring programs, where new franchisees are placed under the care of a veteran franchisee, 
providing assistance in bookkeeping, mechanical work and labour disputes, or motivational 
talks, until they can run the business on their own. Gassenheimer, Baucus and Baucus (1996, p. 
69) conclude that “responsibility lies with franchisors to […] help franchisees […] work to-
gether”. 
Additionally, results (for H3 and H4) suggest that franchisors may want to follow a geographi-
cally dispersed cluster-approach to expansion, rather than steadily growing from a baseline loca-
tion. According to Kelly et al. (1993), when sales growth exceeds expectations, retailers usually 
expand existing outlets or expand to new locations in the same geographical trade area. How-
ever, a third, more successful option can be expanding by placing new outlets more remotely. 
Chaudhuri, Ghosh and Spell (2001) suggest that franchisors open company-owned stores at 
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more profitable locations, while leaving the less profitable ones for franchise outlets. Yet, based 
on the study results, prior definitions of promising locations might benefit from a re-evaluation. 
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 IV. OPPOSITES ATTRACT – EFFECTS OF DIVERSE CULTURAL REFERENCES 
AND INDUSTRY NETWORK RESOURCES ON FILM PERFORMANCE 
1. Abstract 
This chapter analyses motion picture success factors in an intercultural context. Using a sample 
of 160 German top-ten movies of 1990-2005, hypotheses are tested concerning the relation of 
(1) movie team composition (team members’ respective cultural background, industry tenure, 
social network resources, education, star status, age, and gender) and (2) film characteristics 
(sets, movie content) to a movie’s domestic, export, and total performance. The idea is that capi-
talizing on diversity in both of these “input categories”, i.e. in team and film characteristics, 
helps to provide familiarity to audiences in different markets. The analysis shows that offering 
cultural familiarity (team members of different cultural backgrounds, and international sets) is 
strongly rewarded abroad. Yet, domestic success depends on other diversity inputs. For domes-
tic success, diversity in social network resources is essential. The rationale is that such diversity 
reduces the danger of “groupthink” and enhances creative potential available for movie creation. 
Managerial implications are provided for how to target international audiences more effectively. 
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2. Introduction 
 “We know that an announcement ‘British Film’ outside a  
movie theatre will chill the hardiest away from its door” 
(Joseph Schenck, former President of United Artists;  
cited in Low, Richards & Manvell, 2005, p. 298) 
The sector that has recently shown tremendous growth rates worldwide and accordingly, has 
been termed “the new global growth industry” (Roodhouse, 2004), is the sector of cultural and 
creative industries. This sector comprises the economic activities in the creation, production, 
and distribution of goods and services that are cultural in nature, such as film, literature, music, 
theatre, or broadcasting. For film and television, researchers expect that by 2020, consumer 
demand will have tripled compared with the year 2000 (Baughn & Buchanan, 2001). While 
such growth holds promises for film producers, it also ups the economic stakes.  
During this phase of expected industry growth, more profits can be gained when film projects 
are designed in such a way that they do not only meet demand in the domestic market, but that 
they can also compete internationally. Yet, focusing on the European market, as a matter of fact, 
Europeans do not watch many films by other Europeans. Instead, the European national movie 
industries attract domestic audiences, and Hollywood movies still prevail in terms of market 
share in most European countries. Although recently, German movies such as “The Lives of the 
Others” and “The Downfall” have reached admission peaks throughout Europe, German films 
do not show consistency in gaining more than marginal market shares in export markets. 
Like in physical product markets, in cultural industries, a well-known brand is a sales multiplier 
(Ullrich, 2006). For instance, the book market regards some famous authors as “brands”; in the 
field of art exhibitions, the “Guggenheim Museum” has expanded to six branches worldwide by 
now, and when the New York “Museum of Modern Art” lent its impressionists to the “Berlin 
Museum” in 2007, the “MoMa” name was featured prominently (Suchsland, 2007). In the mar-
ket for motion pictures, movies can appear more attractive to consumers if made by a well-
known producer who, like a brand, stands for a certain style, a particular atmosphere or a well-
known set of topics and attitudes. Films that carry a well-known producer’s “brand name” have 
a head start in raising demand.  
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Against this background, this research addresses the following questions: how can producers 
design film projects successfully to create a “brand name” and better profit from industry 
growth? Are there ways to boost a movie’s success prospects in export markets prior to movie 
release, at the stage of movie production? Are these ways feasible without jeopardizing domes-
tic performance? The purpose of this study is to contribute to a more sophisticated understand-
ing of motion picture success factors in an intercultural context. To profit from the growth po-
tential of domestic and non-domestic markets, it is important to comprehend why films perform 
differently at home and abroad. However, movie producers can rarely build on systematic re-
search when attempting to customize movies to different cultural settings (Hennig-Thurau, 
Walsh & Bode, 2004).  
For analyzing the way to intercultural success, this research combines and expands two strands 
of research: the economic approach to motion picture performance, and the team diversity ap-
proach to team performance. The idea is that movies must provide some cultural familiarity and 
identification potential to their audiences, so that these understand what they are offered, while 
still being provided with sufficient novelty to enjoy it. The study is based on the premise that (1) 
the composition of the movie team – as the basis for contributing different cultural backgrounds, 
creativity and talent to movie creation, and as a highly visible movie ingredient – as well as (2) 
essential film characteristics, like set locations or storyline, must suit audiences not only in the 
home market, but also in culturally diverse export markets. Possibly, capitalizing on diversity in 
these two “input categories” helps to provide points of reference to diverse audiences. Then, a 
movie can succeed also elsewhere than in its domestic market. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews literature on movie (export) per-
formance and on team diversity. Then, hypotheses are developed on the effects of team compo-
sition and movie characteristics, with respect to a movie’s domestic and export performance, as 
well as to total performance (section 4). Section 5 describes data and methods, section 6 reports 
the results. Section 7 concludes, offering managerial and research implications. 
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3. Theoretical Background 
3.1 Cultural Industries and Determinants of Movie Exports 
The cultural industries are a promising field for cultural, social and economic research for sev-
eral reasons. First, they are a significant arena for the exchange of meanings. Their function as 
means of communication and their potential for manipulation continue to be keys to understand-
ing modern societies. Second, they provide an exciting example for several contemporary socio-
economic trends: for instance, many are at the forefront of the broad changes in the markets for 
information goods (Eisenberg, Gerlach & Handke, 2006). Third, they show tremendous growth 
rates worldwide, largely in the production of mass media content such as motion pictures. Ac-
cordingly, they have been termed “the new global growth industry” (Roodhouse, 2004). Policy-
makers often expect them to be drivers of economic growth and employment – an appealing 
prospect in particular for de-industrialising urban areas in Western economies that sometimes 
already boast thriving cultural scenes (Eisenberg et al., 2006).  
Throughout Europe, the star of the national motion picture industries has risen. In the 25 Euro-
pean countries, in 2006, European movies reached a market share of 31.2% of the 926m admis-
sions registered. This figure has grown from a 22.9% share in 2000, and has been on the in-
crease since the 1990s (German Federal Film Board (FFA) data). In the 1990s, film-makers like 
Luc Besson in France, or Sönke Wortmann in Germany, started moving towards popular genres 
and narratives previously considered the domain of Hollywood (Bergfelder, 2005). Yet, despite 
their popularity in their respective home markets, the export success of European countries’ 
movies is limited. Focusing on the German motion picture industry, in 2006, German movies hit 
a market share of 25% in their home market and 4% in the other European markets (FFA data). 
Although recently, German movies such as “The Lives of the Others” have reached admission 
peaks throughout Europe, German films do not show consistency in gaining more than marginal 
market shares in export markets.  
Studies on factors that determine movie export success concentrate nearly exclusively on U.S. 
movies. These studies set forth political, economic, sociological, and cultural reasons to explain 
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success (Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Lee & Bae, 2004; Litman, 2000; Seagrave, 1997).37 Some 
studies address the assumption of a “cultural discount” factor that results from the cultural dis-
tance between the exporting and the importing country (Lee & Bae, 2004). As Hutzschenreuter 
and Voll (2008) point out, during international expansion, most difficulties for the international-
ising firm are created by distance, and distance exists also in the cultural sense. The concept of 
“cultural distance” remains difficult to measure. “Cultural distance” can refer to any aspect in 
which cultures differ from each other (Hutzschenreuter & Voll, 2008) and is closely associated 
with the concept of “psychic distance”. Psychic distance is defined in terms of differences in 
language, education level, economic development, political system, or religion that influence 
trade-flows between countries (Arora & Fosfuri, 2000; Boyacigiller, 1990; Dow & Karunaratna; 
2006; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shenkar, 
2001). In the motion picture industry, the “cultural discount” factor stands for a movie’s reduc-
tion in value in export markets; the reduction occurs since audiences prefer domestic entertain-
ment because it shares their cultural values and native language (Lee & Bae, 2004; Oh, 2001). 
Craig, Greene and Douglas (2005) observe that U.S. films perform better in countries that are 
culturally close to the U.S. Marvasti and Canterbery (2005) establish that cultural variables like 
education, religion, and language in export markets influence U.S. movie exports. Yet, most 
analysis has been circumstantial, neglecting the baseline: the actual movie product. 
Even for German movies’ domestic success, studies are few and have produced conflicting re-
sults (Hennig-Thurau & Wruck, 2000; Jansen, 2002; Meiseberg, Ehrmann & Dormann, 2008),38 
which offers little support for identifying criteria that lead to export success. 
                                                     
37 Political reasons can be governmental promotion of the movie industry’s and national interests (“stra-
tegic trade”). Economic reasons can be inadequate foreign protectionist and subsidization policies; ad-
vantages of a large home market; the know-how to maximise the present value of profits across exhibi-
tion windows, which renders superior budget flexibility; or the “success breeds success” principle 
when domestic success signals quality to foreign audiences and serves as a telling basis for the alloca-
tion of distribution budgets. Sociological and cultural reasons can be the prevalence of the English lan-
guage or general fascination with U.S. products. 
38 Some studies forward a notion of “movie quality” as a success factor, others stress the impact of stars 
in the cast, well-known directors, large budgets, and positive reviews. Other studies indicate that stars 
are insignificant, but that team structure, social networks, financing, and marketing influence success. 
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Figure 5: The Value Chain of Motion Pictures 
For advancing a framework for international success in the cultural industry of motion picture 
entertainment (see figure 5), it must first be noted that cultural goods are nonmaterial goods, 
directed at a public of consumers for whom they generally serve an aesthetic or expressive, 
rather than a clearly utilitarian function (Hirsch, 1972). Movies are content products: each film’s 
content is unique, an original creation that differs in important aspects from all other films (Lee 
& Bae, 2004). As the composite of numerous factors like storyline, directing, acting, music, and 
colour, movies are a creation of the cultural context in which they are developed. “Cultural con-
text” refers to the values, customs, mores, and institutions of the environment in which indi-
viduals operate,39 and films inevitably reflect the producers’ vision, the writer’s view, and con-
vey the actors’ interpretation of the script (Craig et al., 2005). Each factor can have a favourable 
or unfavourable influence on the movie’s success in export markets. In this context, the strength 
of Hollywood movies in Europe has been explained by the closed textuality of European coun-
tries’ films. Unlike comparatively polysemous, “open” U.S. films, European films require a 
culturally more competent viewer (Bergfelder, 2005). This characteristic limits movie access to 
foreign audiences. Thus, the cultural familiarity a particular movie offers to foreign audiences is 
a central determinant of its export success: little familiarity results in low export returns. 
Accordingly, the expected returns of movie exports can be modelled in a gravity-iceberg 
model.40 Gravity models assume significant transport costs for overcoming spatial distance. 
Although movie transport costs are negligible, costs from cultural distance occur: psychologi-
                                                     
39 As a “blueprint” for ways to (inter)act, culture determines the perception and interpretation of pheno-
mena, metaphors, icons, and goods. Cultural references in films, for U.S. lifestyle e.g., may include 
traits and habits (a concern with cleanliness, a fast-paced lifestyle, etc.), role models, casual clothes, 
sports like baseball, or fast food (Craig et al., 2005). 
40 Movie characteristics share gravity model assumptions like imperfect competition due to economies of 
scale in production or distribution; for a related model, see Marvasti & Canterbery, 2005. 
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cal costs that audiences associate with consuming a film from a different cultural context are 
distance costs that affect export success increasingly negative the larger the distance. 
Following Samuelson’s (1954) iceberg model, Xijn is the value country i receives from exporting 
movie n to country j. This value “melts down” from xijn (the movie’s “real” value) because there 
are costs of cultural distance between i and j. The meltdown metaphor illustrates the inverse 
relation between cultural distance Dij and export success. The meltdown is a weighted average 
of the effect of all distance variables that influence movie n’s success in the jth country: 



M
m
ijnijmn
t
ijn xDeX ijmn
1
                                                       (1) 
with M independent cultural distance variables and tijmn as the weight of the mth variable in the 
jth importing country.41 Due to the nature of meltdown variables, the assumption is that 
 m ijmnt De ijmn 1 .                                                       (2) 
In Bergstrand’s (1989) gravity equation and Krugman’s (1995) location model, exports are posi-
tively related to the purchasing power of countries, but inversely related to distance. Introducing 
the iceberg effect, the gravity-iceberg export model becomes 
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where Xijn are country i’s movie receipts from country j for movie n, Yi, Yj is the per capita in-
come in each country, Dijn is the general distance (language, politics, religion etc.) between i and 
j that consumers anticipate to observe in movie n. b is an exponent of about one. k is a coeffi-
cient of the term in brackets. Then, export value depends on market sizes and cultural distance. 
The market wealth effect is multiplicative. In this model, exports are inversely related to dis-
tance, depending on the size of b. Cultural effects are also multiplicative. Conform with the 
literature, equation (3) is transformed:  



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m
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1
lnlnln   ,                                  (4) 
                                                     
41 Cultural variables M may include aspects like movie character traits and appearance, socially expected 
behaviour, the movie’s topic, style, use of symbolism, or sets, that provide familiar cultural references 
to some audiences and yet, may fail to meet the expectations of others. 
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with lnGijn = [(InYi + InYj) – b InDijn]. aijn is a constant replacing xijn in equations (1) and (3). 
The last term is an error term with a statistically determined distribution. Country i’s total value 
of motion picture exports is given by  
  
 
J
j
N
n
ijnX
1 1
 .                                                          (5) 
To promote export success, producers can influence only one term in the model: the cultural 
distance Dijmn that audiences may expect to surface in movie n. From the producer’s perspective, 
all other terms are constants. Thus, the study analyses how producers can handle the M cultural 
variables – by choosing team members and film characteristics in a way that keeps psychologi-
cal costs down – to enhance success.  
The idea is that the first “input category” for reducing psychological costs is cultural diversity in 
the movie team. Cultural diversity in the team brings various backgrounds and skills to the ta-
ble, enhances creative input for movie creation, and it also provides a recognition factor to dif-
ferent audiences (i.e. foreign actors may increase interest in the movie in their respective home 
markets).42 The second input category is diversity in movie characteristics, such as storyline and 
set locations. For instance, if the movie is shot at different international sets, it may be easier to 
market the movie outside Germany, too. If designed in consideration of these two “input catego-
ries”, a movie can better bridge cultural differences and keep down individual psychological 
costs associated with foreign movie consumption. Then, producers may create more successful 
projects, build “brand name” value and better profit from industry growth. The role of team 
composition in making an attractive movie is outlined in more detail in the next section. 
3.2 Performance Implications of Team Diversity 
The management and academic press increasingly emphasise the importance of team diversity 
for team performance. Individual heterogeneity “refers to all types of relatively stable individual 
characteristics that might be salient in understanding behaviour in the specific context at hand” 
                                                     
42 The mechanism is one where foreign team members have superior knowledge about their home market 
that they contribute to movie creation, which should lead to improved performance in those markets. 
More general, offering diverse movie elements can provide a larger variety of recognition factors and 
thus be more attractive for export market audiences than “typically German” movie input only. 
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(Boone & Witteloostuijn, 2007, p. 259). Approaches to categorizing diversity are made as two-
factor approaches along the lines of deep-level underlying attributes and surface-level attributes. 
Deep-level attributes can be organisational and team tenure, functional background, educational 
background, attitudes, values and preferences, behavioural and social background, or personal-
ity. Surface-level attributes are more readily detectable, such as age, race, or gender. Both kinds 
of attributes can influence communication, collaboration, cohesiveness, affection, attribution, 
relationship and task conflict, norms, certainty, and cognition (for a review, see Horwitz & 
Horwitz, 2007; Stewart, 2006; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Thereby, they can have an effect on 
team performance. 
The effects of diversity are categorized along three perspectives: the similarity-attraction para-
digm (Tziner, 1985), the self- and social categorisation from social psychology, and the infor-
mation processing perspective from management. The first perspective states that similarity on 
attitudes and values facilitates interpersonal attraction in dyadic relationships (Byrne, 1997). 
The second suggests that following a cognitive process of hierarchical categorisation, individu-
als have team membership preferences even without previous interaction with team members. 
The third offers that individuals have access to others with different backgrounds, networks, 
information, and skills that are sources of diverse perspectives, knowledge, and information 
(Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996; Joshi, 2006; Parkhe, Wasserman & Ralston, 2006). The first 
two approaches are relevant to team processes during movie creation and to moviegoers’ identi-
fication with team members (e.g. with the actors or the characters they play). The third perspec-
tive focuses the creative input available in diverse teams that can be used for movie creation. 
Benefits of team diversity are categorized along the integration-and-learning perspective, the 
access-and-legitimacy perspective, and the discrimination-and-fairness perspective. The first 
suggests that skills and experiences that individuals develop as members of (cultural) identity 
groups are valuable resources for succeeding in the team’s task. The second holds that markets 
are diverse themselves and that teams must match that diversity to gain access. The third claims 
that as an end in itself, diversity is a moral imperative that ensures fair treatment of all society 
members (Ely & Thomas, 2001). The first perspective explains the importance of diversity for 
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creative team processes in movie creation. The second establishes the importance of providing 
familiarity to different audiences. 
Several contingency variables moderate how strongly diversity influences performance, e.g. 
team type, task complexity, task interdependence, team size, interaction frequency and duration 
(Horwitz, 2005; Stewart, 2006). As regards the “team type”, movie teams can be classified as 
project teams. Project-type tasks are highly complex, interdependent tasks (Horwitz & Horwitz, 
2007). Here, diversity is particularly relevant, as the motion picture industry faces rapid obso-
lence of products and is driven by the search for novelty; so a movie team must pull together 
diverse expertise and creative ideas to formulate adequate strategies to face these challenges. 
Input circulating in the team will be less redundant, thus possibly more valuable, if individuals 
come from diverse backgrounds. 
Summarizing these findings, diverse teams have higher potential for making an attractive 
movie. Diversity enhances creativity and innovation, which are principle reasons why cultural 
industries attract audience (Jones, Anand & Alvarez, 2005). Following attributes described in 
the literature, team member attributes relevant to movie creation can be nationalities (as a proxy 
for cultural backgrounds), industry tenure, social network resources, education, status (stars vs. 
unknown members), and demographic variables. In the film industry, the team (particularly, the 
actors’ cast) is a highly visible product component. Thus, apart from influencing team proc-
esses, diversity also influences consumers’ perceptions of the final product.  
The analysis assumes that deep-level diversity determines creative potential and is most relevant 
to movie production. Yet, the deep-level attribute of diversity in culture is also relevant to 
movie consumption, because it offers familiarity for export markets. The surface-level attributes 
will influence consumption by providing identification potential to diverse audiences. The gen-
eral hypothesis is:  
Performancenp = f (Deep_Level_Diversityn, Surface_Level_Diversityn, Film_Character-
istics_Diversityn), where n stands for a movie and p for market boundaries (domestic, ex-
port, total).  
As Guimerà, Uzzi, Spiro and Nunes Amaral (2005, p. 697) point out, “the right balance of di-
versity on a team is elusive. Although diversity may potentially spur creativity, it typically pro-
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motes conflict and miscommunication […]. It also runs counter to the security most individuals 
experience in working and sharing ideas with past collaborators”. Therefore, in different cir-
cumstances, effects of diversity may vary. Accordingly, specific hypotheses that consider both 
positive and negative effects of diversity are developed in the next section. 
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4. Hypotheses 
4.1 Team Level: Deep-Level Diversity 
Culture. Based on the proposition that different cultures provide different distributions of skills, 
knowledge, views, norms, values, and socio-cultural heritage, and that the correlation of skills 
of two individuals from the same country is likely to be larger than the correlation between two 
individuals from different countries, research finds evidence for diversity benefits in terms of 
ideas generated and of solution quality (Watson, Kumar & Michaelsen, 1993). Lazear (1999) 
argues that gains arise when skills and knowledge sets are disjoint, i.e. culture-specific, when 
these sets are relevant to one another on the team, and when they can be learned by other team 
members at low cost.  
Diverse cultural backgrounds enlarge the potential for incorporating different cultural markers 
or styles, i.e. specific ways to dramatize and visualize stories: “Hollywood movies move; Euro-
pean movies linger; Asian ones sit and contemplate” (Miller et al., 2001, p. 98). Cultural mark-
ers can be expressed through shared meaning, communication style, dialects or languages (Lar-
key, 1996). Having superior knowledge of their respective home market, foreign team members 
can help to increase the attractiveness of the movie for their home market. Then, blending cul-
turally diverse individuals can increase box-office success in export markets. Yet, domestic 
success may decrease when the domestic audience’s familiarity with the film is reduced. One 
effect may prevail for overall performance. 
H1: Cultural diversity in the movie team  
a) negatively influences the movie’s domestic success, 
b) positively influences the movie’s export success, and  
c) influences its total box-office performance. 
Industry Tenure. The distinction between newcomers and old-timers is particularly relevant in 
temporary structures with intended short life spans, where teams continually cycle and recycle. 
Newcomers tend to enhance exploration, innovation, and the chances of finding new creative 
solutions to tasks. Old-timers tend to increase exploitation, inertial behaviour, and resistance to 
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new solutions (March, 1991). Tenure heterogeneity thus improves the chances that teams rea-
sonably challenge past practices and avoid status quo commitment. The balance between exploi-
tation and exploration is essential in cultural industries, where “consumers need familiarity to 
understand what they are offered, but they need novelty to enjoy it” (Lampel, Shamsie & Lant, 
2006, p. 292). To satisfy the “novelty” part, innovation is crucial because movies have short life 
cycles and non-repeated consumption patterns. The range of skills, perspectives, and sets of 
contacts offered by tenure diversity heightens the probability that a team finds an adequate ex-
ploration-exploitation balance. Also, mixed teams may be more appealing to consumers, since 
experienced members offer a recognition factor, and fresh faces provide novelty. 
H2: Tenure diversity in the movie team positively influences the movie’s 
 a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
Social Network Ties. In project-based industries, social structure in terms of network relation-
ships can promote creativity and innovation (Guimerà et al., 2005). Creativity is not only part of 
individual talent and experience, but results from a social system whose members amplify or 
stifle one another’s creativity. Creativity aids problem-solving, innovation and aesthetics in a 
movie and is spurred when different ideas unite or creative material in one domain inspires fresh 
ideas in another (Guimerà, Uzzi, Spiro & Nunes Amaral, 2004). Team members that entertain 
many social ties outside the team have better chances to obtain new creative input and know-
how (“ties” may be friendships, collaboration or common membership (Newman, 2001b)). That 
is, the social capital available to a movie team, based on contacts to other teams in the industry, 
helps to avoid the pitfall of “groupthink” and to make the movie more attractive.  
In this context, Joshi (2006, p. 583) notes that when “examining the outcomes of team diversity, 
researchers have typically focused on the internal functioning of teams […]. This approach lim-
its our understanding of the complex nature of a team’s interactions and does not allow a full 
appreciation of the processes by which diversity can influence team functioning. Diversity in a 
team allows for access to a diverse array of external networks” that are sources of diverse per-
spectives, knowledge, and information that can improve team performance (Parkhe et al., 2006). 
In a similar vein, Oh, Labianca and Chung (2006) establish that the two concepts of teams and 
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social capital have rarely been paired together, with the result that a simultaneous understanding 
of intragroup and intergroup relationships, and of team effectiveness, has remained beyond 
reach (Parkhe et al., 2006). 
One particular form of organisation that has received great attention for its ability to provide 
social capital and thereby, influence creativity and performance, is the “small world network” 
(Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). The term denotes a network structure that features two usually opposing 
elements: first, the network is highly locally clustered, i.e. the network consists of groups of 
actors and within each group, most or all actors are connected. Second, it has a short “path 
length”, i.e. a small mean geodesic distance of all pairs of actors between which a path exists 
(Watts, 1999a; 1999b). “Path” means that actors are linked either directly or via a chain of con-
tacts of other network actors.43 The more a network exhibits characteristics of a small world, the 
more actors are directly linked or connected by persons who know each other through past col-
laborations or who have third parties in common. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) argue that the small 
world conditions enable creative material in separate clusters to circulate to other clusters and to 
gain the kind of credibility unfamiliar material needs to be regarded valuable and productively 
used by another cluster. In this vein, Nobel laureate Linus Pauling, who attributes his creative 
success not to his immense brainpower or “luck”, but to diverse contacts, observes: “The best 
way to have a good idea is to have a lot of ideas” (cited in Uzzi & Dunlap, 2005, p. 2).  
Research has determined fields which are subject to small world networks and found scientific 
collaborations, production teams in business firms, and the Hollywood actor labour market 
(Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Examining scientific co-authoring, Newman (2001a) draws the conclu-
sion that small worlds account for how quickly ideas fly through disciplines. He reformulates 
the small world theory for bipartite networks. “Bipartite” means that there are two different sets 
of actors, such as movies and movie actors (Albert & Barabasi, 2002; Watts, 2004). Bipartite 
networks are distinctive in that all network actors are part of at least one fully linked cluster, 
also called “fully linked clique” (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). As figure 6 (following Uzzi & Spiro, 
2005) illustrates, the network is made up of these cliques that are connected to each other by 
                                                     
43 This idea has been illustrated by Milgram’s (1967) famous theory of “six degrees of separation”. 
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Figure 6: Schematic Representation of an Actor-Movie Network 
actors of multiple team memberships (Meiseberg & Ehrmann, 2008). The motion picture indus-
try qualifies as an example par excellence of such a small world featuring a bipartite network 
structure (Marchiori & Latora, 2000; Newman, 2000). 
However, advantages of social structure may hold only up to a threshold of connectivity, after 
which they turn negative as ideas in the network become homogenized. Then, cohesiveness 
leads to sharing common rather than novel ideas (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). High levels of intercon-
nectedness bring about that individuals behave like a group rather than like a set of individuals 
(Guimerà et al., 2004). When there are many connections between a member’s contacts, crea-
tive input may be less valuable as others have similar input at their disposal. Hence, blending 
well-connected team members with less connected ones (that provide original input) can in-
crease creative potential. In this case, movie creation can profit from diverse knowledge and 
ideas from creative personnel that are not in turn directly influenced by one another. Thus, di-
versity in social structure, i.e. in connectivity, helps differentiate the movie from its competitors. 
H3: Connectivity diversity in the movie team positively influences the movie’s  
a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
Educational Background. Heterogeneity in educational backgrounds fosters a broad range of 
cognitive skills, abilities and perspectives to be applied to problem-solving (Horwitz, 2005). 
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Bantel and Jackson (1989) find that educational diversity positively influences innovativeness. 
Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) report that international experience and diverse educational 
backgrounds are positively related to a firm’s global strategic posture. Yet, wide differences in 
education can increase task-related debates and turnover. However, reviewing previous re-
search, Mannix and Neale (2005) find that differences in education are more often positively 
related to performance.  
H4: Diversity in educational backgrounds in the movie team positively influences the 
movie’s a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
4.2 Team Level: Surface-Level Diversity 
Status. As early as in 1938, MGM producer Hunt Stromberg described that the big problem in 
filmmaking was holding the balance between “formula”, meaning giving the public what it 
wants, and “showmanship”, meaning offering something novel, something truly different 
(Bordwell, Staiger & Thompson, 1985). Actors with a considerable fan community (“stars”) 
satisfy the “formula” part as they serve a certain set of audience expectations based on previous 
experiences. They provide familiarity that can be used by movie promoters and audiences to 
assess a movie’s attractiveness prior to consumption. Thus, stars add a quasi-search quality to 
movies. They also help to book the movie on more opening screens. Initial screen coverage is 
important as over the first weeks, demand for a movie becomes obvious and follow-up contracts 
for screens are adjusted. Initial coverage forms the basis for bandwagon effects: subsequent 
growth in demand depends on the demand level already attained. Apart from contributing crea-
tive talent and professional performance to movie creation, stars may also promote their works 
professionally, and they attract media attention. Yet, as according to Stromberg’s quote, audi-
ences appreciate well-known and new faces, status diversity can enhance performance. 
H5: Status diversity in the movie team positively influences the movie’s  
a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
Age. Age-diverse teams can be more appealing for consumers as they offer identification poten-
tial to a broad range of individuals. For team processes, age diversity may have a negative im-
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pact on members’ perceptions of their opportunity to contribute ideas and decrease creative 
potential articulated (Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). Yet, age-diverse members provide different 
perspectives and experiences that improve decision quality. Therefore, positive effects of age 
diversity may prevail.  
H6: Age diversity in the movie team positively influences the movie’s  
a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
Gender. Mixed teams can offer identification potential for different individuals. For team proc-
esses, mixed teams have been found to perform first, better than single-sex teams and second, 
perform worse due to intrateam conflict. Rogelberg and Rumery (1996) observe that teams with 
a lone female outperform all-male teams, suggesting that gender diversity adds to quality. Hor-
witz (2005) points out that there is a consensus on the potential of gender diversity in teamwork, 
as diverse teams more likely generate a diverse set of approaches to problems.  
H7: Gender diversity in the movie team positively influences the movie’s  
a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
4.3 Movie Characteristics Diversity 
Sets. In the time of silent intertitles, it was common to replace characters’ names or locations 
with names or places the target audience was deemed more familiar with. Today, culturally 
specific references are frequently exchanged in translation for more or less similar examples 
from the target context (Bergfelder, 2005). Thus, familiarity provided by set diversity (shooting 
a movie in different countries) can enhance export performance. Yet, it may decrease domestic 
performance when offering less familiarity for the domestic audience. 
H8: Set diversity 
a) negatively influences the movie’s domestic success, 
b) positively influences the movie’s export success, and 
c) influences its total box-office performance. 
Cross-Cultural Meaning of Movie Content. Comedy is a genre that tends to be embedded in a 
particular culture, since the concept of humour and preferences for its forms like sarcasm, irony, 
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slapstick, ridicule, and situational humour, vary between cultures (Zandpour, Chang & 
Catalano, 1992). The appreciation of a particular national type, e.g. British humour, is not uni-
versal. Palmer (1995) argues that humour is based on a situation of incongruity that often im-
plies a disregard of customs or social rules. Thus, humour requires a situational knowledge of 
the appropriate, socially expected behaviour. Thereby, it is culturally local. Thus, the meaning 
of comedy genre films may be strongly bound to the domestic culture. 
H9: Comedy genre 
a) positively influences the movie’s domestic success, 
b) negatively influences the movie’s export success, and 
c) influences its total box-office performance.
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5. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
5.1 Sample 
The data contains 160 films that were released in the closed interval 1990-2005. 1990 is chosen 
as the starting point for the analysis since the reunification of Germany represents a structural 
breach in the data. For each year, the top-ten German films, as regards admissions in German 
cinemas, are selected from the FFA database. The sample is pared down as seven films with 
abnormally high admissions (higher than the mean plus four times the standard deviation) are 
excluded. The movies produced in the period of 1990-1992 form the initial network for the con-
nectivity variable. Hypotheses are tested using 123 films released in 1993-2005. 
5.2 Dependent Variables 
Box-office success (in terms of a movie’s admissions) is used as objective performance meas-
ure.44 The variables are labelled DOMESTIC_SUCCESS for German admissions (data from the 
FFA), EXPORT_SUCCESS for admissions in European export markets (data from the Lumière 
database), and TOTAL_SUCCESS for domestic and export market admissions combined. 
5.3 Independent and Control Variables 
Culture. For the independent variables, the analysis concentrates on the movie’s “inner team” to 
provide a meaningful representation of the cast. It takes the producer, the director, the camera 
person and the three leading actors into account. Nationality is used as a proxy for cultural iden-
tity (data from the Filmportal database and the Internet Movie Database (IMDb)). Calculating 
the Teachman index of diversity in nationalities generates the variable CULTURE. 
Tenure. Tenure is measured as the number of years that a team member has been active in the 
industry since her first hit movie. Concentrating on the German box-office – as a common basis 
to assess experience, since most team members are Germans – a “hit” is defined as a film with 
at least 400,000 admissions. This number implies a threshold value that only the top 20% of 
                                                     
44 Today, the box-office success accounts for a minority of film revenues only, but it is highly correlated 
with revenues from other media, as it establishes the film’s value for subsequent distribution windows 
and for licensing, merchandising, and entertainment products (Craig et al., 2005). 
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German films released in 1990-2005 reached. As the Teachman formula best measures cate-
gorical data, and for consistency in using the same formula, TENURE data is organised in ex-
perience categories (zero to three, four to six, seven to nine, 10-12, and 13-15 years). 
Connectivity. A network consists of a graph and additional information on its vertices (here, 
network actors and movies) or lines (ties). An undirected line is an “edge” (an unordered pair). 
A simple undirected graph consisting of edges is used for the analysis. In the industry’s bipartite 
structure, movies on the one hand and team members – here, the director, the producer, the 
camera person and the three leading movie actors – on the other hand, are two sets of vertices. 
An edge is drawn if a person has participated in a particular film, constituting a vertex pair (i.e. 
movie A and person B). In network logic, vertices can only be related to vertices in the other 
set. This structure is also called a “two-mode” network. To construct the connectivity variable, 
the analysis identifies the number of top-ten German movies a team member has contributed to, 
using the Pajek 1.24 program. Pajek is useful for analysing and visualizing large networks. In 
doing so, the assumption is that contacts to members of successful productions are particularly 
valuable sources of know-how and information. Since the number of previous team member-
ships centres on zero to four, with few individuals having 15 or more previous memberships, 
categorizing the data seems inappropriate. The coefficient of variation is used to define the vari-
able CONNECTIVITY. 
Educational Background. The measure indicates whether the team members have received a 
film-related education. Data is collected from Filmportal, IMDb, and team members’ personal 
homepages. The Teachman index variable is EDUCATION. 
Status. The analysis takes the three leading movie actors and, in line with Jansen (2002), catego-
rizes those that have been long-time well-known, are “celebrities”, or have starred in a film with 
at least 400,000 admissions, as successful. Counting the number of previously successful movie 
actors, the Teachman index variable STATUS is computed.  
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Age. Age data for members is organised in categories (≤10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 
61-70, and 71-80). Data is collected from Filmportal and IMDb. The Teachman index variable 
is AGE. 
Gender. Diversity in GENDER is measured using the Teachman index. 
Set Diversity. Set diversity is measured using the number of countries where a movie was shot. 
Since movie sets average at three, with a standard deviation of 17, a logarithm is used for loca-
tions. Data is taken from Filmportal, IMDb, and press releases. The variable is SET. 
Cross-Cultural Meaning of Movie Content. A binary variable indicates if a film belongs to the 
comedy genre. Data for the variable CONTENT comes from FFA, Filmportal, and IMDb. 
Control Variables. There are three controls: movie awards, critics’ reviews, and movie budget. 
First, with respect to movie awards, awarded films are easier to market and often get a second or 
third run in movie theatres. Information on the number of movie awards received (the study 
focuses on the German and the Bavarian Movie Award as very important awards) is collected 
from www.kino.de and IMDb. The variable is AWARDS.45 Second, as regards critics’ reviews, 
in Germany, the Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FBW) acts as an important critic: they can 
award the “recommended” or the “highly recommended” certificate to signal valuable movie 
content. The binary variable REVIEWS displays whether a sample movie holds the (better) 
“highly recommended”-certificate (FBW data). Third, concerning budget, high-budget films can 
afford well-known and talented personnel and expensive sets and digital manipulations. Budget 
data is not publicly available for the sample movies. Probably, human resources are the biggest 
                                                     
45 As the number of movies and of team members that have received international awards (Cannes, Ve-
nice) is marginal, international awards are not included in the analysis. Besides, the study further con-
trols for age ratings (age restrictions on movie admission), release seasons, release months, for impor-
tant other events like European soccer tournaments and Olympics that might draw attention away from 
cinemas; for the number of released German movies, for German movie exports, for American import 
movies, in several time frames (as proxies for competition), all of which are not significant. It further 
controls for the size of the production company and for the initial distributor, the movie duration in 
minutes and, for home success only, for GDP, population, number of screens and of multiplexes, and 
movie ticket prices (no results). It also controls for genres. Family films enhance domestic success, 
drama genre limits domestic success (no export effects). 
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cost block in budgets: budget = f (personnel). Using Filmportal data, the number of people em-
ployed during movie production is counted. The sum BUDGET is a budget proxy.46 
5.4 Methods  
Team Composition. When data is categorical or the utility of values is irrelevant, Teachman 
(1980) recommends an entropy-based diversity index to measure heterogeneity. This measure is 
defined as: 

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where H is the quantitative heterogeneity measure of the system, Pi is the probability of finding 
the system in state i, and S is the number of categories of a dimension on a team. The greater the 
distribution across different categories, the higher the diversity score.47 For interval data, Allison 
(1978) suggests that the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) 
provides the most direct and scale invariant measure of dispersion. This coefficient is used to 
measure connectivity diversity, as due to its distribution, categorizing data seems inappropriate. 
Regression Model. The analysis is based on a stepwise Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
(OLS) and controls for absence of multicollinearity, for homoscedasticity and normal distribu-
tion of disturbance terms, using Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) and correlations, White- and 
Newey-West-Tests and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test. VIFs are all lower than two. Both the 
White- and the Newey-West-Tests show heteroscedasticity for Models 1-3. So, the premise of 
constant variance of the disturbance terms has to be rejected. Heteroscedasticity-consistent error 
estimates are employed using Newey-West consistent covariances. Furthermore, for log-
transformed admissions, two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) is used to consider the pos-
sibility that domestic box-office success may have a signalling function in terms of movie at-
tractiveness, and thus determines movie performance for export markets. 
                                                     
46 Budget data can be obtained for a third of the sample. The correlation between budget data and the 
budget proxy is as high as 0.32 (p < 0.03), which validates the proxy. Unfortunately, budgets cannot be 
split up into production and marketing budgets, as data is unavailable.  
47 For one foreign team member and five Germans, the score is 0.45; if there are two foreigners, the score 
is 0.64. Teams are usually made up of Germans only, or of Germans and one to three foreign members. 
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6. Results 
Table 10 shows OLS results. As regards the deep-level diversity attributes, team diversity in 
culture enhances export performance. Yet, it does not affect domestic performance, and its ef-
fect on total performance is positive. Thus, providing audiences with a culturally diverse cast 
will increase export and total success, without jeopardizing domestic success (H1). Tenure di-
versity (H2) and connectivity diversity (H3) increase domestic and total performance without 
decreasing export performance. Diversity in educational backgrounds marginally influences 
domestic performance, but does not seem too relevant to box-office success (H4). For the sur-
face-level attributes, status diversity negatively influences export and total success, but does not 
affect domestic success (H5). Age diversity enhances domestic and total performance (H6). 
Gender diversity negatively affects domestic and total performance (H7). Set diversity enhances 
export success and total performance (H8). Along with the positive impact of cultural diversity 
in the team, the latter result strongly supports the proposition that movies that incorporate dif-
ferent features better meet the demands of diverse audiences. The strongest influence of the 
independent variables on export success comes from diversity in sets (standardised coefficient 
of 0.31), status (0.24), and culture (0.11). Movie content is insignificant (H9).48  
The control AWARDS is positively significant across markets. The importance of REVIEWS 
on a domestic (and total) scale, but not for exports, may be explained by the fact that the FBW 
is less known abroad, thus its certificate has little signalling effect. The budget proxy may be 
insignificant if it is not close enough to real budgets. Possibly, audiences expect lavish sets and 
special effects to be of U.S. origin anyway, so expensive inputs are not rewarded in proportion 
                                                     
48 Some foreign audiences value cast members from their own country more strongly than others do (e.g. 
a French actor significantly enhances movie success in France). This effect occurs for France (21% of 
the sample’s export admissions in Europe) and Poland (8%). It does not occur for Britain (6%), Italy 
(13%), or Spain (15%); however, the latter markets still favour international casts over all-German 
productions. U.S. team members enhance success in all these export markets. Effects on a single-
market-basis are not analysed in detail as the sample size – as well as the number of overall exported 
movies for which complete data would be available – is rather limited. Of foreign team members, the 
largest groups come from the U.S. (17%), Britain (14%), Poland (11%), and France (5%). 
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to what is spent.49 Table 11 shows descriptive statistics, table 12 presents the results and indi-
cates the directions of the variables’ impacts on success. 
  
                                                     
49 Domestic box-office success may have a signaling function in terms of movie attractiveness for export 
markets. Then, domestic success would be an explanatory variable for export success. Potential simul-
taneity issues would be involved since the other independent variables that affect export performance 
are expected to affect home box-office success as well, so OLS would lead to inconsistent coefficient 
estimates. To correct for this issue, 2SLS is applied, where domestic box-office success is estimated 
based on the other independent variables. The estimated values for domestic success are then used in 
the second stage of the regression (Heinrich, 1998; Lang, Switzer & Swartz, 2009; Maddala, 2001; fol-
lowing the 2SLS order condition, the control variable “FBW-certificates” is dropped from the export 
equation). The first stage is: Domestic_Performancen = g (Deep_Level_Diversityn, Surface_Level_Di-
versityn, Film_Characteristics_Diversityn), where n stands for a movie; the second stage is Ex-
port_Performancen = h (Domestic_Performancen^, Deep_Level_Diversityn, Surface_Level_Diversityn, 
Film_Characteristics_Diversityn), where Domestic_Performancen^ is the estimated value from the first 
regression. Results show that domestic success does not have a significant impact on export success. 
2SLS results are identical as regards signs and significance levels for cultural diversity in the team and 
in sets as in Model 2, and status diversity again has a negative impact (5%-level) on export success. 
Thus, the study results are robust. 
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Table 10: Results 
 
 
Model 0 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Dependent  
Variable 
Domestic Success Domestic Success Export Success Total Success 
C 869923. 
(131344.
29 
89) 
342939.
(225375.
50 
52) 
-600733. 
(352482.
32* 
30) 
53006. 
(216750.
91 
58) 
Culture  15486.
0.
(255523.
95 
00 
40) 
714311. 
0.
(286256.
11* 
11* 
95) 
537161. 
0.
(303839.
41† 
12† 
41) 
Tenure  347115.
0.
(182587.
96† 
14† 
77) 
355373. 
0.
(367840.
14 
07 
30) 
828088. 
0.
(273460.
61** 
23** 
25) 
Connectivity  516350.
0.
(203843.
10* 
22* 
39) 
587995. 
0.
(608148.
27 
12 
59) 
649557. 
0.
(251650.
09* 
18* 
35) 
Education  -306343.
-0.
(183538.
18† 
11† 
62) 
448893. 
0.
(377935.
01 
08 
81) 
-250533. 
-0.
(260595.
66 
06 
40) 
Status  -125368.
-0.
(187300.
55 
05 
86) 
-1285045. 
-0.
(484642.
79** 
24** 
04) 
-821302. 
-0.
(242950.
17** 
21** 
96) 
Age  365235.
0.
(211087.
23† 
14† 
96) 
226150. 
0.
(338369.
42 
04 
66) 
655367. 
0.
(224384.
54** 
16** 
60) 
Gender  -567477.
-0.
(257911.
52* 
19* 
97) 
-120616.
-0.
(459388.
78 
02 
70) 
-660560. 
-0.
(305211.
92* 
14* 
75) 
Set  -228308.
-0.
(143842.
99 
14 
99) 
1046872. 
0.
(478846.
39* 
31* 
01) 
373439. 
0.
(198376.
42† 
15† 
30) 
Content  237897.
0.
(176524.
15 
15 
87) 
-3921. 
-0.
(263582.
99 
01 
64) 
47874. 
0.
(176852.
81 
02 
80) 
Awards 218801. 
0.
(97685.
59* 
25* 
59) 
189208.
0.
(95267.
65* 
22* 
83) 
612397. 
0.
(310846.
82† 
33† 
37) 
424385. 
0.
(134654.
85** 
32** 
63) 
Reviews 378645. 
0.
(161781.
05* 
22* 
98) 
353959.
0.
(140350.
43* 
21* 
55) 
85639. 
0.
(264703.
65 
02 
15) 
324667. 
0.
(181688.
60† 
12† 
21) 
Budget 6371. 
0.
(13385.
44 
05 
45) 
8744.
0.
(12433.
13 
07 
88) 
-31355. 
-0.
(39078.
50 
11 
96) 
-26956. 
-0.
(19309.
78 
13 
18) 
F 7.67*** 3.81*** 6.20*** 10. 60*** 
R2 0.162 0.294 0.0.404 0. 536 
Adj. R2  0.141 0.217 0.339 0. 489 
N = 123. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** if p < 0.001; ** if p < 0.01; * if p < 0.05; † p < 0.1.  
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Domestic 
Success 1204559 823117 1.00  
           
(2) Export  
Success 534592 1740634 0.02 1.00 
          
(3) Total  
Success 1739151 2563751 0.60*** 0.69*** 1.00 
         
(4) Culture 0.28 0.27 0.00 0.27** 0.23** 1.00         
(5) Tenure 0.51 0.34 0.29** 0.30*** 0.47*** 0.01 1.00        
(6) Connectivity 0.63 0.35 0.27** 0.17† 0.27** -0.11 0.42*** 1.00       
(7) Education 0.30 0.32 -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.16† 0.22* 1.00      
(8) Status 0.29 0.32 0.05 -0.18* -0.15† -0.14 0.17† 0.29** 0.18* 1.00     
(9) Age 0.94 0.31 0.24** 0.25** 0.36*** 0.18* 0.32*** 0.18* 0.32*** 0.02 1.00    
(10) Gender 0.38 0.27 -0.15† -0.13 -0.22* -0.02 -0.04 0.17† 0.06 0.25** 0.02 1.00   
(11) Set 0.34 0.51 0.06 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.30** 0.33*** 0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.18* -0.22* 1.00  
(12) Content   0.03 -0.24** -0.28** -0.15 -0.16† -0.01 0.22* 0.21* -0.05 0.22* -0.29*** 1.00 
(13) Awards 0.62 0.94 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.49*** -0.15† 0.28** 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.28** -0.04 0.24** -0.24** 1.00 
(14) Reviews   0.32*** 0.16† 0.30*** 0.05 0.19* 0.11 -0.06 0.14 0.08 -0.09 0.17* -0.24** 0.33*** 1.00 
(15) Budget 9.76 6.08 0.16† 0.11 0.10 0.17† 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.20* -0.11 0.31*** -0.06 0.26** 0.22* 
Significance levels (two-tailed): † if p < 0.10; * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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Table 12: Overview of Hypotheses and Results 
 
 
Category Subcategory Hypothesis  Domestic 
Success 
Export 
Success 
Total 
 Success 
Team Characteristics  
Deep-
Level 
Diversi-
ty 
Culture  
H1: Cultural diversity in the movie team a) negatively influ-
ences the movie’s domestic success, b) positively influences 
the movie’s export success, and c) influences its total box-
office performance. 
 + + 
Tenure  
H2: Tenure diversity in the movie team positively influences 
the movie’s a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) 
total box-office performance. 
+  + 
Connectivity  
H3: Connectivity diversity in the movie team positively 
influences the movie’s a) domestic success, b) export suc-
cess, and c) total box-office performance. 
+  + 
Educational  
Background  
H4:  Diversity in educational backgrounds in the movie 
team positively influences the movie’s a) domestic success, 
b) export success, and c) total box-office performance. 
–   
Surface-
Level 
Diversi-
ty 
Status  
H5: Status diversity in the movie team positively influences 
the movie’s a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) 
total box-office performance. 
 – – 
Age 
H6: Age diversity in the movie team positively influences the 
movie’s a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) total 
box-office performance. 
+  + 
Gender 
H7: Gender diversity in the movie team positively influences 
the movie’s a) domestic success, b) export success, and c) 
total box-office performance. 
–  – 
Film Characteristics 
Set Diversity 
H8: Set diversity a) negatively influences the movie’s do-
mestic success, b) positively influences the movie’s export 
success, and c) influences its total box-office performance. 
 + + 
Cross-Cultural Meaning 
of Movie Content 
H9: Comedy genre a) positively influences the movie’s 
domestic success, b) negatively influences the movie’s ex-
port success, and c) influences its total box-office perform-
ance. 
   
Controls 
Movie Awards Significant in Models 0-3 
Critics’ Reviews Significant in Models 0, 1, 3 
Budget  
Signs indicate the direction of a significant influence of an independent variable on a dependent variable. 
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7. Limitations and Discussion 
7.1 Research Limitations 
There are some limitations to this research. First, the analysis cannot separate effects of diver-
sity on the production level (on team processes) and the consumption level (on audiences’ per-
ceptions of the team). An educated guess can be taken as to where each kind of diversity exerts 
the stronger influence. Second, external result validity requires a randomly chosen sample. 
Here, the sample is chosen according to the movies’ box-office performance, because the analy-
sis focuses on successful productions. Moreover, the study only considers “survivor” movies 
that were actually released, as there is no data on movies that died in production. Survivor bias 
is a common restriction to performance studies. 
7.2 Discussion 
The purpose of this paper is to explore differences in the factors that determine the success of 
German motion pictures at home and abroad. The analysis builds on a gravity-iceberg model 
based on the premise that from the producer’s point of view, there is only one variable in the 
model that can be directly influenced to promote film success: the cultural distance between the 
movie and its audiences, which is determined by the composition of the film team and the selec-
tion of certain movie characteristics.  
Producers promote success prospects when (1) the composition of the movie team – as the basis 
for contributing different cultural backgrounds, creativity and talent to movie creation, and as a 
highly visible movie ingredient – as well as (2) essential film characteristics, like set locations 
or storyline, suit audiences not only in the home market, but also in culturally diverse export 
markets. The thinking is that capitalizing on diversity in these two “input categories” helps to 
provide points of reference to diverse audiences. The study assumes that particularly, cultural 
diversity (diversity in culture in the team, and in movie characteristics) enhance export success.  
Specific hypotheses are tested and widely supported. Diversity in the deep-level attribute of the 
team members’ respective cultural backgrounds enhances export success, as does the film char-
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acteristics variable of set diversity. Both variables have positive effects also on a movie’s total 
success, and they do not decrease domestic performance, which highlights the value of diverse 
cultural input for movie performance.  
Export performance is not affected by the three other deep-level team variables of tenure, edu-
cation, and connectivity diversity. Tenure und connectivity diversity enhance domestic and total 
success. The idea is that deep-level diversity influences team processes: diversity in tenure im-
plies more constructive conflict about creative tasks in movie production, because team mem-
bers benefit from different experiences in the industry over time. Yet, intra-team conflict can 
still result in the adoption of “conservative” solutions: if an agreement on creative, unorthodox 
solutions cannot be reached, it may be that tasks are rather done the “safe way”. Such conserva-
tive solutions may appear “typically German” to consumers abroad, which could explain the 
absence of a positive effect of tenure diversity on export performance. It may further be that the 
understanding of what an attractive creative solution looks like varies between countries (an 
example is “Run Lola Run” that was innovative in a way appreciated much in Germany, but not 
abroad). Then, for export success, spurring creativity in an arty way is an inferior strategy to 
reducing cultural distance by providing diverse cultural references. Connectivity diversity re-
duces the danger of “groupthink”: the movie can profit from diverse creative ideas. Again, crea-
tive input from the German film industry may appear “typically German”, so there is no positive 
effect on export success. Individuals that have been active in the industry for a long time tend to 
have a large network. Thus, the effects of tenure and connectivity diversity complement each 
other in enhancing domestic and total, but not export, success.  
As regards the surface-level attributes, status diversity in the team decreases export and total 
success, but does not affect domestic performance. For export markets, well-known actors are 
important to signal movie quality (in the sample, the correlation between the number of stars in 
the cast and export success is 0.389 (p < 0.04)). Thus, stars can reduce psychological costs of 
foreign movie consumption. Although the idea that the star system does not seem to be relevant 
in Europe has been supported for domestic film performance (Delmestri, Montanari & Usai, 
2005; Meiseberg et al., 2008), it does not necessarily apply across borders. Then, producers had 
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better choose actors as a “formula” ingredient, as audiences do not reward “showmanship” ex-
periments here.  
The two other surface-level diversity variables, age and gender, influence domestic and total 
success. Surface-level attributes offer identification potential with the cast and the film charac-
ters. Age diversity provides identification potential to a broad range of individuals. Also, many 
films starring several generations are family entertainment, which as a genre is usually popular. 
Possibly, the positive effect does not hold for export markets as cultural distance is more diffi-
cult to overcome in family films than in other genres (action movies e.g.), so that foreign mar-
kets rather prefer their domestic family entertainment. Moreover, the effect of gender diversity 
is negative, which may come from the fact that gender-diverse movies often belong to the drama 
genre. Drama genre may have a low appeal for entertainment-seeking audiences.  
The second film characteristics’ variable, movie content, is insignificant across markets. Failure 
to export comedy may then rather be caused by a lack of production values, marketing, or ade-
quate exhibition windows than by the genre’s cultural specificity. Summarizing these findings, 
the study’s results support the cultural industries’ wisdom that producers can push market suc-
cess when they blend familiar and novel elements.  
Managerial Implications. Parkhe et al. (2006) point out that surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to the cross-national, cross-cultural aspects of network forms of organisation. Accordingly, 
there is little research that helps to customize movies, as cultural goods that are created within 
network structures, to a cross-cultural setting. This study offers some implications concerning 
network design in terms of team formation, and cross-cultural performance. The study results 
show that producers can target international audiences more effectively by giving heed to diver-
sity of movie features in a cultural context. A cast of network members of different nationalities 
provides cultural familiarity to different audiences and increases international performance. 
Such a cast also increases diversity in tenure and in industry network resources, which enhances 
creative material available for movie creation and has positive effects on domestic success. It 
establishes further that for export success, apart from adequate selection of team members, cul-
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tural references can be provided by choosing non-domestic set locations. Further, well-known 
actors in the cast make movies appear more attractive abroad.  
By organising projects accordingly, producers can handle the trade-off between homogeneity 
and heterogeneity, and integrate domestic and export orientation. Successful projects then sup-
port producers in creating an international “brand name”. As Swaminathan (2001) points out, 
“pioneering brands” tend to have long-term advantages when consumers have imperfect infor-
mation about product quality, as they do for movies. 
An initial difficulty for producers is raising funds. Raising finance for motion picture projects is 
not for the faint-hearted: for every success story there are many failures, and the strategies and 
structures of financing arrangements are as numerous as the films that are made (Squires, 2005). 
Rajan and Zingales (2001, p. 208) argue that technological, regulatory, and institutional changes 
in recent years have caused a “financial revolution” that “has subjected internal decisions to 
greater scrutiny, while making outside decisions easier. Unless there is a strong complementar-
ity between assets in place and growth opportunities from a technological point of view, there is 
no reason why new opportunities should be undertaken […] by the existing company”. Accord-
ingly, the producer’s reputation becomes an important asset for attracting outside financiers. 
Squires (2005) explains that producers with a good brand name and strong project elements 
(lead cast, director) increase their chances of negotiating successfully and that they can some-
times even pre-sell distribution rights before production commences. These producers profit 
from increased budgetary flexibility during project realisation, which further promotes the qual-
ity and attractiveness of the final product. 
Research Implications. The advent of global markets, the rise of Europe-based centres of audio-
visual production, new electronic distribution technologies, and an increase in the amount of 
cinematic material available to consumers making inroads on blockbuster audiences, require 
producers to face paradigm shifts and meet (culturally) diverse moviegoers’ demands (Scott, 
2004). Future research could explore ways for building a “producer brand name” in the context 
of different strategies that are intended to cope with industry changes, in order to help create a 
„safer bet“. 
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 V. SUPERSTAR EFFECTS IN DELUXE GASTRONOMY – THE IMPACT OF 
PERFORMANCE QUALITY AND CONSUMER NETWORKS ON VALUE 
CREATION 
1. Abstract 
This chapter analyses whether Superstar effects (disproportionate income effects) exist in the 
German deep-pocket market for quality gastronomy. Following two central theories on star 
effects, the analysis tests the impacts of differences in (1) the quality of chefs’ performances, 
and (2) the chefs’ media presence, on chefs’ financial rewards. Thereby, the study investigates 
whether offering high performance quality or providing a “hot topic” for discussion in consumer 
networks is better for obtaining disproportionate incomes. In doing so, this research addresses 
an economic issue of general interest: does it pay more to develop your skills in your core busi-
ness to perfection, or to invest in self-marketing? The study does not find Superstar effects cor-
responding to the two theories. Yet, perfecting skills and investing in self-marketing have simi-
larly positive moderate income effects, but self-marketing seems the less risky, less stressful 
way to enhance income. 
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2. Introduction 
 “In the future everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes” 
Andy Warhol (1928-1987) 
We live in a world centred on stardom and hits. A surprisingly large number of markets are 
developing, or have already developed, into so-called “winner-take-all” markets, where “Re-
wards tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few top performers, with small differences in 
talent or effort giving rise to enormous differences in incomes” (Frank & Cook, 1995, p. 24). 
Research provides evidence that these star effects occur in mass markets. In mass markets, of-
ten, a large number of people are willing to pay a premium to consume the services of those few 
individuals whom they perceive as the “best” performers. Here, Rosen (1981) was first to ex-
plain a strong connection between a person’s talent and income. In contrast to mass markets, 
deep-pocket markets remain underresearched. A “deep-pocket” market is characterized by the 
fact that a relatively small number of consumers are willing to pay a large premium to consume 
the services of the few “best” performers. Then, in deep-pocket markets too, Superstars may 
command high rents. 
The objectives of this paper are first, to analyse whether Superstar effects exist in deep-pocket 
markets. This study examines the market for gastronomy, and here, the segment of the best 
German restaurants. The “stars” can be the restaurant chefs. International Superstars in the res-
taurant sector are “house-hold name” chefs like Paul Bocuse or Jamie Oliver. German stars may 
be Dieter Müller, Harald Wohlfahrt, or Sven Elverfeld. Second, this study analyses what factors 
determine the stars’ rents.  
Building on Rosen’s (1981) and Adler’s (1985) central theories on star effects, two potential 
sources of Superstardom in deluxe cuisine are explored. First, this research tests if quality dif-
ferences between chefs’ performances, as measured by restaurant guides’ ratings – “Guide 
Michelin” stars and “Gault Millau” points – have a direct impact on financial rewards. A direct 
income effect of superior performance could be called “direct Superstar effect”, based on the 
effects explained by Rosen (1981): the better and the more innovative your cuisine, the higher 
the customers’ willingness to pay, and the more financially rewarding is cooking for the chef 
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(Frick (2008) finds evidence for this idea). The French chef Paul Bocuse could be a role model 
for direct stardom. His name is associated with the (innovative) Nouvelle Cuisine that is less 
opulent and calorific than traditional Haute-Cuisine and emphasises the importance of preserv-
ing the characteristic taste of fresh ingredients. 
Further, the impact of media presence on chefs’ financial rewards is addressed. Why would star 
effects in the restaurant sector be based on media presence? Adler (1985, p. 212) gives a de-
mand-related explanation: “The phenomenon of stardom exists where consumption requires 
knowledge”. The acquisition of knowledge by a consumer involves discussion with others 
within the consumer’s social networks. Here, a discussion is easier if all participants share 
common prior knowledge. “If there are stars, that is, artists that everybody is familiar with, a 
consumer would be better off patronizing these stars even if their art is not superior to that of 
others” (Adler, 1985, p. 212). Consequently, chefs who use the media to attract attention to their 
cooking and to promote discussion in consumer networks about their activities rather become 
stars than others who are less present in the media. An impact of TV appearance can be called 
“classical Superstar effect”. The British chef Jamie Oliver could be a model for classical star-
dom. His career gained momentum through two highly successful seasons of “The Naked 
Chef”, a TV program filmed in 1998/1999. The popular series brought Oliver international rec-
ognition as a star chef, and more television programs and book deals followed.  
This study examines if Superstar effects exist in the deep-pocket market of German quality res-
taurants and what factors determine the chefs’ rents. In doing so, it deals with an economic issue 
of general interest: does it pay better to develop your skills in your core business to perfection, 
or is it more rewarding to maintain your current level of skills and invest in self-marketing?  
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, the deep-pocket market of quality gas-
tronomy is described. Then, Rosen’s (1981) and Adler’s (1985) theories that explain the phe-
nomenon of Superstars are outlined (section 3). Based on the two theories, hypotheses on in-
come effects of factors that can lead to stardom in deluxe cuisine are developed (section 4). 
Section 5 presents data and methods, section 6 report the results. Section 7 offers some conclu-
sions.
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3. Theoretical Background 
3.1 The Market for Deluxe Gastronomy 
The share of quality gastronomy in the entire field of gastronomy is less than 0.5% in volume. 
Yet, from a qualitative viewpoint, deluxe restaurants play a key role as they define trends, shape 
expectations and set quality standards for the entire gastronomy sector. The chefs operate in a 
market that is driven by creativity, individuality, and the striving for perfection (Surlemont & 
Johnson, 2005). 
A central characteristic of quality gastronomy is that its services fall into the experience good 
category. The perceived consumption risk is high because deluxe restaurants charge high prices 
and the taste buds of many customers may not be sufficiently developed to notice small differ-
ences in meal quality. Thus, firms in the market must signal their quality to potential customers 
(Akerlof, 1970; Deuchert, Adjamah & Pauly, 2005). Restaurants can use information on prices 
and locations (“In-Restaurants”) or promotions (e.g. reduced-price offers). Yet, using high 
prices as a quality signal is problematic. First, increasing prices is virtually impossible without 
losing customers. Second, Becker (1991) shows that a good has a higher value for consumers 
when there is excess demand for that good. He argues that restaurant eating, watching a play, or 
attending a concert e.g., are all social activities in which people consume a service together and 
partly in public. The pleasure from a good can then be greater when many people want to con-
sume it, perhaps because a person does not wish to be out of step with what is popular or be-
cause confidence in the quality of the performance is greater when a restaurant, theatre, or con-
cert is more popular. Then, skimming excess demand by increasing prices may lead to serious 
drops in demand. Further, promotions may be counterproductive to image-building and discredit 
the restaurant’s reputation as a deluxe location.50 
Following selection system theory, consumers often select experience goods after considering 
the opinion of experts. Gemser, Leenders and Wijnberg (2008) argue that due to the high credi-
                                                     
50 Excess demand shows when restaurants have guest lists and reservations must be made early, as with 
the (resigned) star chef Joël Robuchon (Paris) who maintained a two-month waiting list (Snyder & 
Cotter, 1998). “Quality” and “deluxe” gastronomy are used interchangeably to refer to those restau-
rants that are included in quality restaurant guides. 
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bility of the assessment, expert-selected awards are the most effective way of increasing the 
market success of non-main-stream products (like independent films or fine arts). This idea may 
also apply to deluxe cuisine: for consumers, restaurant guides like “Guide Michelin” or “Gault 
Millau”, widely respected institutions in the market for Haute-Cuisine among chefs, restaura-
teurs, culinary experts, and the dining public, reduce information asymmetries (Balazs, 2002; 
Johnson, Surlemont, Nikod & Revaz, 2005). For a chef, a guide’s good rating, like an award, is 
an acknowledgement of his superior skills and efforts. As the economics of awards literature 
points out (Frey, 2005; Frey & Neckermann, 2008), people do not only strive for higher in-
comes than others have, but also for gaining social distinction or peer group acceptance. For 
some chefs, social distinction may be reached by achieving an excellent rating, even if there is 
no increased income associated with it. A rating demotion can have tragic consequences, as the 
example of the French three-star chef Bernard Loiseau shows: the media suggests the reasons 
that drove Loiseau to suicide in 2003, were his demotion by two points in the Gault Millau and 
rumours that he would lose one of his three Michelin stars (Mariani, 2003). 
Restaurant guides like the Guide Michelin are secretive by nature. It is difficult for chefs to 
determine what the guides expect in return for an excellent rating: Michelin categorically re-
fuses to divulge its criteria. The stated purpose of such secrecy is to promote diversity in the 
market. If criteria were published, a framework would be defined and a standard created. Then, 
chefs will try to comply with that standard to be promoted. Surlemont and Johnson (2005) quote 
a chef who points out that making the criteria public could lead to a “McDonaldization” of 
Haute-Cuisine restaurants. 
The guides’ top priority is minimising beta errors, i.e. giving high ratings to restaurants that are 
just average (Surlemont & Johnson, 2005). This goal implies rigorous rating. Before a restau-
rant gets a (better) rating, it is tested by several inspectors who also assess the stability of cui-
sine quality over a certain period. For a chef, this “qualification period” procedure involves high 
risks in terms of investment in the restaurant: high-quality input like exquisite ingredients, ex-
cellent personnel, and prime ambience are costly, and higher revenues are hard to realise prior 
to the rating promotion. Minimising beta errors further maximises alpha errors: some restaurants 
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are not promoted even though they deserve it (Surlemont & Johnson, 2005). These aspects carry 
the danger of operating at higher costs (due to investment in high-quality input) without realis-
ing higher revenues. Chefs could make more informed investment decisions if they knew how 
earning substantially higher rents in quality gastronomy could be achieved. Thus, the study 
analyses what factors determine individual stardom and stars’ rents in this market. The next 
section outlines conditions for stars to occur and links stardom to revenues. 
3.2 Theory of Superstar Effects 
The phenomenon of so-called “Superstars” with extremely high incomes has been in the public 
eye since World War II. Building on the insights of Marshall (1947), Rosen’s (1981, p. 845) 
seminal work defines the Superstar effect as follows: “relatively small numbers of people earn 
enormous amounts of money and dominate the activities in which they engage”. Empirical re-
search investigates and finds evidence for Superstar effects in different industries (Torgler, An-
tic & Dulleck, 2008).51 
Rosen (1981) suggests that two conditions must be fulfilled for Superstar effects to occur: im-
perfect substitution and joint consumption. Imperfect substitution means that lesser talent is a 
poor substitute for greater talent. Most people will not be satisfied with a less talented artist’s 
performance if they can patronize a more talented artist instead, even at a somewhat higher price 
(Frey, 1998). In addition, individuals prefer one outstanding performance to a larger number of 
poor performances (Schulze, 2003). The less a substitution is possible, the higher are the obtain-
able incomes for the relatively talented individuals (Rosen, 1981). Superstar effects further re-
quire a market concentration on a few sellers with the highest talents. Concentration is possible 
when rendering the service is a form of joint consumption, i.e. the costs of production do not 
rise in proportion to the size of a seller’s market (Rosen, 1981). Then, talented persons can 
command both very large markets and very large incomes. 
Adler (1985; 2006) offers a complementary approach to Superstar effects based on consumers’ 
learning processes. Building on the findings of Stigler and Becker (1977), Adler (1985, p. 208f.) 
                                                     
51 Chung and Cox (1994), Hamlen (1994) and Sochay (1994), and Lucifora and Simmons (2003) provide 
evidence for Superstar effects in the music industry, the film industry, and in professional soccer. 
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assumes that the more a person knows about the seller, the larger is the utility derived from the 
consumption of that seller’s service, “the more you know the more you enjoy”. An individual 
can accumulate knowledge about a seller by consuming the goods offered and by discussing the 
seller’s services with other consumers. Here, superstars emerge because art consumption (fine 
dining, watching a play, attending a concert e.g.) is not an isolated activity, but is socially 
shared (Adler, 1985). Much of the pleasure from consuming art consists in the possibility of 
discussing it with people, especially with friends and acquaintances. For the purpose of discus-
sion, consumers entertain face-to-face relationships or self-organise into virtual networks to 
create social ties and exchange units of discourse (Dwyer, 2006). Through serving the individ-
ual need for communication, both kinds of consumer networks, real and virtual ones, have a 
strong impact on who becomes a star.  
As a person cannot be equally informed about all artists in a specific field of interest, the person 
will choose a limited number of preferred artists whose services they wish to avail of and dis-
cuss with others. If a person chooses the most popular artists, she minimises her search costs for 
finding discussion partners. Thus, once a certain amount of people shares knowledge about an 
artist, the discussion is likely to focus on this person, which fuels the process of star creation. 
Then, consumers can acquire additional information about an increasingly popular artist at low 
cost, as such an artist is likely to have more and more media presence (Meiseberg, Ehrmann & 
Dormann, 2008). In consequence, a concentration of demand on a few artists develops, who 
become Superstars. These stars absorb part of consumers’ “savings” in search costs by demand-
ing higher prices for their services. If other sellers offer services of similar quality, that are not 
cheaper by more than the savings in search costs, consumers are better off patronizing the most 
popular seller (Adler, 1985). In a continuous process, a few stars emerge who can demand much 
higher prices than their competitors and who dominate the market. For Superstars, demand con-
centration is reflected in differences in income and fame which far exceed any differences in 
talent and performance (Frey, 2008). 
Thus, Adler’s (1985) Superstar effect can be understood as an internalisation of search costs that 
emerges where consumption requires knowledge. While Rosen’s (1981) approach explains how 
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small differences in talent can lead to large differences in income, Adler’s (1985) model also 
allows the emergence of stars who do not possess greater talent than their competitors, due to 
externalities of popularity (Adler, 1985). The study addresses the question of whether Super-
stars exist in German quality gastronomy and what factors determine the stars’ rents. 
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4. Hypotheses 
4.1 Superstar Effects by Differences in Talent 
For Superstar effects according to Rosen (1981), consumers must be able to observe talent dif-
ferences. A chef’s “talent” is the ability to create a dining experience of a certain quality. By 
rating restaurant quality, guides offer information on the chef’s talent. As Frey (2005, p. 4) ar-
gues, “prizes that rank books, plays, films and even persons may serve to lower search costs 
making it easier to know what to watch and read”. Thus, ratings enable consumers to view dif-
ferences in talent.  
Superstar effects build on imperfect substitution. For deluxe cuisine, common wisdom may say 
that consuming many mediocre meals is not as good as consuming one excellent meal. Further, 
joint consumption must be possible, meaning that the activity is reproducible endlessly at a cer-
tain fixed cost, or that production costs do not rise in proportion to the size of the seller’s mar-
ket. The chef’s service comprises the creative composition of meals (selection of ingredients, 
composition of meal courses, the definition of the way the meal should be prepared, the instruc-
tion of the staff, etc.) and actual meal preparation. Meal composition is subject to scale econo-
mies as it is done once and can be endlessly reproduced. Meal preparation may be subject to 
decreasing marginal costs, when a high-performing chef can make more perfect meals and more 
of them in a given time and can reduce waste of ingredients. In addition, the staff may develop 
its learning, so that fewer people are needed to fulfil the tasks. Thus, production costs do not 
rise in proportion to the chef’s market size.  
Then, with higher talent, a chef’s revenues can increase disproportionately52 (to analyse the 
deep-pocket market of deluxe cuisine, the focus is on revenues rather than on market concentra-
tion). Revenues depend on meal prices.53 In line with Frick (2004), the idea is that following a 
                                                     
52 “Disproportionate” means the income distribution is skewed towards more talented people; small talent 
differences are magnified in larger earnings differences (Rosen, 1981). This study does not suggest a 
specific curve progression. The point is that income does not increase linearly with talent, but convex: 
income differences (far) exceed talent differences. 
53 Increasing the number of meals sold can also enhance revenues. Yet, using restaurant sizes, Cotter and 
Snyder (1998) find that 75% of their sample restaurants that were promoted do not enlarge capacities. 
There is no connection between rating and size in this sample either; a possible reason being that chefs 
prefer to benefit from excess demand. 
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positive evaluation, sellers (here: chefs) may increase prices. Several empirical studies find evi-
dence for a connection between (high) ratings and (substantially larger) prices (Frick, 2008; 
Snyder & Cotter, 1998). 
H1: With an increase in the guides’ cuisine ratings, 
 the restaurant’s price level increases disproportionately. 
Guides do not divulge their rating criteria. In an effort to reduce the danger that potential “qual-
ity standards” are unfulfilled, chefs may even over-fulfil some requirements since avoiding a 
demotion is essential: Snyder and Cotter (1998) explain that losing a one-star status makes a 
striking difference, and that losing a three-star status is disastrous. Michelin describes three-star 
restaurants as “worth a special journey”. When a restaurant gains a third star, it usually loses 
many of its regional customers (due to price increases), but attracts a larger (inter)national clien-
tele. When it loses the third star, the (inter)national clientele no longer comes, and the local 
clientele does not return (Snyder & Cotter, 1998). For an excellent rating, apart from the chef’s 
talent, investments in real estate, high-quality staff, first-rate ingredients and an extensive and 
expensive wine list are necessary (Johnson et al., 2005). That is, customers also pay for “non-
food” parts of the experience that support the chef’s superior talent. Scully (1995, p. 64) notes 
that “Players interact with one another in team sports. The degree of interaction among player 
skills determines the nature of the production function”. In Haute-Cuisine, the quality of the 
ingredients, the performances of the staff, and the décor of the restaurant, are elements contrib-
uting to the “team” output. Then, a chef and his meals are (more or less) “only as good as the 
weakest link”. To convert superior talent into superior quality meals, exquisite ingredients, the 
best staff, and a stunning ambience are necessary. 
H2: With an increase in the number of different wines,  
the restaurant’s price level increases disproportionately. 
H3: With an increase in staff costs,  
the restaurant’s price level increases disproportionately. 
H4: With an increase in the guides’ ambience ratings, 
 the restaurant’s price level increases disproportionately. 
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4.2 Superstar Effects by Differences in Media Presence 
Superstar effects according to Adler (1985) can occur when there are differences in the chefs’ 
popularity, when consumer utility of consuming a meal increases with knowledge of the chef 
(that is necessary for discussing the chef with others), and when finding information on popular 
chefs incurs low search costs for consumers. Then, stars can absorb parts of consumers’ savings 
in search costs and earn disproportionate rents. A chef’s popularity can be measured by his me-
dia presence (like TV appearances). Accordingly, the German star chef Alexander Herrmann 
points out that since he has been present in popular TV cooking shows, his career has acceler-
ated immensely and his restaurant attracts customers from 500km (311m) away. 
H5: Restaurants with a TV-present chef have  
a disproportionately higher price level.
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5. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
The sample, based on Germany’s 204 star-rated Guide Michelin restaurants and the 229 restau-
rants with at least 16 Gault Millau points (guides’ 2007 versions), consists of 288 restaurants. 
Data for 32 restaurants was incomplete, so the analysis focuses on 256 restaurants. The depend-
ent variable PRICE reflects the Guide Michelin maximum price for a meal (whole menu), as the 
minimum price information is skewed: some restaurants have special offers at lunchtime. 
In line with Frick (2008), the cuisine rating is used to measure a chef’s talent. The ratings of 
Guide Michelin (one to three “star(s)”) and Gault Millau (ten to 20 “GM points”) differ slightly. 
Both guides may exert the same influence on consumers (and chefs), as they have sold equally 
well according to their Amazon sales rankings at the time of the analysis. Thus, they have equal 
weight in a combined rating CURATE. This rating groups the chefs into categories from one to 
four (see figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Cuisine Ratings 
Data on the number of different wines offered, WINE, can be obtained for 197 restaurants. To 
assess staff costs, the number of employees who attend to guests or support meal preparation is 
used. To compare restaurants of different sizes, the number of employees per seat is employed, 
STAFF (data for WINE and STAFF from www.restaurant-hitlisten.de). Décor ratings (one to 
five, where five is best) of both guides are combined into one measure, AMB. The dummy TVP 
measures if a chef is regularly present on German TV cooking shows (data from the homepages 
of shows and chefs). The analysis includes several control variables. A restaurant’s price level 
may be influenced by an adjoining hotel, HOTEL (Guide Michelin data); by strong competition, 
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COMP, i.e. many other quality restaurants (13 or more Gault Millau points) in a certain radius 
(10km, 6m); or by high population density in a restaurant’s county offering many potential cus-
tomers (inhabitants per square kilometre, DENSITY). As conformable with the results of Eke-
lund and Watson (1991), restaurant demand is strongly responsive to income and employment, 
the study also considers the gross domestic product per resident in a restaurant’s county, GDP 
(DENSITY and GDP data from the federal Statistical Office).  
A stepwise Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) is used to model the effects of the inde-
pendent variables and the controls on the dependent variable. The analysis controls for absence 
of multicollinearity, for homoscedasticity and normal distribution of disturbance terms, using 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) and correlations, White-, Newey-West- and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-Tests.
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6. Results 
Table 13 shows OLS results, while table 14 presents descriptive statistics. Model 1 displays the 
influence of the controls on PRICE (table 13; adjusted R2 of 12.9%). When introducing the re-
gressors, the adjusted R² increases to 50.5% (53.7%) in Model 2 (3). WINE is used in Model 3 
only, as including WINE reduces the sample size to 188. For results of H1, and H3-H6, the fo-
cus is on the larger sample. 
Results establish that an increase in the cuisine rating positively influences prices (H1). Yet, 
prices do not seem to increase disproportionately. To analyse this issue in more detail, another 
regression is estimated that uses dummies for the different cuisine categories. Here, results cor-
respond in signs and significance levels to those in Model 2, dummies are positively significant 
(1%-level), and their coefficients do not increase disproportionately. Further, a log-linear model 
is used. Again, results correspond to those in Model 2, but the adjusted R² decreases to 42.5%. 
Thus, results indicate that the relation between prices and cuisine ratings, or chefs’ revenues, is 
not disproportionate.  
The variables’ coefficients for H2 (WINE), H3 (STAFF), and H4 (AMB) are (highly) positively 
significant. Thus, there is support for the idea that converting superior talent into superior qual-
ity requires substantial investments in talent-supporting input like ingredients, staff, and ambi-
ence. Given that supporting input has little value of its own for consumers who wish to consume 
a certain chef’s meals in the first place, but rather helps in realising this chef’s superior talent, 
supporting input does not lead to disproportionate income effects either.54 Thus, there are no 
Superstar effects due to talent. 
                                                     
54 There are no disproportionate effects when using the same procedures as for cuisine rating, either. The 
study also controls for regional disposable income (insignificant). Results do not change for average 
prices. The analysis further considers whether high ratings lead to TV presence. Then, TVP would not 
be independent. Yet, there is no evidence: the sample comprises the entire population of star chefs; of 
these chefs, 43% got stars before being present on TV, 43% were present on TV first. For the others, 
both events occurred in the same year. Also, many TV-present chefs in Germany do not have any star 
at all. Neither a logistic regression (CURATE (X), TVP (Y)), nor a mediation model show any expla-
natory value. A reduced form model (without TVP) produces identical results for H1-H4. Multicolli-
nearity is not an issue either, as there is no correlation between CURATE and TVP and VIFs are far 
below the tolerance limit of ten (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
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Further, TVP is positively significant (1%-level). TV-present chefs can charge about €13.27 
more per meal. Hence, TV presence leads to income increases, but to moderate ones – they are 
rather equal to winning an additional star (worth €15.04). That means, results do not show 
Adler’s (1985) star effects, either. The next section outlines limitations and prompts discussion. 
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Table 13: Results 
 
 Model 1 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
Std. Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
C 72.
(4.
594*** 
669) 
32.
(5.
172*** 
129) 
32.
(6.
728*** 
060) 
CURATE   15.
0.
(1.
038*** 
478*** 
562) 
14.
0.
(1.
742*** 
487*** 
790) 
WINE     0.
0.
(0.
009*** 
154*** 
003) 
STAFF   23.
0.
(10.
130** 
115** 
114) 
10.
0.
(11.
019 
052 
086) 
AMB   6.
0.
(1.
053*** 
208*** 
487) 
6.
0.
(1.
124*** 
194*** 
877) 
TVP   13.
0.
(4.
272*** 
126*** 
736) 
10.
0.
(5.
641* 
093* 
837) 
HOTEL 17.
0.
(3.
810*** 
349*** 
139) 
7.
0.
(2.
852*** 
158*** 
602) 
7.
0.
(3.
706** 
147** 
070) 
COMP 3.
0.
(1.
774** 
172** 
838) 
1.
0.
(1.
104 
052 
422) 
0.
0.
(1.
667 
031 
593) 
DENSITY 0.
0.
(0.
003 
150 
002) 
0.
0.
(0.
001 
076 
001) 
0.
0.
(0.
002 
119 
001) 
GDP 0.
0.
(0.
000 
003 
000) 
-0.
-0.
(0.
000 
008 
000) 
0.
0.
(0.
000 
003 
000) 
N 266 256 188 
F 10. 770*** 33.583*** 25.128*** 
R2 0.142 0.521 0.560 
Adj. R2 0.129 0.505 0.537 
Dependent Variable: PRICE. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) PRICE 28.000 165.000 92.992 24.863 1.000         
(2) CURATE 1 4 1.778 0.765 0.639*** 1.000        
(3) WINE 120 4300  509.025 409.302 0.363*** 0.321*** 1.000       
(4) STAFF 0.100 1.167 0.334 0.119 0.423*** 0.405** 0.235*** 1.000      
(5) AMB 1 5 2.974 0.746 0.598*** 0.408*** 0.365*** 0.376*** 1.000     
(6) TVP 0 1   0.154** 0.045 0.007 0.037 0.052 1.000    
(7) HOTEL 0 1    0.249*** 0.133** 0.124 0.247*** 0.437*** -0.075 1.000   
(8) COMP 0 3 1.622 1.120 0.185*** 0.129** 0.158** 0.043 0.120** 0.048 -0.291*** 1.000  
(9) DENSITY 51.777 4040.344 1095.800 1216.923 0.153** 0.092 0.087 0.072 0.077 0.131** -0.351*** 0.711*** 1.000 
(10) GDP 13467.000 75341.000 3113.559 13896.736 0.091 0.086 0.085 -0.007 0.049 0.020 -0.294*** 0.554*** 0.630*** 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
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7. Limitations and Discussion 
7.1 Research Limitations 
The study has several restrictions. Talent cannot be quantified precisely. Cuisine rating is the 
best proxy available. It may also be that the most talented chefs do not always get the best rat-
ings; they may choose, for example, to avoid investment risks. Data on restaurant profits or on 
chefs’ wealth is not available. Meal prices as an income proxy may allow at least a relative 
comparison of earnings. 
7.2 Discussion 
This research analyses if Superstar effects exist in German quality gastronomy, and what factors 
determine the stars’ rents. Following Rosen (1981), the study tests if quality differences in the 
chefs’ performances influence financial rewards (“direct Superstar effect”). Following Adler 
(1985), it tests the income effect of chefs’ media presence (“classical Superstar effect”). In ana-
lysing these sources of stardom, this research deals with an economic issue of general interest: 
does it pay more to develop your skills in your core business to perfection, or to maintain your 
current level of skills and invest in self-marketing?  
Results show that higher performance quality increases chefs’ revenues, but not disproportion-
ately so. Therefore, there is no “direct Superstar effect”. High ratings require substantial invest-
ments in exquisite ingredients, staff and ambience, which may imply negative marginal profits 
for additional quality. This idea is reflected in the “agony of the stars” problem (Mariani, 2003) 
that manifests itself in the recent bankruptcies of European three-star restaurants (see Pierre 
Gagnaire e.g.). Guy Savoy, another three-star chef explains the simple calculation (Burros, 
1993, p. 2): “A bistro returns 10 times more on the investment than a restaurant like [Guy Sa-
voy’s]”. Put differently: economies of scale can be realised much more easily in a bistro than in 
a three-star restaurant. In this context, the economics of awards literature argues that when a 
person’s performance can only be vaguely determined, awards are a better incentive than mone-
tary payment, are less likely to crowd out the recipient’s intrinsic motivation, and are not taxed, 
while income is. That is, awards are an important part of the incentive system of a society (Frey, 
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2005). In deluxe gastronomy, a high cuisine rating is an award for the chef that shows his rank 
in the hierarchy of excellent chefs. Then, incentive effects of high ratings may explain why sev-
eral empirical studies find that for chefs in the highest category, financial goals are secondary: 
they exercise the métier for love for the art of cooking and for prestige (Johnson et al., 2005). 
That means, they weigh the acknowledgement of their excellent performance higher than mone-
tary gains.55 
Furthermore, TV presence has a moderate effect on income. Therefore, there is no “classical 
Superstar effect”, either.56 The fact that consumers pay TV-present chefs more – for the same 
quality of food that competitors offer – shows that consumer utility increases when consumers 
can discuss prominent chefs with others in their social networks: “the more you know the more 
you enjoy”. Accordingly, the German star chef Alexander Herrmann states that since he has 
been in TV cooking shows, his career has accelerated immensely and customers travel long 
distances to his restaurant. Herrmann explains that he makes half of his income in his restaurant, 
the rest with TV appearances and product marketing; yet, the income made in the restaurant 
takes up the lion’s share of his time and is much harder to acquire than TV-related revenues 
(Lembke, 2008). 
In Germany, there is no chef who is present on screen, and who belongs to the highest rating 
category. This insight supports a suggestion by Surlemont, Chantrain, Nlemvo and Johnson 
(2005): chefs who get the highest rating concentrate on their core business and do not diversify. 
Being under enormous pressure to continuously ensure highest quality, they cannot “waste 
time” on fostering a TV presence. Thus, as to whether perfecting one’s skills or self-marketing 
is more rewarding, history suggests that although both can have similarly positive income ef-
fects, self-marketing seems the less risky and the less stressful way to enhance income. This 
result matches the story of Gordon Ramsay, currently the most financially successful chef on 
earth: “Despite his Michelin Stars […] two years ago his company was in the red”; “TV helps 
                                                     
55 The study focuses on price increases as a result of good ratings, not on motivational effects for chefs. 
Data on the impact of rating “awards” on motivation is unavailable. 
56 A less “exclusive” image of, e.g. German chefs compared with French chefs, may limit willingness to 
pay, and the limited market size for German deluxe cuisine must be considered a factor in preserving 
excess demand. 
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Ramsay cook up a £60m fortune” (Mail Online, 2006). Ramsay connects cooking and TV ap-
pearances nicely: “I haven’t stopped cooking. Sure, I spend some time in the office but I haven’t 
forgotten how I got the Michelin stars that got me here” (Mail Online, 2006). Back to Jamie 
Oliver, the well-known chef from the series “The Naked Chef”. What gives him a superb sec-
ond position on the list of the richest chefs?  
First of all, he doesn’t own a deluxe restaurant! Second, compared with Paul Bocuse and other 
chefs from French cuisine, he has not added that much innovation to cooking. Rather, he has 
brought his TV-personality to the world of quality cuisine. Thereby, he in fact demonstrates that 
in deluxe gastronomy, self-marketing can be much more rewarding than refining cooking skills.
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